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CECIL D. ANDRUS: This year, a tragedy
struck the western United States with the
tremendous destruction of the range and forest
lands by the wildfires in western America. That’s
why the Andrus Center at Boise State University
and the Idaho Statesman came together to bring
you here today. It’s a pleasant surprise for a
former politician to join up with a newspaper.
Usually, they lie about you all during your
political career–well, depends on where you sit
and how you’re looking at it, I admit–and they
don’t tell all your finer points every day. Now,
however, I’ve been out of politics for a long
time, we have a new president and publisher of
the Statesman, and perhaps I’ve mellowed just
a tad. 
Now I have the great pleasure of introducing
the publisher and president of the Idaho
Statesman. Margaret Buchanan came to us from
Elmira, New York where she was the president
and publisher of the largest newspaper there.
She received her B.A. and M.B.A. in finance from
the University of Cincinnati. She is an out-
standing administrator and has been a major
influence in the changing of the direction of the
Statesman. She is here to welcome you and to get
us started.
When Margaret came to town, she and 
her husband Greg and their two sons imme-
diately became a part of the community. 
She gives of her time to serve on the boards 
of many community organizations, including
the Chamber of Commerce, Fundsy, the
Shakespeare Theatre, and the Y.M.C.A. She is an
active member of this community and an
outstanding executive of the Idaho Statesman,
Margaret Buchanan. 
MARGARET BUCHANAN: Thank you,
Governor. Good morning and welcome. The
Idaho Statesman is really privileged to be able to
work with the Andrus Center for Public Policy to
organize this conference today. We have
provided the forum, but the day is about you.
We are so pleased that you have come together
today from many perspectives but all with the
same goal in mind: to honor the heritage of our
forests and our unique communities and to
leave them all healthy for the future.
This fire season, though difficult, did give us
a unique opportunity to find some common
ground. Today, we hope to take advantage of
that and set an agenda for the nation. We will
compile the recommendations of this con-
ference into a white paper, and we will forward
that to the next Administration, whoever that
may be. 
Your conversations today are very crucial and
very important to the issues we’re going to
discuss. I’m really inspired to think you have all
come today to talk about this issue because this
summer was a very challenging summer for the
state of Idaho, to see all of the land that burned
up, land that we all use and love and recreate in
and utilize. So I look forward to listening and
learning from you today because these issues are
relatively new for me, not being westerner and
not having to deal before with forest fire issues
as you do when you live out in the west. I look
forward to a great day and a great discussion and
to seeing some good things come out of the
actions today. 
So thank you, and, Governor, I’ll turn it back
to you. 
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CECIL D. ANDRUS: Thank you, Margaret. I’d
like to add the welcome of the university to all
the participants. Let me make a couple of
introductions. It’s my understanding that the
Secretary of State for Idaho is here, Pete
Cenarrusa. He is our oldest elected official in
state government. We also have with us today a
gentleman who traveled here from Montana to
be with us, Bill Tash. He is a senior member of
the Montana Legislature, and Montana suffered
some of the devastation we did.
Let me tell you a little bit about his honor,
William Tash. I knew him in Korea when he was
19 years old, and we called him Wee Willie Tash.
I won’t tell you any of the stories because he
might reciprocate. All of mine would be
truthful, but he would lie. He was a tin bender,
and when our airplanes got beat up, he put
them back together. Now, all of a sudden, I find
that cowboy from Montana wearing a neck-
tie and a suit. He has the same curly hair I 
have, and I’m pleased he is with us today. Bill,
stand up.
We also have with us Tom Steger, the
Congressional Fellow in the office of Congress-
man Tom Udall, who is unable to be with us
today. Tom has been called back into duty as a
result of the indecision in Washington, but he
will join us later today via satellite. Please stand
up, Tom. I’ve known the Udalls from Arizona
and New Mexico for many years, an outstanding
political family. Tom and I crossed swords a few
time. He was Attorney General in New Mexico,
and he was very sensitive because I wanted to
send the nuclear waste from over there in the
desert by Arco to Carlsbad. He’s such a narrow-
minded fellow, and he gave us a lot of grief. So I
supported his candidacy for the Congress of the
United States to get him out of the Attorney
General’s office in New Mexico, and it worked.
We are hauling some of that stuff to New Mexico
right now. 
On the back of your program are the spon-
sors. We’re a 501(c)(3), and that means that we
beg for the funds to keep afloat. If you have an
opportunity, please thank them because they
make these conferences possible. 
In your packet is a booklet, Policy After Politics.
This is a white paper we published after the June
conference, prior to all the fires. There are six
recommendations in there. We hope you will
take a look at it and see where some of those
recommendations or proposals will fit in to a
new Administration when they are discussing
the policies governing the public lands of
America. The rangelands and the forest lands 
of the western United States provide us our
lifeblood from a recreational and industrial
standpoint. We need to make some changes. I
particularly would like to thank Boise Cascade,
who paid for the reprint of this white paper.
Take a look at it. 
Let me now introduce to you our keynote
speaker, Dr. Stephen Pyne, who is with us this
morning. He is Professor of Biology and Society
Programs at Arizona State University, an expert
on fires, and a prolific writer. We can’t
understand where we are going if we can’t
understand where we have been and how we
have arrived at this point. Dr. Pyne has made a
lifelong study of fires from the beginning of
time, and while he was working his way through
the university, he fought forest and range fires in
the southwestern part of the United States. I
thought we had to start with an historical
perspective this morning, and he is the perfect
one to start us out. He has the knowledge; he has
the history; he has no axe to grind. We’re
fortunate to have him here, and we’ve set up a
table in the lobby to allow you to buy one of 
his books. With that, let me present to you Dr.
Stephen Pyne. 
STEPHEN J. PYNE: Good morning. It’s my
privilege and most daunting task to explain
from the perspective of history how a fire season
like that of last summer could occur and how we
might respond. If I could have the slides on...
In truth, there are many fire problems in
the west, and it’s useful to disentangle them. We
can appeal to many stories to explain them. I
say “story” advisedly because the creation 
and perpetuation of a story is, in fact, part of 
the explanation. I will argue that the need for a
new kind of story will be part of whatever
solution results. 
I’m going to suggest three large narratives: an
industrial narrative, an imperial narrative, and a
national or American narrative. These are dif-
ferent because part of the situation we’re in is
the result of the fact that the United States
industrialized. We have similar kinds of fire
problems and relationships to all nations that
are industrializing. The world is, in fact, dividing
along those lines.
There are also problems that result from the
fact that we have public lands. This is part of
what we can call an imperial narrative. If you
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look around the world, what cognate countries
have similar fire problems? They are places like
Canada, Australia, Russia, South Africa. These
are all countries that had a similar history,
which allowed them, for a period of time, 
to have vacant land. We have large wild-
land fires in the United States because we have
large wildlands. That is a different story than 
the industrial story, but the two, of course, 
will interact. 
Then we have a national or American story.
How is it that these and other events came
together in the United States to create a
particular kind of fire scene? That is the result of
accident, history, politics, of course, and many
other factors. What we see today is the result,
the crystallization of that long historical process. 
We often hear the phrase that fire is a tool. It
is a tool, but it’s also something more. It’s a 
very odd tool. Think of a candle, for instance. A
flame sits on a candle taper the same way that
an ax head sits on a handle. That’s a tool. But
there are other ways in which we use fire, ways
that are more like a domesticated animal, much
more like a milk cow or a sheep dog. It takes its
character from the context around it. It is bred,
it is trained, and it is almost the origin of our
sense of domestication. That’s a very different
kind of relationship.
Then there is another sense in which we use
fire in which it is much more like a captive
animal, much more like an elephant or a trained
bear. We can use it, and we rely on the properties
that are, in a sense, bred in the wild, but we
redirect them for different purposes. We use it in
all of these cases, and in fact it exists on its own,
quite apart from us. But how industrialization
will affect those different kinds of fire tools and
what that means turn out to be quite different. 
This picture is a map produced by satellite
image and published a while ago by National
Geographic. This is the section of the world
looking over Africa and Europe. The red spots
are fires that result from burning biomass; the
white and yellow are electricity, the lights of
cities. They are from burning fossil biomass.
From a history standpoint, when you begin
burning fossil biomass or processing it, it begins
in odd ways to replace and to compete with
living biomass. The world, in fact, is dividing
into these two huge combustion regimes. There
are very few places where the two co-exist, and
that, I suggest, is probably transitional. The
northeastern United States looks very much like
the European scene. Parts of the west look like a
different mix.
This picture represents an important part of
the story. In 1880, the census produced a map of
forest fires in the United States. There it is. Some
areas were not forested; hence weren’t recorded.
Some areas were not yet settled, so they weren’t
reported very well. If you read the text that goes
with this, you realize the United States in the
1880s was pretty much like Brazil in the 1980s.
The response was very similar. This was an
agricultural society that relied on fire for almost
all of its functions, but it was beginning to
industrialize, and we’re seeing the collision. 
There was a lot of extravagant fire, abusive
fire. In a survey of the forest, one cartographer
said the scene was magnificent but it was too
extravagant even for Americans. Something
would have to intervene to stop the process of
simply burning over everything everywhere. We
know that process was interrupted. It was
interrupted because of a great historical
accident. For a short period of time, much of the
western United States was vacated. The
indigenous people were gone or removed into
small reservations, and yet a new wave of
settlement had not yet arrived. At that particular
point, we begin setting aside lands for the
“common wealth” as permanent public domain.
That interrupted the process, and that’s why we
don’t look exactly like either Europe or Africa.
We have a chunk that was permanently set
aside, land that would not be subjected to those
same processes.
The map on the bottom shows different states
where experiments were tried. What do they do
with fire in this? One of the chief arguments for
setting the areas aside was to protect them  from
fire, but what model was appropriate. No one
knew. This was a new invention. They had no
real idea how to go about it. Interestingly
enough, a century ago, the state of New York
was probably the most prominent candidate
because it had been setting aside areas in the
Adirondacks, the Catskills, as well as dealing
with the rural fire problem. The state model, not
the federal model, in a different scenario may
have turned out to be the key.
The bottom one is a little hard to see, but one
of the oddities of reserving the land in the west
is that this area is very fire prone. The upper
map is a map of lightning-caused forest fires.
The bottom is a map of thunderstorms, that is, a
map of lightning. And they are not the same at
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all. The only place where there is any overlap is
southern Florida, which, as we all now realize, is
certainly anomalous in fire as in anything else. 
What you need is a pattern of wetting and
drying. That’s the geographic basis for fire. It
may come annually; it may come over longer
rhythms, but you need that. Then in the west,
you have a pattern of relatively dry lightning
because of topography. So we have a chunk of
the world where nature is going to burn things
if people don’t. 
You have now set aside an area. It is not going
to be converted to farms and towns. You’re
going to have to manage it. You’re going to have
to do something with regard to fire because if
you don’t do it, nature will do it for you. The
choices are basically to convert that area into
something that doesn’t burn or to do the
burning yourself. But at the time, that was not
the obvious choice. The first of the experiments
in controlling it was actually Yellowstone Park,
and it became effective in 1898 when the
Cavalry took it over. The military model was the
foundation for federal fire protection. In some
ways, we have not found a way to transcend
that. Certainly as we began setting aside forest
reserves, everyone looked keenly to the Army as
a cheap and reliable source of firefighting.
This picture reflects again an international
exercise. The man on the left is Dietrich Brandis,
who created the British Imperial Forest Service
for India and established a basis for what to do
with large reserved lands. This model was
propagated throughout the British Empire, and
it was copied in fundamental ways by the
United States. 
This quote is from Gifford Pinchot’s auto-
biography in which he said he hoped to do
something in this country similar to what
Brandis had done in India. This is part of the
imperial narrative. I realize that is a loaded term,
but we’ve been experiencing globally over the
last fifty years a de-colonizing process. The
survival and character of the public lands are
going to be the most fundamental parts of the
story of what happens to fire in the U.S. What
happens is that forestry here, as in many other
parts of the world, claims priority, and we begin
a national story in 1905 with the Transfer Act,
which carried these lands to the national forests.
If any of you have read any of the stuff I’ve
written on the history of fire, you know that I
tended to divide it off into twenty-year blocks,
beginning in 1910. There were certain problem
fires that defined the year and gave it a
character, and this works out very nicely. We’re
in the midst of one of these, which has to do
with the mixing of wildlands and fragments of
cities, but it’s possible to conceive this history in
many ways.
I’m going to suggest a different organization
here, one that deals with defining stories. It
actually works on a thirty-year cycle, beginning
in 1905 with the creation of the national forests
as we understand them and the search for some
kind of appropriate fire protection regime. Then
by 1934, another crisis develops, this time in
Idaho, and the response to that reinforces that
story in 1935. By the mid 60s, there is another
major reexamination, and thirty years hence
brings us to the 94 fire season and to the crisis
that we enjoy today. 
One of these surprising events in looking at
the early fire history is that it was fundamentally
political. The catalytic event, to the extent that
we have a founding one, emerged out of 1910,
and that was a deeply political era. It began with
the firing of Gifford Pinchot for insubordination
and led ultimately to the resignation of Richard
Ballinger, the Secretary of Interior. Their
controversy split the Republican Party, and they
lost the election of 1912.
The fires were seen as a test of competing
political philosophies, competing senses of what
to do on the public lands. These were large fires;
they burned over 5 million acres in the national
forests, a little less than 3 million in the
northern Rockies. 78 firefighters were killed
initially, and the Army buried 88 bodies. They
were completely overwhelmed by the
catastrophe and the trauma of the event. Shortly
after that, to show the politics, the Weeks Act,
which allowed for the expansion of the national
forests and, by implication, that model of
conservation, broke out of the Congressional
logjam within six months and was passed. 
But there was, in the midst of all this, a major
controversy about policy, and there was a
cultural context that I think is worth spending a
minute on. Not everybody died out there. Ed
Polaski, a 40-year-old ranger (That’s he to the
right with his crew) managed to get his crew
into a mine shaft and had to hold them at gun
point to keep them in as the fire storm passed.
Six members of that crew died; the rest lived.
Polaski later invented and promoted a fire tool,
and if you go over to the Fire Center you will see
a statue of a firefighter holding a Polaski. That
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story is deeply embedded in the culture. 
All the people on the scene in 1910
considered it a rout and a disaster. They were
completely blown away. The Forest Service had
been spending about $40,000 each year over
budget, fighting fires, and in 1910, they spend
$1 million. That would be like us today
spending $15 or $16 billion. The whole thing
became a major crisis. But Polaski’s story and the
story of others as they moved up the food chain
portrayed them as gallant fighters that had not
been given the resources they needed, mostly by
those miserable western politicians, who refused
to support the Forest Service appropriately.
It turned out that the same month as the big
blowup, we had a controversy that hit major
newspapers and even Sunset magazine. It argued
that the whole approach was wrong. What the
U.S. should be doing was to copy the Indian way
of managing the forest, and that was by light
burning, controlled burns. Indeed, if we did 
this, we would not have these big fires. This is
a sample of what the burning looked like 
in California. 
In effect, everything that is now being
promoted as arguments in favor of prescribed
fires was there on the ground in 1910. The
problem was that Secretary of Interior, Richard
Ballinger, also liked light burning. So suddenly
the choice of whether to fight fires or light fires
became a part of that controversy, and the
success or failure of the great fires will be seen as
a political test of these men and their competing
philosophies of public land management. 
So a story that might have been a technical
story became a personal and political story. As
well, light burning will be fought to the death
by the Forest Service. An entire generation will
be profoundly traumatized by the fire, and they
will see any evidence of fire in the woods as
something that they should extinguish. 
Also in August of 1910, one of our great
philosophers, William James, one of the
architects of pragmatism, published his last
great philosophical work, a short essay called
The Moral Equivalent of War. James was alarmed
at what he saw as a growing militarism, not only
in the U. S. but in Europe, and wanted to find
some way to redirect that energy to constructive
purposes. So in the same way that there could be
a mechanical equivalent of heat, could we not
have a moral equivalent of war? He decided yes,
and the way to do it was to unite against the
forces of nature. We would have a national
conscription of youth, and they would begin a
collective war against our common enemy in
nature. There it is, being played out in the
Northern Rockies. Even as he speaks, he dies. 
At the end of 1910, the smoke from the fires
turned the skies over Boston and New England a
copper color. 
The moral equivalent of war has remained,
folded into the Polaski story and the other
trauma of 1910, to give us a founding narrative
that we have, in some ways, not yet tran-
scended. This was the first great crisis faced by
Pinchot’s successor, Henry Graves as Chief
Forester. The next three chiefs, up through 1939
will personally be on the fires. The great fires
will affect this entire generation, not unlike the
long march did Communist China. It will stamp
them; they will refer to it constantly. This will be
the standard: They will not allow it to be
repeated. So to the best of their abilities, they
extended this philosophy. The question is how
far can you push it into the back country. 
In 1934, after a series of very large fires, some
in the Selway, there was a major review by the
Forest Service of its policies. What should they
do with these fires? And this led to a major
review in Missoula, and they decided that they
should either try to put them all out or, it was
proposed, just leave them alone. It was widely
recognized by everyone on the scene that the
land was in worse shape than it was when 
the Forest Service took it over. Whatever they
were doing was not working. How should 
they respond? 
There were a number of biological and
cultural critics coming to the fore, and in 1935,
the Chief Forester, Gus Silcox, who had been the
second in command of the northern region in
1910, announced the “10:00 AM Policy,” which
said “We will fight every fire and suppress it by
10:00 AM the next morning.” He had the entire
force of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the
civilian army behind him; he had all of the
presidential enthusiasm he could want; and
there was sanctuary. There was one huge surge
to fight fires. He was going to replay the fires of
1910, and this time, he was going to win. 
World War II produced a further nationali-
zation and demonization of fire. The 10:00 AM
policy and its prescriptions continued until
roughly the mid-1960s with the passage of the
Wilderness Act. We were going to redefine some
of the character of the public domain; we were
going to have to conceive of a fire policy suitable
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to it. This begins a major debate and a revision
of the debate as to what policy is appropriate.
This picture is a record of burned area. You can
see that the purple is the unprotected area. As
we moved more and more land into protection,
the amount of fire plummets. If you think about
this ecologically, we were removing fire that
might want to be there, but this was a very suc-
cessful program. The yellow is the cumulative
burned area; the green is the cost. Yes, there is
some inflation coming into this, but it was
costing more and more, despite better science
and better equipment. We were not able to keep
a lid on fire as we should. 
So there were economic costs. There were
ecological costs. The land was changing. Fire can
be just as effective removed as applied. There is
no neutral position on fire in these lands. So
there are reasons to try to reverse that old
debate, to take the other side, to try to reinstate
fire into the landscape. For a period of time, we
made the experiment. I’ll talk about Yellowstone
separately if anyone is interested, but I think the
era continued until the next thirty-year break,
which is in 1994. The 94 fire season was large
and lethal, but it had something that many
others had not: It had a book behind it that
created a cultural context for understanding.
Norman McLean’s book gave people who
otherwise had no connection to fire a prism by
which to interpret it. So the Storm King
Mountain fire and the fatalities associated with
that could be understood as a replay of Mann
Gulch, and suddenly there was a cultural
connection—not simply a policy connection
but, if you will, a poetry connection through
which people could become interested. This
became a catalyst, and it seems to me we are still
dealing with the consequences of that. 
Let me spend just a minute on this graph of
two alternatives. The graph on the top shows
burned areas in the western national forests
from 1940 to 1994. You can see an increase over
the last twenty years. It doesn’t seem to want to
go away. It used to be you had big fires when
you had dry years. Now we can have big fire
years unless it’s wet and suppresses it. The
bottom one is a graph of a wildlife refuge in
Carolina. They had a wildfire problem, and they
beat it down. Then they realized they needed to
put fire in; they did. With aerial ignition, they
are now burning almost three times as much by
controlled burning as they suffered from
wildfires initially. 
What’s interesting is that, apart from the
scale, the shape of the two graphs is the same. If
the U.S. had it to play over again, we would have
opted for the bottom road on those lands where
it is possible–not all forests are amenable to this
kind of manipulation–but what you have is
essentially the same. We were unable to do that
for whatever reasons, and now we are left with a
rising tide of fire. 
That brings us up to the current debate. What
are the problems? There are many fire problems.
We have a fire problem in wilderness and
roadless areas that has no technical solution. It’s
a cultural decision, a political decision, a
decision that has to be made. Nature gave the
task to us; we can’t just hand it back. I think we
have to accept that and act as best we can. We
have a problem with the interface–I like to call it
the inter-mix–but that is a solvable problem and
has solutions. This is a really dumb problem to
have. This can be fixed. You simply have to
choose to fix it. 
We have problems with ecosystem health,
which is much murkier and more difficult. The
question is that we seem to have a maldis-
tribution of fire here–too much of the wrong
kind, not enough of the right. There are all kinds
of other issues dealing with global environmen-
tal concerns, not the least of which is climate
change. We’re talking about sequestering
carbon, trading that for our emissions from cars,
but now we’re going to start removing carbon
on an enormous scale over tens of millions 
of acres. That is going to complicate the issues
considerably. 
So the debate continues. What we have is not
the same series of contexts we had in 1910. I
don’t think that context will probably ever be
repeated. What will happen this year? Who
knows. It may not be unlike the election and
just go on and on and on without a clear
resolution. The sense is that a big fire will
produce big results. That’s absolutely nonsense.
We’ve had big fires that did absolutely nothing.
We’ve had lots of crews killed and burned over,
and we went absolutely nowhere. There has to
be some larger cultural connection; there has to
be appropriate political context. The political
ecology of fire is such that you have a year to
plant. It’s a lot like slash-and-burn agriculture.
You can plant in the ash and have something
grow. If you wait a year, it’s pretty tough. If you
wait three years, it’s gone. You have a very short
period of time in which to transfer this. 
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7What I think is missing, if I look at the
comparison with 1910, is the story. It’s the
equivalent of the Polaski story, and I’m not
arguing for someone to go out and pull a gun
and order somebody in a fire situation to do
something. I don’t want to see people killed. It
may not even be one person. But there has to be
some event, something that can be converted
into a story. It’s not a problem of policy; it’s 
a problem of poetry. It’s a need to have a
convincing story for ourselves and for the 
larger public as to what we are doing and why 
it matters. 
I have some difficulty with the term “restora-
tion.” I won’t bore you with that now, but I
think that locks us into an ironic narrative
because you never really restore it. I would
prefer we had a different term and think about
what we would like instead. 
Let me suggest that fire takes its character
from its context. Fire is something that
synthesizes its surroundings. If you have
messed-up landscapes, you’ll have messed-up
fires. It is not strictly a fire problem; it is a
problem of land use; it’s a problem of political
and intellectual culture. Fire will act on
whatever is out there, and it will be effective or
not effective, depending on those contexts. 
What were the causes of the fires last
summer? They were a mixture of nature and
people as they always have been. How does it
compare to 1910? If you’re a realist, you’ll say
nothing will happen, but unfortunately, history
isn’t made by realists. It’s made by people who
believe in the future, believe that something can
happen and act accordingly, and that is what is
unresolved. Part of that will have to be the
invention of some parallel story to 1910, or we
will be forever locked in this para-military
cliche. We deserve better; the land deserves
better. Our relationship to fire over which we
have a species monopoly is far more complex
and nuanced than that, and we can do better.
What can we learn from history? How many
days do you want to be here? In some respects,
we can learn nothing from history, but I think
we can also learn some lessons about being 
site-specific, about separating different problems
from the whole. We can learn a degree of mod-
esty and accept that there are going to be no
universal solutions, that it’s going to be an
ongoing negotiation between ourselves and the
land in which we live, and that fire is going to
be the medium of that discussion. 
ANDRUS: Thank you very much, Doctor, for
that interesting and enlightening historical view
of where we are today and how we got there.
Next will be the science panel, and I’ll introduce
Dr. John Freemuth in just a few moments. But
let me point out that you have cards with your
programs, so if you have questions, write them
on the card. The ushers will pick them up, and
we’ll handle as many of those questions as 
we can.
I think there is an agreement this year that
something has to be done, that the guns need to
be checked at the door, that the enviros have to
quit fighting with the timber people, and the
cowboys have to quit fighting with everybody.
There has been a tremendous amount of
publicity about fires we call “forest fires,” but if
you look at the fires this year, we’ve had an
equal number of disastrous range fires. I’m
looking forward to hearing what the scientists
say about the cheat grass in August that is so
explosive and about what would happen if an
old cow ate it in the spring when it’s green 
and then got off the land. Would it still be 
that explosive? I don’t think so, but that’s a
personal opinion. 
CECIL D. ANDRUS: Now I would like to
introduce Dr. John Freemuth. He is the senior
fellow for the Andrus Center for Public Policy at
Boise State University. He’s a tenured professor
and heads up the political science and public
administration area at Boise State University. He
is chairman of BLM’s National Science Advisory
Committee, which Pat Shea put together three
years ago. He has produced many publications,
and I enjoy working with him. He will introduce
the panel, and we’ll go from there. 
JOHN C. FREEMUTH: I’m from an academic
discipline that is so secure about itself that it
calls itself “political science” as if that makes
what we do more scientific. 
I thought Dr. Pyne’s initial remarks were
wonderful and showed the importance of
history in understanding where we’ve been.
These questions are really not technical
questions; they’re political and analytical
questions. Dr. Pyne, you said that we need a
story. We do, and maybe we’ve dumbed
ourselves down now so that the only person
who will tell us that new story is Smoky the Bear.
Perhaps he can get the message to the American
public that things have changed because people
might pay attention to Smoky if he decided to
tell us something other than “Only you can
prevent forest fires.” This is also, ironically, the
place where Secretary Babbitt announced the
change in approaches to fire in Interagency
work, right here on campus, right here at this
podium. Many of you were here for the
Secretary’s announcement in 1994. 
Also Dr. Pyne would like to chat with all of
you at the break about some of his messages, but
please, he’s already been asked 350 times, “So,
what are you going to do with our football
coach?” Don’t ask him about football at Arizona
State. He’s already tired of that conversation
here in Boise. 
It is my distinct pleasure to introduce three
people, and we’ll have them go one after
another in the order that their names appear on
the program. Then, if there’s time, we’ll get to
questions from the audience. These are folks
whose work I’m aware of, work I read. I find it
exciting to have them all here in the room at the
same time. 
The first person is Ross Gorte from the
Congressional Research Service. If you want to
find out, in these reports to Congress, about
natural resource policy dilemmas, you’ll find his
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9name on most of them. You can get a lot of
these on the web, and he’ll tell you how to do
that. Remember, he works for Congress, so you
can’t push him too far on these things. We’d like
to thank John Hoehne from Senator Crapo’s
office, who made the request to get Ross out
here to talk to us today. He’s very influential and
has written many wonderful things about
natural resource policy from fire to water to
public lands.
He’ll be followed by Bob Nelson. Bob has
worked in Interior and is now a professor at the
University of Maryland where he has one of the
sweetest deals I’ve ever seen. He only has to
teach every other semester. If anyone from Boise
State is here, his is a good model to follow. He’s
a wonderful writer and has written a great book
on the role of economics in modern society. It’s
great stuff, and I use it in my work a lot. Bob and
I will continue a little of this tonight on
Dialogue, a program on public television. We’ll
talk about what came out of the day. His latest
book uses fire as an example of why he calls for
the abolishment of the U. S. Forest Service. 
Finally, it’s also a wonderful pleasure to
introduce someone I’ve worked with. It shows
that the universities in Idaho can work together.
Dr. Neuenschwander from the University of
Idaho is one of the nation’s pre-eminent fire
ecologists, has testified before Congress, and can
give us a lot of wonderful insights about what
we can and cannot do from his discipline’s
perspective on fire. 
So with that, I’ll sit down and turn it over to
Ross Gorte to begin the conversation.
ROSS W. GORTE: Good morning, I’d like to
extend my thanks to the Andrus Center and the
Idaho Statesman for inviting me here today. This
is a topic of great concern to many people,
including a lot of members of Congress, and it’s
been an issue to me personally for a long time. 
Before I begin, let me talk briefly about what
the Congressional Research Service is, what we
do, and how we do it. CRS is part of the Library
of Congress, and we provide information and
non-partisan analysis for the members and
committees of Congress. Hence we are
essentially professional critics. Interest groups
and agencies propose solutions to various
problems, and we look at these solutions,
emphasize the limitations, and the potential
unintended consequences of those proposals. As
a result, we are naturally skeptical of proposals,
so my comments here today should be taken in
that vein. I’m a professional skeptic, and I don’t
believe anything anybody says, generally.
I’d like to start by talking about fire effects,
mainly because that’s what my dissertation was
on, so I know more about fire effects than a lot
of other areas. Also, the whole reason we get
into this issue of fire protection and fire control
is that we want to avoid damages. We don’t do
it just because fires are burning but because they
are doing something we don’t want them to do. 
I’d like to begin by noting that the standard
measurement in reporting forest fires is acres
burned, sometimes acres consumed, acres
destroyed. Those latter two terms are not accu-
rate. We do not lose any acres whatsoever when
they burn. The surface changes, the top few
inches of the subsurface change, but the acres
are still there. They have not been consumed by
anything. The biomass has been consumed.
“Acres burned” is generally not a very useful
measure because damages are not proportional
to acres. They are related to intensity, the flame
length, various other unmeasured characteristics
of fires, and the extent of each of those factors
spatially and temporally.
We do not do a very good job of measuring
damages from forest fires. I’d like to note that
ecological damages are typically overstated
because, first, burned areas look devastated
immediately following a fire even when
recovery is likely. For example, there is generally
no tree mortality if the crown scorch is 60% or
less. 60% looks like a pretty badly burned tree;
yet those trees generally recover. 
The second factor in why ecological damages
are often overstated is that fires burn less than
100% of the area within the perimeter. Wild fires
are patchy. For example, in the 1988 fires in
Yellowstone, within the perimeter of the fire,
only about half of the acres burned was in crown
fires. Another third was in surface fire. One-sixth
of the area wasn’t burned at all. So when people
talk about a million or two million acres in
Yellowstone having been burned, that overstates
the reality. A lot of that wasn’t burned or was
burned lightly. 
The third aspect of this is that conflagrations
in stand-replacement ecosystems like lodgepole
pine and aspen are normal. Preventing stand-
replacement fires may cause greater ecological
damage than are caused by the fires. It is unclear
at this point whether silvacultural treatments
provide an adequate substitute for stand-
replacement fire. 
Nonetheless, fires do cause damages that are
of concern. That’s the reason we try to do
things. The first and foremost aspect we look at
today is property, especially houses. Wildfire
conflagrations in the urban/wildland interface
do a lot of damage to property. I’ll talk more
about that a little later. 
We’re also concerned about the off-site
impacts, particularly on watersheds and air
quality. In watersheds, we can get erosion,
sedimentation, mass soil movement, and floods.
With air quality, the concern is particulates
because smoke from today’s wildfires does put a
lot of particulates into the air. Nevertheless,
there is also research that documents that the
amount of particulates we’re getting from
wildfires and from prescribed burns today is
only about a third of what was being put into
the atmosphere before European settlement of
the west. If we do a lot more prescribed burning
in the future, we’re going to have a lot more
smoke. That’s a guarantee. You can’t have
prescribed fire without smoke. We’ll see smoke
like the kind you saw this summer, only it will
probably be in the spring and the fall when
prescribed burning takes place.
The third concern about damages is the
ecological impact of stand-replacement fire in
frequent-fire ecosystems. We don’t know what
the future ecology will look like in those areas.
History is a poor guide because stand-
replacement fires in frequent-fire ecosystems
were rare before white men intervened. That’s a
great concern. We don’t know whether we will
get back those frequent-fire ecosystems or
whether we will get back something that has
never been seen before. 
Let me turn now to talk about fuel
management. There are basically three tools that
are commonly used: prescribed burning,
commercial timber sales, and other mechanical
treatments, including potential new uses for
small and medium-sized materials. You will
probably hear more about that from Bob Nelson
in a little bit.
These tools are not good substitutes for one
another. They are complementary. What you
can do with a prescribed burn, you cannot do
with a timber harvest. Likewise, what you can
do with a timber harvest in terms of protecting
an area, you cannot do with a prescribed burn.
These are not substitutes. They are
complementary tools. You have to use all of
them in various ways and in various settings,
depending on the site.
The second thing I want to raise is that these
are likely to be very expensive. Traditional
treatments cost a lot. In 2000, the U. S. General
Accounting Office estimated that it would cost
$12 billion over the next sixteen years to treat
the areas of national forest lands that were
considered at high risk. 
This is probably significantly understating the
reality for three reasons. First, in frequent-fire
ecosystems, it’s not a program that’s going to
end. It’s going to go on forever. Thus, it isn’t a
16-year program; it’s a permanent program to
treat these lands. Second, the Forest Service
estimate of acres at risk has risen more than 20%
on their own land, and we’ve finally begun to
identify other federal and non-federal lands that
are at significant risk. Third, we’re likely to be a
lot more careful and spend a lot more on
prescribed burning after the escaped fire in Los
Alamos this year. There may be new uses that
offer ways to cut the costs, as I’m sure Bob will
allude to, but I’m skeptical about the ability of
the federal government to create markets and 
to become a reliable supplier over time, parti-
cularly in light of the generally low levels of
trust among the industry and environmental
communities with the way the agency works
and with each other. 
Let me turn to the effects of each of the
treatments and combinations of treatments. We
don’t really know, on a broad scale, how those
treatments will affect forest fires, either acres
burned or damages. Why? First, fires are patchy.
The intensity across the burned area varies
significantly, depending on the micro-
conditions at the time. It depends on the site,
the aspect on the slope. It depends on fuel
conditions: the load, composition, structure,
and moisture content. It also depends on the
weather conditions: the humidity, tempera-
ture, solar radiation, and especially wind speed 
and direction. 
So fires do not burn consistently, which
makes the results of a fire difficult to predict.
Second, it’s difficult to do forest-fire effects
research. Wildfires are not well-suited for
research because we don’t know the a priori
conditions, i.e. what it was like before the fire
started. Prescribed fires are typically not very
suitable for doing fire effects research because
burning conditions are necessarily restricted.
Fires in laboratories are feasible, and we have an
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excellent facility in Missoula to test these, but
they are not very good at reproducing the
complexity of field conditions. 
The last option is experimental wildfires, but
somehow I think that experimental conflagra-
tions are not going to be politically feasible.
Hence the effects are often based on models
from expert opinions and on anecdotes, in
contrast to case studies. However, many fire
experts believe-–and must believe in order to do
their jobs effectively–-that catastrophic fires can
and should be controlled. Thus their views may
well be biased, overstating the effectiveness of
fire control efforts.
Despite fuel management programs, confla-
grations will happen. As long as there is bio-
mass, drought, wind, and a fire ignition source,
conflagrations will occur at least occasionally.
They are rare but not unprecedented even in
frequent-fire ecosystems with restored natural
fire cycle. Few fires that occur become
conflagrations, only about one percent on
average, but predicting which fire is likely to
become a conflagration is difficult because it
depends on a host of factors that we don’t know
very well. The effects of fuel treatment on the
likelihood, on the damages, on the ability to
control conflagrations is largely unknown. 
So, what do we do? Well, there are roles and
responsibilities for governments at all levels as
well as for individual land-owners. For the
federal government, one priority, obviously, is to
protect their own lands, which includes the
appropriate level and mix of fuel and other
vegetative treatments and an appropriate road
system, “appropriate,”of course, being defined
politically. 
Another role is to disseminate information, to
let other government agencies and the public
know about what is being done and what can be
done. The federal government has a role in
providing financial and technical assistance for
appropriate protection of non-federal lands. The
federal government also conducts research and
supports research on the effects of wildfires and
on the ways to reduce damages before the fires
occur and after the fires occur. Last, the federal
government can and does need to provide some
form of appropriate assistance after catastrophic
fires occur. 
State governments have the responsibility for
protecting state and private lands within their
boundaries. States are generally responsible for
providing adequate transportation systems and
for regulating the insurance industry to ensure
appropriate fire insurance requirements on
individual homeowners in conjunction with the
appropriate federal relief and disaster assistance
programs, whatever those systems are. The states
can also contribute to the information exchange
on what can and should be done, and they can
contribute to the financial and technical aid for
protection of individual lands. 
Local governments have a couple of impor-
tant roles in protecting areas from wildfire also.
Local governments are responsible generally for
zoning and for controlling land use. They
regulate the urban/wildland interface to the
extent that there is any regulation on that. How
local governments deal with local land use can
include how they deal with access, requirements
on water supply, information, assistance, and
incentives. Local governments are also responsi-
ble for building codes and fire codes, and these
have a significant impact on burnability of an
individual house. Local governments can do a
lot to protect individual houses if they choose
to. Whether they choose to do this by
regulation, by providing information, or by
providing incentives is also a local decision. 
Finally, private land owners, individually 
and communally, have some responsibility.
Individually, they must take responsibility for
their own property. They must learn what the
threats are and what they can do about them.
Research has shown that in excess of 90% 
of houses can survive catastrophic wildfires 
(a) if they have non-flammable roofs and (b) if
the homeowners clear flammable material–
vegetation, firewood, outdoor furniture, etc–for
ten meters around the structures. Ten meters is
not very far and is typically within their own
property boundaries. They also should find out
what government programs exist to provide
both financial and technical assistance in their
efforts. In addition, landowners can cooperate
with their neighbors and with their state and
federal government agencies to reduce the
threat through ensuring adequate access,
available water supplies, and fuel reduction
where appropriate. 
Thank you. 
ROBERT H. NELSON: I’m very pleased to be
here. I think this is an extremely important
subject. It could well be that when we look back
on the year 2000, the fires of 2000 may not
match the fires of 1910 in terms of influence on
future land management, but it could very well
prove to be a landmark year for the public lands
system and for the Forest Service. 
As John suggested, I’m going to focus some of
my remarks on the Forest Service. I think that
some of the problems that we have are less
problems of technical knowledge about fire or
causes of fire and more institutional and
political. They are policy problems about how to
get things done. I think the Forest Service is at
the center of that, and we need two things.
Stephen Pyne said we need a better story. The
Forest Service has been one of the main story
creators in this area. Smoky the Bear was one,
and the fires of 1910 were another.
We also need a better management capability.
Without leaving the substance aside, we have
actually, as a result of the fires, reached some
degree of consensus that the basic problem was
that we had excess fuel buildups on the forests
out there. There were a number of warnings of
the potential for catastrophic fire, and the fires
of the year 2000 to some extent were a
realization of those warnings. We ended up in
this situation with basically tinder-box forests,
as they’re called, as the result of management
decisions, suppression of fire especially by the
Forest Service over many decades, and failure to
act in the1990’s. 
Now what are the options that we have
available? One is prescribed burning. That’s
basically going in and removing the excess fuels
by setting fires or allowing natural fires to burn.
Another is mechanical thinning, whether it’s
commercial or non-commercial is an important
question. The third option is to do nothing. You
could call it the let-it-burn option. We’ll get rid
of the wood eventually. If we don’t do anything,
it will burn, and we’ll have more fires like the
fires of 2000.
I would claim that for the last ten years, not
by conscious policy deliberation exactly, we
opted for the let-it-burn option. As the result 
of the management systems we had and of
decisions made at the national level, very little
action was taken. It’s not that this was a situa-
tion of ignorance because we knew about the
problem. In effect, we de facto said let it burn. 
Now why is that? That gets me to my subject
of the current condition of the Forest Service
and to some of the stories it tells and that we tell
along with it. I think the Forest Service has been
experiencing difficulty for some time with its
management systems. I would trace it at least
back to the 1970s. I’d say it has had a
dysfunctional land-use planning system. Every
time you try to cure it, the cure seems to turn
out to be worse than the disease so that we’ve
now reached a point of almost total gridlock in
land-use planning decision-making in the 
Forest Service system. The Forest Service had
tremendous economic problems. Probably the
leading natural resource economist of the last
fifty years, Marion Clawson, once said in Science
magazine that the Forest Service’s economic
practices were disastrous. It made all the wrong
investments. It responded to political incentives
rather than economic. From the economic
perspective, it was about the equivalent of an
Eastern European steel mill around 1980. It has
run large deficits in billions of dollars every year
from excess costs over revenues. 
That was under multiple-use management
which, in some sense, was the story. It was a
utilitarian story. The forests were used to serve
human needs. In the 1990s, the Forest Service
adopted another story and another manage-
ment mode, which has been called “ecosystem
management.” Basically, my message is that
ecosystem management doesn’t work. It was a
mistake, and the fires of 2000 are, in consider-
able part, a reflection of the failures of ecosystem
management. Maybe it can be fixed, but it’s 
in a grave condition, and these fires illustrate
the problems. 
Ecosystem management has exaggerated the
economic problems of the Forest Service. The
deficits are getting larger all the time. In 1999,
the revenues were $788 million; the costs of
managing the system was $2.3 billion. So costs
were almost three times revenues. Another
expense we have to factor in is fire expenses.
This year, the Forest Service will probably spend
close to $1 billion on fire suppression in 
the west. That’s another major item on the 
debit side.
Of course, ecosystem management didn’t
claim to be doing great things economically.
We’ve gone from 12 million board feet of timber
harvested in 1989 to less than 3 million in 1999.
But it did claim that it was going to be doing
good things environmentally. It’s not clear,
however, that ecosystem management is doing
good things environmentally. In fact, the major
events of the last seven or eight years in the west
in terms of shaping the landscape, especially
given the de facto no-action management
outcome resulting from gridlock, have been
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fires. So we had large fire seasons in 1994, 1996,
and, the worst in fifty years, in the year 2000. 
What have been the environmental conse-
quences of fire? There are obviously some pluses
and minuses. There are some places where
stand-replacement fires are a good thing, but on
the whole, they have probably been negative.
Even in stand-replacement areas, we get
abnormal patterns of burning and burning over
wider areas at one time as a result of past fire
suppression. In Ponderosa pine and other light-
burning and frequent-fire cycle areas, we get
crown fires that have never occurred before.
They burn the whole forest. Environmentally,
we get air pollution; in some places, we sterilize
the soil. You can get tremendous runoff
problems if you don’t act quickly. Probably,
under ecosystem management, we’ve had a
negative environmental impact as well. 
The Forest Service has had management
problems for at least twenty or thirty years, but
the Forest Service has to come in for severe
criticism for the quality of its management in
the 1990s. These fires that I’ve been talking
about as being the major events of the decade
were not unanticipated or unknown. Leading
foresters have been telling us for ten years that
catastrophic fire was about to arrive. In 1994,
the National Commission on Wildfire Disaster
said western forests were fire prone and that
something desperately needed to be done.
Nothing was done. In 1995, the Secretaries of
Agriculture and Interior put out a report that
almost mirrored those conclusions. It came right
from the top of the agencies, and nothing 
was done. 
In 1998 and 1999, G.A.O. put out reports
saying that catastrophic fires were threatening
the west, and nothing was done. Finally, this
summer, after we had the worst fire season in
fifty years and the national media focused on it,
there seems to be some impetus to action. But
when you have these warnings and you have a
management system that is not responding, you
clearly have a big problem. 
Now the Forest Service was founded on the
idea of scientific management and technical
expertise. That was also part of its story, its
rationale for existence. Of course, it never
realized that in its fire management, going back
to the 1910s, 20s, and 30s. It was probably
unscientific. A lot of the outside experts thought
the Forest Service was making large errors. Even
inside the Forest Service, there were people who
were saying as far back as then that things were
going wrong.
But science has actually played a relatively
modest role and has been subservient to
political and bureaucratic imperatives right back
to the very beginning. Ashley Shiff wrote a
famous book in 1962–-well, it should be
famous—called Fire and Water, published by
Harvard Press. It basically described a decades-
long history of misuse of science in the Forest
Service. I would say that we’ve seen it again.
Here in the 1990s, we had the best forestry
scientists putting out reports, issuing warnings,
saying something has to be done, and the Forest
Service basically ignoring this disaster waiting to
happen. As Ross says, there may be some
exaggeration, but on the whole, we have to
think of it as a very negative experience: damage
to the environment, loss of homes, loss of
tourism, just the costs involved. 
What about ecosystem management, which
has become the new story to guide management
in the 1990? How does that stand up
scientifically? When the Forest Service adopted
it, they said, “Well, we have to set objectives like
‘healthy forests’ or ‘natural forests.’” Of course,
no one had any idea what these phrases meant.
People started making jokes that ecosystem
management is whatever the Forest Service or
anybody else says it is. They were scientifically
meaningless, but they sounded good.
You can’t just go on forever with no
relationship between your management system
and your actual goal. So in the last few years, the
agency has tried to translate this into an actual
management reality, and it focused on the idea,
in the last two or three years, that a healthy
forest is going to be a pre-European settlement
forest. That means we now have thousands or
millions of dollars being spent on historical
research, on sending out biologists and
historians, to try to figure out what the forest
looked like in the west prior to European
settlement, about 1870 to 1890. There wasn’t
any timber harvesting in those forests, which
may be one of the reasons why timber
harvesting is plummeting. We’re actually
realizing the goal of pre-European harvests.
There wasn’t any livestock grazing. There wasn’t
any motorized recreation. There were no ski
lifts, and so forth. It seems we are setting a 
goal that excludes most of us unless you are 
pre-European.
I call this management Disneyland manage-
ment. We’re going to create a giant theme park
across the west to pre-European settlement. I
really don’t think the American public, if they
ever actually know what’s happening on these
lands, will think we should turn it into one giant
theme park containing 10% of the land area of
the United States and 40% of the Idaho land, the
largest percentage of any state of the national
forest system. 
In fact, this whole idea of going back to some
original condition has very little scientific basis.
Dan Botkin wrote a book about 1990, Discordant
Harmony, in which he says that nature is
basically a series of moves from one disequi-
librium state to another. There is no climax, no
permanent equilibrium. It’s more like chaos
than harmony. From a scientific point of view,
it’s quite arbitrary to pick any point, like 1870 or
1880, as the goal for restoring the land to
something considered to be the idyllic condition
of the past that has been lost.
One way of characterizing it is the Disneyland
phrase. Another way that gets to another
element is to call it “Garden of Eden” manage-
ment. We lost touch with our original virtues
when we were infected by industrial develop-
ment and when humans, who were sinful, came
from Europe, and disrupted the harmony of
nature. We have to restore that. Just like in the
Bible, we are waiting for the millennium, or we
may achieve that harmony in Heaven and the
hereafter. The way we’re headed, we’ll turn the
management of the forests over to the
theologians rather than to foresters.
This whole idea of ecosystem management
has led practically to paralysis and gridlock. That
paralysis and gridlock contributed significantly–
obviously there were weather and other
problems–to the forest problems and the fires of
the years 2000. It is a story, but it’s a
fundamentally flawed story. When you look at it
seriously, I don’t think it can hold up. It is an
extremely appealing story at some level. It’s a
story of secular salvation. I guess if enough
people are willing not to look at it, it might sell.
But also, it provides no realistic basis for
management. The idea that we’re really going 
to turn these forests back to 1870 or 1880 
is unrealistic.
That basically leaves wide open the question
of what we’re trying to do. It’s partly that wide
openness, when your story doesn’t really tell
you anything and is actually misleading, that
encourages the tremendous politicization of the
Forest Service. 
So what do we do? In the long run, my
proposal is to abolish the Forest Service. I think
the agency has outlived its usefulness. The
whole idea of centralized management from the
federal level is an idea that had its time in
American history but is no longer apt. The
Forest Service, right now, is a bit like the Roman
Catholic church on the verge of the Protestant
Reformation, and we’re facing an era of
increasing pluralism of values. The church is just
having more and more trouble justifying that it
is the authoritative priest with all the answers
and that everyone else should follow the
instruction and wisdom as handed down from
on high. But I don’t really think we’re going to
abolish the agency in the near term. It could
happen, but it probably won’t. In any case we
need to move forward. 
What would I recommend? Like a lot of
people, I feel that the need is for a basic
decentralization of authority in the agency. Fire
provides a great opportunity for that. I think the
states and localities will have to be not just
consultants but total participants in the
development of any plans. Prescribed burning is
like locating a toxic dump. You can’t locate it till
you get the local people to agree to what you
want to do. 
The Forest Service in general has lost so much
legitimacy that it’s extremely difficult for the
Forest Service to take the lead and to sell
solutions for things like fire. I think what
actually is going to have to happen is that the
states and the localities will have to be the ones
to put these solutions together. The Forest
Service will be part of the working team to
implement the solutions, it will provide a lot of
knowledge and expertise, like risk maps, so that
every community will know where it stands vis-
a-vis fire, and it will have to be an important
part of the implementation process. 
But I see Governor Kempthorne or Governor
Racicot as the ones who will have to become
intimately involved in the details of planning
the response to fire in the west. They’re going to
have to be the ones to put the political heat on,
and they will have to deal with the conflict of
pressures, with the environmental organiza-
tions, which often resist a lot of these solutions,
and with a lot of other people. There will, in
some sense, be an incremental radical decentral-
ization. The states won’t take over the land
formally, but in terms of the actual decision-
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making process, I see the states playing a central
role. 
They are being driven to it. In a state like
Idaho, if you see a large chunk of your state burn
down and you say that this is because the Forest
Service sat there and did nothing for the past
eight years, you might say, “We can do better.”
In fact, we’d better do better unless we want to
see the same thing happen in two or three years.
Thank you.
LEON F. NEUENSCHWANDER: Good morn-
ing, and thank you for having me. John asked
me to talk about several things today. One was
whether we have enough background, research,
and science information in fire ecology and fire
science to proceed. The answer to that is yes. 
Am I finished?
I’m going to go through a series of statements
here, and some of you have heard them before.
For research, we’re going to use “R”. We won’t
say “research” every time; we’ll just say “R”. For
other stuff, we’re going to say “duh,” and “duh”
means duh. The first of these statements is,
“We’ve had large fires in the past, and we’re
going to have large fires in the future.” Duh. 
We’ve burned about 7 million acres so far this
year. Those are perimeters, not the black acres.
That is probably a fraction of what’s going to
burn if we maintain the current management
approach. We’ve heard that already from two
different people. 
Montana and Idaho burned about 2.2 million
acres. Steve, that’s pretty close to what we had in
1910. There were some similarities, too. We had
a lot of fires in a lot of different locations, and
some of them got really big. Some of them
burned really hot. Some of them didn’t. About
30% of these reported acres were on private land
in Idaho. However, nationally, about 70% of the
acres that burned were on private land. This is
not too far different from the ratio of public
land to private land. We have assumed, though,
that the effects from these large fires are the
same on private land as they are on federal 
land. R.
We spend over $2 billion a year, according to
FEMA, fighting fire in the wildland/urban
intermix. This is a huge problem. R. Fires this
year burned over 852 homes and other
structures. We’re averaging 600 homes per year.
We need to do something about that. R. 
I’ll give you one example, my favorite. The
Los Alamos fire damage will likely exceed more
than a billion dollars. It burned 235 very expen-
sive homes and 12 energy lab buildings. It also
burned 47,000 acres. Help me with this one.
This includes a building at the lab where the first
atomic bomb was dropped.
Let’s talk about smoke. We’ve already heard
about smoke. The smoke from the wildland fires
was extensive, and we’ve heard some
projections that it will get even worse in the
future. The smoke concentrations exceeded
health and safety standards in many locations.
R. How many people were really affected by the
smoke, and where were they? Our firefighters
that are making a living in this smoke concern
me. That needs to be addressed. R.
The fallout from the smoke will likely be
further restrictions in prescribed fire smoke. This
year, from our burning on our school forest, I
was shut down on seven of the twelve burning
days I had because of smoke restrictions. Catch
22. This is a problem. We often use these pre-
scribed fires to reduce the chances of having
these large catastrophic fires. R. We have to do
something reasonable about smoke. 
Resource losses are not available yet. That’s
probably several years out. But I expect the
losses to be less than the suppression cost to put
the fire out. Losses on federal land will be even
less because about 68% of those acres burned in
wilderness or roadless areas. My few economist
friends say that, in theory, it’s not supposed to
happen this way. In theory, the more we spend,
the more we should save, not the more we
should pay. Also, with high costs are the
rehabilitation costs after fires. In one area in
Idaho, we spent essentially $200,000 to rehab 39
acres within a fire. R. A certain amount of
research suggests that a lot of this rehab is not
needed. Where it’s needed and how much is
certainly an R.
Now I’m going to step on John’s toes just a
little bit and talk about fire policy. It’s always
changed when you’ve had a fire crisis and a big
fire year, especially when the media makes it
change. It was perceived that fire suppression
efforts were costly, and they are. Many homes
were lost; many stories were told. The
suppression costs were perceived in many places
as too little, too late. Fire suppression forces were
too few, too tired, and overworked. Fire
suppression forces were unavailable to fight fires
during the peak of the fire season. 
I grew up in a little town near Sweet,
Wyoming. I don’t know why it got that name.
The fire that was burning there got to 8,000
acres, and in that 8,000 acres, they had eight
firemen. Well, it was Wyoming. But really. There
are many examples where we just didn’t have
enough people. 
Procedures and rules for prescribed fires were
questioned, especially around New Mexico.
Some disastrous fires, it was said, could have
been avoided altogether if we had taken a
different course of action. Maybe. Maybe not. 
Probably one of my favorite quotes in this
area came from a report in the Missoulian when
they were interviewing some of the people who
were harmed by the fires. It said, “Some fires just
burned hotter than hell. You know, it did that
fire roll thing.” The “fire roll thing” just means
that it sucked a lot of debris up and really got
out of control. 
President Clinton did respond and came up
with a change in policy in September. There are
four parts to this. In the first part, he was going
to pay back the emergency firefighting funds,
the funds they had already spent. Duh. The
second part of this was to increase fire
preparedness. To this, they are going to add
$340 million. I’ll come back to that. They had to
do some of that. And, they’re going to increase
the local fire department and private landowner
assistance with $88 million. This is innovative.
This is new. For essentially the very first time
after these fires – Steve, you can correct me if I’m
wrong, but do it later in private – we’re going to
be very pro-active and spend about $390 million
in thinning and fuel treatments. 
I have a few conclusions. Let’s start with the
basics. The goal of fire suppression is to save
lives and private property and to protect natural
and cultural resources from fire at the lowest
cost to the government. That’s out of the
manual. It isn’t really to suppress all fires, but
what if we did. Let’s just say we could. What
would happen? We would see a tremendous
decline in the biodiversity in our wild lands. We
would see a decline in our fish populations. I
heard Fish and Game make a presentation that
said the elk herds in Idaho are declining in the
Lochsa, our premier elk herds. There are only
three calves per hundred cows now, and the
population is falling. This is surely a response to
lack of fire and to lack of the habitat that fire
creates. We would have a forest that would
become very uniform and very monotonous,
and there wouldn’t be very much life in it. Duh.
We don’t need an R here.
What if we just let all fires burn? Let’s just
ignore this goal of life and property. We’re just
going to let all fires burn. Well, how many of
you want one of those big grumbling infernos in
your back yard? I think it could put a whole
bunch of our economies out of business in short
order. That’s not acceptable either. 
But it is true that eventually wildland fuels
will burn and eventually fires will occur. From
an ecological standpoint, in my opinion, they
must occur. It’s not a matter of “if”, it’s a matter
of “when.” Further, these fires occur during dry
years. Global warming is happening, and we
could have more of those. The fire suppression
paradox is that as we put fires out, the fuel,
forest succession, and tree density increase,
making the forest more flammable and harder to
suppress when the next fire comes. We continue
to suppress fires, and despite the fire record, we
put out more than 95% of them. 
We will continue to put these fires out until
the forest conditions combine with drought,
wind, and fuel to produce an inferno that we
can’t suppress. In my opinion, the fires that used
to burn at low intensity are the easy ones to put
out. Today, all fires except prescribed fires in the
forest burn the same. They burn hotter than
hell. Large, high-intensity fires are more difficult
and more costly to suppress than low intensity
fires. Duh. Small fires are easier to put out than
big fires. 
This year, as in any extensive fire year, the
solution, at least one of them, is fire prepared-
ness, i.e. to increase the number of firefighters,
the number of fire trucks, the number of fire
planes. This is Catch 22. Putting out more fires
leads to more fuels which leads to more fire
trucks which leads to more fuels which leads to
more fires which leads to more fire trucks, and
so on. High levels of fire preparedness may even
give the public a false sense of security. People
who live in the urban/wildland interface–Burt
and Ethel, for example–may feel comfortable
enough that they will not make the effort to
clean up around their home. Catch 22. Fire in
the wildland/urban interface is a major problem. 
In my opinion, the only way out of this
dilemma is the use of fuel treatments. Now
Steve, help me with this: that means restoration
thinning and restoring fire to fire-dependent
communities in our forests and rangelands.
Putting fire back is part of the solution. 
Now let’s talk about the goal of the fuel
treatments. It’s to reduce the chances of crown
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fires, to reduce the intensities of these wildfires,
and to give our suppression forces a chance to
extinguish the unwanted fires. It could be to
bring the forest back to HRV [historic range
variability] conditions. I’ll enjoy debating that
with you later. It’s certainly a viable goal in some
areas though maybe not everywhere. Wildland
fires and damages are going to cost us more in
the future, especially in the short term. The
number of fire trucks, the number of fuel
treatments in the short term are not going to
change that. Catch 22. The sufficiently large
areas must be treated and in the right location
before we will realize a reduction in our fire costs
and damages. Nevertheless, I think, because of
past management actions, that restoration
thinning and fuel treatments are needed to
restore the role of fire and to reduce the fire
intensities, especially around our urban inter-
mix areas. 
This problem is most acute in the dry, low-
elevation forests and woodlands. Most of these
forests are on private land and are on the lower
portions of the national forests. Catch 22. Fuel
treatments only on federal lands will not solve
the problem. A single national fuel treatment
strategy is not compatible with our different
ecosystems. There was a proposal that we set a
diameter limit of 15 inches in our thinning, a
national diameter limit. There was also a fear
that fuel treatments will be put in all forest types
and everywhere. It is too expensive, unneeded,
illogical and ecologically unsound to undertake
these fuel treatments everywhere and to have a
single statement. This is stupid. It’s not even
duh. Catch 22. Fuel treatments can modify fire
behavior, increase the survivability of natural,
economic, and cultural assets and increase fire
suppression effectiveness, but it will not
eliminate the large fires. It will not eliminate the
need to clean up around houses and structures,
along right-of-ways and highways, and on
private and state lands. 
Fuel treatments should be concentrated
where they will do the most good. I’ve already
brought up the low elevation, dry forests. There,
leaving the large trees and removing some of 
the small trees, the brush, and the slash are the
preferred treatments. Some of this has to done
in the private and urban intermix as well. Where
they will also do most good is along the roads
and right-of-ways and around the houses. 
Logging is one tool. Prescribed fires is one
tool. Thinning is another. In some circum-
stances, they can be used independently. In
some circumstances, it’s questionable whether
changing the structure of that forest is going to
make it more sustainable. You must change the
structure and the function together. Often the
best results occur when logging, restoration,
thinning, and prescribed fire are used together.
Catch 22. Stop logging on federal lands. Catch
22. Stop prescribed fires because of smoke. 
President Clinton authorized 3 million acres
of thinning out of the 39 million federal acres
that have been classified as high risk. This is less
than 10%. Catch 22. It’s probably not enough.
What is enough? R. Where should they be done?
That’s also R. How big? That is also R. I don’t
know what we’ll do with all of the small trees,
debris, and little green crap that we take out of
the forests with this thinning. Catch 22. Burn it. 
I don’t know how these fuel treatments and
thinning will affect fish and wildlife popula-
tions. R. But I do know the consequences of
doing nothing, of not doing the thinning. It’s
already been stated. It will be more of the same:
increased deforestation, increased erosion,
increased sediment in our streams, decreased
huntable wildlife, and an ever-increasing set of
supression costs and damages. 
Thank you very much.
FREEMUTH: OK. We’re going to have about
ten minutes for questions, then we’ll take a
break to set up for the next panel. We have the
questionnaire forms on your programs, but we
have a roving mike to use for oral questions.
We’ll get the three scientists and Steve back up
on the stage for some questions.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Can we afford to
leave untouched all these lands that this
Administration has set aside as roadless where
we can’t do anything because of lack of access.
Can the forests afford to remain untouched?
NELSON: If you look at it one way, you can
say that since the Forest Service loses money on
most of the things they do, the less they do, the
more we save. It also seems at times that the
more they spend, the less they do. A lot of the
complaint is about the fact that nothing is
happening even though we are still spending $3
billion a year on management for the U. S.
Forest Service. It mostly seems to be going for
paper work. I don’t have the answer, but this
roadless stuff does somewhat come out of the
idea of ecosystem management. If you’re going
to go back to pre-European, they didn’t have any
roads either or any timber harvesting. It’s part of
the whole idea that our real goal should be that
the forest should be natural. That’s our story
that we’re actually operating under, at least in
the Clinton Administration. 
Some people don’t buy the story, but it’s been
governing land management. It’s that the
purpose of the forest is not utilitarian–that was
multiple use–but to make the forest natural. I
don’t think it’s either possible or sensible, but I
never liked the multiple use thing much, at least
as it was implemented. The new story has to
involve the idea that natural is not a good idea
either in theory or in practice. In a certain sense,
the forests are going to be more like a garden.
We have an obligation to decide what we want
for these forests, whether it’s for them to be
aesthetically appealing or a source of timber or
whatever we want, and we’re going to have to
manage affirmatively to get there. I think road-
less stuff is a diversion from that.
FREEMUTH: I have a question over here. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Question for Dr.
Pyne. In your book on Australian forestry, you
talk about how the early British-trained foresters
in Australia changed the narrative, particularly
McArthur, much more quickly than the
narrative has changed here in the United States
about the role of fire in forests. Is there anything
we can learn from that Australian experience
that can be applied today? 
PYNE: I don’t think there is anything
specifically that we can learn, but what’s
interesting about the Australian story is that
they tried very specifically to integrate their fire
practices with Australian history. This was
something they needed to do because it was part
of their identity. Their native vegetation,
eucalyptus, was adapted to fire. The people who
had resided there for tens of thousands of years,
the aborigines, had used fire. Australians are
rediscovering their own cultural identity by
adopting this strategy, and they are repudiating
the American model with all its aircraft. They
were very specific about this because that would
mean they had been re-colonized. They left
Britain and now would become an American
colony. They very specifically rejected that, so it
was an act of nationalism. That was part of the
appeal. It was able to move beyond technical
issues. So I would say that’s the lesson I would
draw from it. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: It’s a two-part
question, but I’ll take about two minutes. Mine
has to do with the Special Projects Unit that the
Forest Service has and relates to the making of
their topo maps. They have overlays of canyons
that could generate fire storms. These are storms
that twist like tornados and can pull up trees up
from half a mile away and have crowns of 500
feet high. Sometimes the embers must travel
several miles high in the atmosphere to cool
below kindling temperature. My question is that
with these topo maps and the kind of support
that the aircraft line gets, if they could
coordinate with their scratch maps before they
go out to support the firefighters, wouldn’t that
help? Now when they do dump their chemicals,
those chemicals contain a fire chemical, sodium
cyanide, which turns to cyanide when it hits
water. A study done fifty years ago indicated
effects on small sports fish, and after the fires of
2000, the feds told them to change it. With the
fed funding and with the outfitters and rafters
we have, if we have seagoing fish that are
affected, won’t it be three or four years before we
see the results? 
NEUENSCHWANDER: R.
PATRICK SHEA: A geologist in the insurance
industry created the Richter scale for
earthquake, and it’s a useful scientific index that
allows you to assess what the actual damage was
from an earthquake. Why in the fire community
can’t we come up with perhaps what we’d call
the Andrus scale, which would be the
temperature of the fire, the high and low in
terms of its effect on the ecology; a smoke index
in terms of health; and then a watershed impact
index, which would include the actual costs of
suppression and then the cost of whatever post-
fire activity went on. 
PYNE: Yes, we can, and in many places we
have. I’ve worked with the Boise Forest, and
they’ve developed what they call the Fire Hazard
Index. Nationally, the Forest Service has been
putting these together. I’ve worked with
Governor Lamb and Neil Sampson and others,
and we did this for the state of Colorado. This
can be done, and it’s useful because it can be
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done before the fires start, and it can give you an
area to prioritize where you want to spend your
limited dollars on treatment. 
FREEMUTH: We can take one more. Here’s a
hand, and then I’ll turn the mike back to
Governor Andrus.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: A question for Dr.
Nelson. Given the pretty even split on so many
political issues in the American population, can
we expect anything better than the gridlock
we’ve seen in Forest Service management if we
get rid of the Forest Service or change the
management model so that the states have more
control? 
NELSON: If you look at the map, there was all
red and all blue. It seems the gridlock comes
from trying to combine the two, though there
was a little story in the paper that said the
solution was to split up and give Bush all the red
and give Gore all the blue for the next four
years. It seems to me that if you get smaller
units, you’re more likely to have more
homogenous groups and less division. 
ANDRUS: We’re at the break, but permit me
to make an observation. I saw Dave Alexander
arrive this morning; he’s supervisor of the
Payette National Forest. I would bet that Dave
Alexander could have gone out last spring north
of Payette, looked at the fuel piles, and told you
what was going to happen if you had a lightning
storm. But I’ll tell you, Bob, that he didn’t have
the money and didn’t have the authority to go
out there. So closer control at the local level
would help. 
We’re going to have a short break, and then
I’ll have you all back in here for the next panel.
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CECIL D. ANDRUS: Let me remind the
attorneys here that your C.L.E. registration slip
is on your program. It’s on the flyleaf on your
program. Fill it out, put it in a box on the
registration table, and you’ll get six hours of
C.L.E. credit if you’re an attorney licensed in
Idaho, Washington, or Oregon.
Let me introduce Marc Johnson, who will
coordinate the panel for the stakeholders. Marc
Johnson is a partner and Boise principal of the
Gallatin Group, which is an industrial affairs
and business management firm, located in
Boise, Spokane, Seattle, and Portland. Marc was
head of public television here many years ago at
Boise State University. He worked with me in the
Governor’s Office for eight years as my Chief of
Staff and now has found honest employment
and is making money outside the political arena
by heading up the Gallatin Group.
I give you Marc Johnson.
MARC C. JOHNSON: Thank you, Governor. 
What we want to do with this panel is to ask
our panelists, some of whom have come great
distances to participate, to respond initially to a
couple of questions. Then I’ll give you an
opportunity to get into the conversation fairly
quickly. I want to ask each of them for, frankly,
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a sound-bite answer to this question: What
impact, from your perspective, has come about
as a result of the fires in the west this year? 
Let’s start with Jim Hull, who is the Texas
State Forester. He came a long way to be with us
and arrived about midnight last night. He is very
active with the National Association of State
Foresters and heads up their Fire Committee.
Jim, from the perspective of the state foresters,
how devastating a year was this fire season that
we just came through.
JAMES B. HULL: It was obviously extremely
devastating in many ways. One was that it
changed the entire way we look at fire pro-
tection in America. Until we come to grips with
that, all of the rhetoric that might come out of
this meeting and many others that are being
held across the nation are really moot issues. 
As we look for a new phrase or new title, 
we’re going to have to look at a sign like that,
draw a big red line right through the middle of
it, about where the heart of that buffalo is, and
say, “The Fires: No Next Time.” Until we change
our paradigm about how we look at wild fire 
in America, quite honestly, we’re never going to 
get there.
JOHNSON: Brad Little, leader in the livestock
industry, articulate spokesman for those who
use the public land as range land. What’s your
answer to that question? How devastating has it
been from your perspective and your industry’s
perspective?
BRAD LITTLE: Marc, here in Idaho, we had
some of the big range fires. We lost a lot of
cattle, and if you have livestock that are burnt
up, that’s obviously a significant factor. 
One of the things that’s probably of most
concern to us is the position of federal agencies
on rehab, particularly for the medium and
smaller operators that have only one unit to
operate on. They have a year-round unit, and
they have livestock out there all year round.
They’re talking now about three to five years of
rest if they’re doing some of these chemical
treatments for annual grasses. That’s going to
put those people out of business, and that needs
to be addressed. There needs to be some kind of
dialogue on it. 
It would be nice if we could have the dialogue
before the fire instead of after the fire because
you’ve got to look at buying hay and some other
things. It’s really going to be critical for some of
these operators in the west. If you’re in the
livestock business or any other business out
there on the land and if you have a fire that’s
burning, you have a lot of high-stress things
going on. You’re worried about your family, and
you’re worried about your livestock. Besides
that, it’s a very emotional time. When you’re
out there moving that livestock out of the way
and are worried about the safety of your family
and employees, it’s really a problem to have
arbitrary rules come in on top of it. 
JOHNSON: Jim Smalley is with the National
Fire Protection Association and came all the way
from Massachusetts to be with us. Mr. Smalley,
you’re in charge of educating the American
people about the impacts of fire in the wildland/
urban interface. Tell us, from your perspective,
what happened this year.
JAMES C. SMALLEY: Well, we didn’t have an
unusually high or anomalous peak in the
number of home losses, given the relative
number of acres that were on fire. We had 850 to
1,000 homes lost. That may sound heartless on
one hand, but it could have been much worse.
Our concerns are that we don’t take a knee-jerk
reaction and that we don’t just put in more fire
trucks and more suppression and go that route.
We have to have a significant change in course
in redefining responsibilities and redefining
what this interface is. This is a solvable problem.
We don’t have to have this problem. The
wildland/urban interface or intermix–where the
eaves meet the leaves–is not a fire problem at all.
It is a land-use planning problem. It’s only a fire
problem when there is a fire. That mix is created
much earlier than the natural event. Is it a
disaster? The fire is only a disaster when there is
human involvement.
JOHNSON: Darrell Knuffke, you’re the Vice
President of the Wilderness Society, one of the
nation’s leading and oldest conservation and
environmental organizations. How is this
dialogue unfolding after the fire season from
your perspective?
DARRELL R. KNUFFKE: Thanks for not
identifying me as one of the nation’s oldest
conservationists. I’m rapidly approaching that.
The topic of this conference is “the fires next
time.” I don’t think we have a hope in hell of
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preparing for the fires next time unless we come
out of this conference and others like it with a
pretty clear-headed understanding of the fires
this time. What happened? We think what
happened is that what could burn, did burn. It
was a function principally of the weather and
the convergence of a number of other factors.
Everything burned: cut-over private land, some
wild lands. 
The thing we’ve seen more than anything else
in the wake of this fire season is the re-ignition
of the public policy debate over how we manage
our forests. Everybody who has disliked the
Clinton Administration’s forest management or
roadless policies or pretty much anything else,
including the Florida recount, sees some hope in
the dramatic nature of these fires to change
things. It’s sort of a mass “gotcha” by people on
both sides of the issue. If we don’t stop that,
we’re not going to get very far down the trail. 
JOHNSON: Jaime Pinkham has been on the
Executive Committee of the Nez Perce Tribe.
He’s a very articulate spokesman for Native
American governments. He has recently become
the head of the fisheries effort for the Nez Perce
Tribe. Jaime, we’re delighted to have you here. I
know you have an academic background in
forestry issues as well. Tell us from your
perspective and the tribal perspective what’s
going on and what has gone on this year.
JAIME A. PINKHAM: Well, in Indian country
in the U. S... Actually, all the U. S. used to be
Indian country. Maybe that’s another goal in
getting it back to pre-European conditions...
JOHNSON: ...That’s a different conference,
Jaime.
PINKHAM: Actually, in Indian country, we
got by fairly easily this past year when you look
at the national statistics. About 3200 acres were
lost. Something we need to keep in mind, when
you look at the dedicated effort by the people on
the fire lines, is that 25% of those firefighters
came from Indian communities. That does offer
a form of employment in very depressed com-
munities. Tribal communities are very rural, and
sometimes we lack the infrastructure. We talk
about the urban/wildland interface, but when
you look at Indian country, there is no interface
because we live intimately with the land. 
We’re beginning to see more and more issues
about where we put our dispersed housing
because we’ve always had a lack of planning
dollars. One of the disparities is that for every
dollar that the federal agencies, like the Forest
Service, receive for coordinated management,
Indian country only gets 35 cents. We’ve really
been lagging behind on adequate planning on
how to do better fire management as well as
integrated planning, which means where should
our home sites go? We’re running into that
conflict more and more, and we’re trying to
elevate the importance in our tribal commu-
nities on how we respond to those issues. 
One of the things we really took a hard look
at this past year was all the talk about how we
want to mimic nature. We took control of
nature, but now we want to mimic nature. In a
sense, it’s giving the knowledge back to nature
and relying on that knowledge to help us
manage the forest and the ecosystem. 
One of the biggest investments the Nez Perce
Tribe has made over the past few years, an
investment in science and political talent as well
as capitol investments, is to rebuild those critical
habitats for endangered salmon and steelhead.
We’ve made considerable investments there,
and as we watched these fires unfold, rolling
through these habitats, it raised a concern for us.
With that kind of investment and with those
goals in mind of recovering endangered species,
we’re concerned about the effect of the fire on
our ability to recover these endangered species.
That’s another equation. We can talk about the
urban interface; we can talk about our depressed
communities, timber salvage, and so forth; but I
think we also need to talk about the endangered
species and help find a solution to this equation.
JOHNSON: Gary Wolfe is the president and
CEO of the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation,
headquartered in Missoula, Montana, nationally
respected leader on conservation issues, partic-
ularly as they pertain to wildlife management.
Gary, give us your perspective on what we have
been through and how it is impacting the west. 
GARY J. WOLFE: I’m in a pretty enviable
position here. I don’t have to worry about all
these other impacts that we’re talking about. I
can focus on the impacts on elk, on elk country,
and on elk-hunting opportunities. I recognize
that there were some very disastrous, very
devastating impacts, especially from a human
and economic standpoint, but looking at it from
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a wildlife perspective, especially on big game–
elk and deer–the species that have evolved
throughout their entire existence with wildfires
in the western landscape, both short-term and
long-term impacts have occurred. Short-term,
certainly there were deaths of individual
animals from large catastrophic fires. It caused a
change in the movements and distribution of
animals. It certainly disrupted recreational
opportunities like hunting. Some of my outfitter
friends were actually burned out of their areas;
and they can’t really get in and set up their
camps this year. 
In regard to the long term, what we’ve
learned over time is that these animals have
evolved with wild fires. In the northern Rockies,
many of the most important winter range areas
were created as a result of catastrophic wild fires.
1910 is a good example in the Selway and the
Lochsa. That is not to say that’s the best way to
do it. In fact, we think there are many better
ways to do it than with catastrophic wild fires.
But the reality is that the long-term impact on
big game animals in the west is going to be
positive as a result of this. Short-term problems.
Long-term positive benefits. There are better
ways to do it in the future, and we’ll be talking
about that in a minute. 
JOHNSON: Absolutely. Jim Riley is the execu-
tive with Intermountain Forest Association,
headquartered in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. He
represents the wood products industry in 
Idaho and Montana and across the northwest. 
Jim, what’s your perspective from the wood
products industry.
JAMES S. RILEY: Well, Marc, last summer’s
fires have been a huge lesson for all westerners,
certainly, and I hope across the nation. The
person who said it best was Patrick Moore, who
was the co-founder of Greenpeace. I made his
acquaintance over a year ago. He speaks about
the forest and what needs to happen in the
forest. His simple message is that we need to
help the public see the forest through a new set
of eyes. What he means and what is the turning
point of this last summer is that simple sound-
bite solutions to forest management, which this
debate has swirled around for the past two
decades, are not consistent with the dynamics of
an evolving, changing forest ecosystem. People
who thought that they were protecting their
forests by excluding all kinds of activities,
including fire, and who practiced management
activities that mimicked nature, actually have
done more not to protect the forests than
they’ve done to actually protect them. With
those lessons behind us, my real hope from all
this is that we can move forward in an era of
more thoughtful, cooperative, and collaborative
decision-making on public forest land manage-
ment and leave behind this era of polarization.
JOHNSON: Let’s pick up on that point. The
science panel earlier gave the view that we have
a window of opportunity here to do something.
Clearly the public is better informed than it was
back in May regarding the impacts of forest fires.
We have a window of opportunity. We have a
new political environment apparently taking
shape. How do we capitalize on that? 
RILEY: I think it’s going to take two things.
Part of the recognition of what the science panel
has very capably reported again this morning 
is that the evidence of existing problems out
there is compelling and overwhelming. If you
remember what Leon talked about, he said of
the millions of acres of unacceptable forest
health conditions that lend themselves to these
catastrophes, less than 10% are under current
treatment plans.
So with that scientific background, I hope we
can capitalize on the leadership of the governors
of the western states. They’ve already stood up
in the Western Governors’ Association and other
places and said they want to help evolve plans
that work locally and that are based on some of
the principles that came from the previous
Andrus Center conference and the white paper
that Governor Andrus held up today, part of
which suggests localized decision-making, and
marry that up with the $1.8 billion in financing,
which was authorized by the Clinton
Administration but will be spent by whoever is
in office next year. If that can be given to the
governors to work out local plans and if we can
have local collaboration and real spots on the
ground, I think we can bring about that era of
new management. 
JOHNSON: Don’t be bashful. Everyone has 
a microphone; everyone has them turned 
on. Darrell?
KNUFFKE: We’ve heard some of the speakers
this morning talk about how significantly
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inadequate that infusion of money is. That tells
us at the Wilderness Society that we’ve got to be
pretty darn strategic about how we spend it.
That gets me back to the role of science. I was a
lot more sanguine about the role of science last
night than I was after this morning’s panel. The
scientists seem to have a lot of room for
disagreement. But still, there ought to be some
places where we can come together.
Bruce Vento, who just passed away, was fond
of saying that we’re all entitled to our own
opinion, but we’re not entitled to our own facts.
There needs to be some body of agreed-upon
information from which we can, as a committee
of people, move forward and take some steps. 
JOHNSON: Where do you think the
divergence is? Where is the lack of consensus?
To put it more positively, where is the
consensus? Where can we work together?
KNUFFKE: It seems to me, from what I’ve
heard this morning, that at least one area where
we have a real problem, perhaps the most
fixable of our problems, is at the interface or the
intermix. Forests, wilderness areas, roadless areas
don’t deal in catastrophes, don’t deal in
devastation. They deal in natural events, some
of which are more dramatic than others. What is
going to drive this debate in the years ahead is
fear on the part of people who live where the
eaves meet the leaves. That phrase is a lot 
more appealing to me than the urban/rural
interface. Nonetheless, we’d know what we’re
talking about. 
JOHNSON: So what do we do? Let’s be
specific. 
KNUFFKE: I think specifically what we have
to do is bring together all these people from the
federal agencies all the way down to local
homeowners and homeowner associations and
put together something like an Extension
Service or maybe an extension of the Extension
Service and help people know what they can
and should do. 
Get the insurance companies involved.
Anyone who thinks the insurance industry,
through rate structures, can’t influence positive
behavior and penalize negative behavior hasn’t
bought insurance for a sixteen-year-old lately.
They can do it, but they haven’t. The whole
subject is more than just professional and
academic with me. I live in a frame house in the
trees in northern Minnesota. I called my
insurance agent and said, “What are you hearing
in the wake of these fires?” He said, “Nothing,”
and this was State Farm. “It’s not a a problem up
here.” I think it’s a problem everywhere, and
we’re going to have to engage at that level and
offer some incentive to people to retrofit their
homes and to be a lot more thoughtful in
zoning and building codes in these places. 
JOHNSON: Jim? 
SMALLEY: Well, let me say this. I was at a
conference last week in California, and every
time I go to that state, I hear the same kind of an
argument. The insurance industry and the fire
departments should fix it, and that’s the
response to fire. One thing is that there is a
misconception that there is an “insurance
industry.” There is no insurance industry. There
are insurance companies. 
I sit on a land-use planning committee for the
Instituite for Business and Home Safety, and
their member companies are large insurance
companies. At every meeting, we have to go
through this little thing about rate-setting. We
can’t discuss rates, and we can’t discuss any kind
of monetary premiums. They cannot talk about
that among themselves. Some of the tools that
we need to assess risk are just now becoming
available to the insurance industry. There is a
talk in structural fire departments about resi-
dential sprinklers, about putting these things 
in homes to save lives and property and then
getting a rate break from the insurance com-
panies. The problem is they have no track
history. They have no way to know whether
these things actually work. In addition, what is
a fair rate structure?
Say someone is living out in a wildland area
and they have a combustible roof with pine
straw all over the top of it and in the gutters.
They are finally convinced to put on a really
good non-combustible roof. I’m going to put on
slate or tile, make it look really nice. The fire
people are saying, “The insurance company
should give you a break in your premium.” The
fact is that, since you have added value to your
house, your insurance premium goes up. 
The other irony is that–let’s say we have a
good program to replace combustible roofs with
non-combustible roofs. Non combustible roofs,
let’s say, have a replacement cost of $10,000.
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Hypothetically, let’s say the insurance company
says, “We’ll give you a 50% rate reduction in
your fire insurance.” Go back and look at your
homeowners’ insurance. How much of that
insurance is for fire? Mine is $500 a year. $400 of
that is in liability, replacement costs, and that
sort of thing. The smallest percentage is in fire
insurance. So if they give you a 50% cut, that
might amount to $25 per year. How many years
will it take you to pay back a $10,000
investment? The incentives are placed at the
wrong end. 
The other irony I like to point out is that the
insurance industry is the largest purchaser of
replacement roofs in the United States, but it’s
basically from hail. Hail and wind damage. And
Jim Hull from Texas knows that. 
JOHNSON: Brad, you’re itching to get in this,
I can see. 
LITTLE: When was the last time an insurance
company said, “Our stock price is going to go
down, and we’re going to lower our dividends
because of a fire claim. Every time there is a fire
claim, FEMA jumps in and does something, so
why should the insurance companies do
anything. Until the politicians quit standing up
and saying, “We’re going to make everybody
whole,” the insurance companies aren’t going to
do anything. 
SMALLEY: You’re right. The incentives are
placed at the wrong end. We’ve made wealthy
some homeowners living in large homes
destroyed by devastating fires. FEMA comes in
with low-cost loans, and they don’t build the
home they had; they build one twice as big.
They still put the vegetation right back where 
it was. 
RILEY: I agree that we ought to start looking
at places where there is agreement, and the
wildland/urban interface is one of those.
However, if I had the numbers rights,
somewhere between 30 and 50 million acres is
judged to be at risk. Is that right? OK, 39 million
is the figure Leon uses. Of that, I would say, less
than 1% is truly in the urban/wildland interface.
The rest of it, the vast majority is wildlands that
are not covered by any insurance program. We
can get all distracted by these kinds of issues,
and I think Jaime Pinkham’s point is excellent.
While we spend a lot of time worrying about
protecting the $200,000 house out there, we
might have burned up invaluable riparian
habitat for endangered species. Why does that
make sense? Is that the right way to do our
priorities? That’s what we have to be looking at.
HULL: One quick comment on the insurance.
I don’t sell insurance, but they’re not quite as in
the dark as we might think. In places in east
Texas, we worked with the local fire districts,
volunteer fire departments, and put in dry
hydrants on a three-mile grid. The insurance
industry dropped the rates by 10 to 15% for the
homeowners that lived there. That many times
more than paid for the cost of installation of dry
fire hydrants. So there’s a lot we can do that
perhaps we’ve not explored yet.
SMALLEY: That’s very important, and I’m not
trying to lessen that impact. But that’s the
suppression response end of it. I agree with that
idea, I think it’s a wonderful idea, and I totally
support it, but we’ve got to redefine what it
means for protection. I’m a second generation
firefighter. My father used to say, “Oh, don’t
worry if the Washington politicians take the
shirt off your back. They’re going to have a
bureau to put it in.” 
While fire suppression is the normal response
in municipal settings, it doesn’t work on a vast
scale of wildlands. We have a fire department,
but we don’t have a flood department. We don’t
have a wind department to come out and
control wind emergencies. We have to get away
from the idea that we can respond to these
things in some sort of meaningful scale. When
you have two hundred houses on fire and seven
fire trucks, do the math. Duh. It doesn’t work.
We have to think of a different way to put
protection into structures and into these
interface areas. We really have to separate what
we can really solve, which is an interface
problem, and the other factors and
interdependencies. It becomes like trying to
keep a hundred corks under water at the same
time. You can get some under, but they’re going
to pop back up. This is the nature of what we’re
trying to do here today.
KNUFFKE: I would suggest that rather than
the fact that we don’t have a flood department,
we have a couple of them: the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers. At least
a fair amount of the way those folks have made
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a living is by protecting people against their own
foolishness of building in flood plains. We do
the same thing in erosive beaches and have
massive public works projects for beach
replenishment when homes don’t belong there
in the first place. So all of that has served over
time to insulate people from their personal
responsibility to make sensible decisions. 
SMALLEY: You’re right, and I live in a coastal
community. When the storm hits the coast of
Massachusetts, the cameras are usually in my
community, so you’re seeing my neighbors
being washed off into Massachusetts Bay. It
comes down really to personal responsibility
and ownership of that property. Any attempt we
make to force federal or state agencies to do
something fails when we get to the private
ownership, the homeowner. There are all kinds
of incentives and ways to force compliance, to
force safety, and to use mitigation measures. I
work for the National Fire Protection
Association, and we publish a set of national fire
codes that cover a lot of things that are right
here in this room and that are protecting us
from fire, things that, when you walk into the
room, you are not aware of. Certainly exit signs,
sprinkler systems, floor finishes, wall finishes,
and that sort of thing are covered under the fire
codes. I don’t personally believe that it’s a code
issue because only 16 states of the fifty have
building codes that cover all buildings and all
occupancies. I know I’m out here in the west
where you really don’t want to talk much about
codes and ordinances, but I don’t think it’s a
code problem. 
JOHNSON: Yes, we don’t want to get into
that. Let’s move on. Jim Riley, is prescribed
burning something we can start some consen-
sus about?
RILEY: I think there can be some consensus
about prescribed burning, but again, I think
people have tried to say that prescribed burning
is the answer, that if we control the time the fire
is lit in some of these ecosystems, they’ll burn in
the ways that would do certain things. That, I
believe is folly, according to a lot of the research
–R– that’s out there. 
I was meeting with Jack Ward Thomas the
other day, and he made the pertinent observa-
tion: “We’re talking about reintroducing fire
into ecosystems that have never existed before
in these forests. They have evolved to the point
that we don’t know what they will do.” That’s
what the data is telling you. If you did that with-
out mechanical treatment, logging, and thinning
beforehand, you’ll have a disaster on your hands
of the magnitude of what we just went through. 
JOHNSON: Gary?
WOLFE: I’d just like to build upon that, Jim.
I think one of the most important things we
need to do is to recognize that active man-
agement is something we have to embrace. For
too long, we’ve had this difference of opinion
between industrial foresters and conserva-
tionists. Some people in the conservation and
environmental movement say prescribed fire
can do everything. Other folks in industry say
“No, we don’t need fire at all. Commercial
timber harvest can do everything.” I think Ross
really hit on it this morning when he talked
about a variety of tools, and we can’t use all of
the tools interchangeably. They’re compatible
with each other. You have to have a manage-
ment plan and goals in mind. You have to bring
a variety of stakeholders together, collaborate at
the local level, and move forward with common
goals and common vision. 
JOHNSON: Do you see that happening now
and the beginning of that with this new
national fire strategy that we will hear more
about later today?
WOLFE: I don’t know whether it’s going to
happen at the national level, but there is a
specific program that we have going here in
Idaho that I think is a good model at the local
level. It’s called the Clearwater Basin Elk Habitat
Initiative. It’s in one area, one basin, about six
million acres in the Clearwater Basin, but it in-
cludes a whole range of stakeholders, including
the Intermountain Forest Association, the Rocky
Mountain Elk Foundation, the Idaho Fish and
Game Department, the Forest Service, the BLM,
some of the private timber corporations, and the
University. That’s a collective group that is
working together at the local level to identify
common philosophies, common values, and
common goals for the Clearwater Basin and
then developing prescriptions that can be
implemented and that everyone can embrace. I
think that’s a perfect example of how we have to
move forward. 
27
JOHNSON: Jim Hull, how does prescribed
burning fit into this equation?
HULL: I came here prepared to talk about a
few things. When I walked through the door a
while ago, I was handed this paper. It said,
“Boise Officers Shoot Man in Confrontation.” I
hope I don’t get shot over this. 
JOHNSON: The governor insisted that the
guns be checked at the door. I think you‘re OK.
HULL: Flying up here, I thought, “I’m not
going to get into politics and elections,” but I
really did like that “Rs” and “Duhs” thing of Dr.
Neuenschwander. What was the question?
Prescribed burning. I think I am probably like
90% of the folks in here. I’m an absolute
pyromaniac when it comes to prescribed burns.
I love to do it. I think there is great potential
there. The problem I have with it is priorities. I
see the absolutely huge amounts of dollars that
are being allocated to prescribed burns on a very
few number of acres. As a state forester that has
responsibility for all rural fire protection in my
state, as do most other state foresters, with the
west being a little bit of an exception, I do worry
about the dollars and how to prioritize. For the
same dollars that are going into a those very few
acres of land, I think we could do a tremendous
amount in recognizing what the situation is
around the nation. While you’re from the west,
the fire problem we had this year was not a
western problem. It was a national problem.
I came up here and drove from here to
Missoula. I found it very interesting that as I
stopped in these various fire camps, most of the
people that I saw were from North Carolina and
Georgia and other states all over the rest of the
nation, outside of the west. Also, as I went
through these little communities, I found it very
interesting that I saw the same identical thing
that I see in Texas and throughout the other
parts of the nation. I saw the signs in the
windows of stores. “Thanks to the firefighters.
We appreciate what you‘re doing.” But I also
saw, as I visited with some of those folks that
had had their houses destroyed and had lost
property, the same thing that I saw in the eyes of
Texans that had lost property. They appreciate
what all of us are doing to suppress these fires,
but folks, the reality is that Americans would
rather not have destructive wildfires in the first
place. I think that is where we have to come
from. We’ve got to look at spending priorities. 
There is so much we could learn about
wildfire. Four of the most devastating fire
seasons we’ve had in the state of Texas occurred
in the last five years. It didn’t just happen.
Certainly fuels, population build-up, land-use
changes and all those things were part of it. But
when we got to looking at it and analyzing it, we
learned what we should have known all along.
When you look back at 150 years of weather
patterns in Texas, you find they are on a 25 to 30
year cycle. All of my career, up to 1996, had
been spent in a wet cycle, and every decision I
made was based on this wet cycle. In 1996, we
came out of it, and it’s just as predictable as
anything could possibly be. 
Therefore, we’re going to have to change the
way we look at wildfire, reforestation, and
everything else in the state. We must learn what
it is we’re all about. A lot of these prescribed
burn dollars could be going to learn that. One of
the things I’ve done in Texas is to realize that
wildfire suppression is extremely expensive. I’ve
dedicated 10% of my entire fire budget to
prevention. Folks, that 10% is paying a whole
lot more dividends than that 90% we spend on
suppression. It’s a matter of priorities whether
we prescribe burn, whether we do an awful lot of
other things, but we have to look at all of it.
JOHNSON: Other thoughts on prescribed
burning? Darrell?
KNUFFKE: The Wilderness Society sees it as a
valuable tool, one of a mix of tools. Apart from
the horrible human cost of the Los Alamos fires,
the other victim, we feared for a while, might be
the use of fire as a tool. I was delighted to see
that the press across the country did not rise to
the bait and basically said, “Los Alamos is an
example of what not to do.” It does not 
stand for the proposition that we should not 
use controlled fires in our forests. That was 
good news.
SMALLEY: Around the interface areas, one
thing we’d like to emphasize is that prescribed
fires should be used in strategic goals rather than
in quantity goals. We don’t think it should be
used because we have to burn a thousand acres
here or a thousand acres over there. Rather, if
you burn a smaller number of acres strategically,
it makes it more manageable.
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PINKHAM: Educated as a forester, I have
come to understand that science isn’t always
failsafe, and neither is forest policy. While we do
want to reintroduce fire back into the ecosys-
tem, we need to also understand that where it’s
been excluded for so long, we can’t just launch
back in there and reintroduce it then and there.
At the same time, we can’t stand back and do
nothing. It’s a painstakingly long process with
continued drastic consequences. There needs to
be the opportunity to allow some management
activities. I think the term people are using now
is “restoration forestry,” to try to reintroduce the
diverse cycles into the ecosystem. But we need
to come to a common understanding of both
the science and ecological processes that are 
out there. Too often we get bound up on
questioning each other’s motives on why we
want to do this, but if the focus is truly to restore
back to nature’s methods of management, we
have to allow that there has to be some
manipulation, including thinning to reduce the
densities, and then going through a transition
period. We have to reintroduce fire at that time. 
LITTLE: I thought we had done this before.
We’ve talked about forest health for the last
fifteen years here in the Boise Forest. We talked
about forest health, and they said, “We’re going
to clean up these forests, log all these trees.”
Then here come the lawyers, and everything
gets tied up, and all these plans are stopped. It’s
just like these consensus groups. All you have to
do is have one guy file one suit on one
endangered species, and the whole thing is for
naught. So that looks to me like the biggest
hurdle we have, whether it’s prescribed burning
or salvage sales. 
How do you take care of these litigation
hurdles that rise up everywhere and add to the
cost? One of the biggest cost factors we have is
those big piles of books I’ve been getting from
the Forest Service on roadless plans and resource
management plans, which are just compilations
of stuff to keep the lawyers from taking over. I
don’t know how you resolve that issue. 
JOHNSON: We could keep them tied up 
in conferences all the time so they couldn’t 
file lawsuits. 
WOLFE: Marc, could I ask one thing? On the
prescribed burns, one of the things we need to
do is continue with the education process with
the American public about the role of fire in the
ecosystem and the sometimes positive benefits
of fire. John, I think you mentioned earlier that
Smokey the Bear has been the icon for the Forest
Service: “Only you can prevent forest fires.”
Why couldn’t we think about Smokey helping
to educate the American public on the positive
benefits of controlled, prescribed fires and what
it can do for wildlife habitat, increased forest
health, and increased safety around certain
communities? I think it’s something we need to
look at. I think the agencies, the industry, and
non-profit conservation groups should think
about how we get out the word about managing
fire appropriately and that all fire is not
necessarily bad. 
JOHNSON: John does a great Smokey the
Bear. We’ll have him do it again later. Jim, what
would you tell these federal managers–Lyle
Laverty is sitting right behind you-about how
they should approach this part of the problem?
RILEY: I know Lyle. I have a book I’ll send
you on this soon. Jaime mentioned restoration
forestry, and I think that’s a concept that’s
coming around. I came late to believing in
restoration forestry because, as a private sector
forester, I always believed that if you did forestry
right, you wouldn’t need to do restoration
because your stands would be sustainable and
healthy over time. The fact that they are out 
of balance and need to be restored showed 
that you’ve failed rather than succeeded in
some respect. 
But putting that aside, I believe that the
concepts there, where the science shows us that
we have particularly high-risk stands that are
volatile and susceptible to fire and other agents,
we can quickly look at those through the lens of
science and decide what needs to be left. You
need to look not from a perspective of what
needs to be taken but what’s the right thing to
leave on that site. With that in place, then you
can have a rational conversation about how you
can get that done. Will logging get you there?
What mix of logging and other things? That’s
what we did in the Clearwater Elk Initiative. If
you have all that done based on science, I’m
more optimistic today than ever before that we
can arrive at those site-specific prescriptions.
Then you run headlong into Brad’s excellent
point that the process is so encumbered. How
can you ever implement the plan? We’re there
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with the Clearwater Elk Initiative where we have
an excellent plan supported by a very broad set
of interests but have difficulty getting financing
carried out because of it. I think it’s going to take
an Executive Office instruction or an order that
allows flexibility at the local level to implement
these decisions when they are made, even when
there is not 100% consensus. I believe that’s
what the governors were asking for because
that’s what needs to happen. The biggest failure
of all of this would be sitting here three years
from now, having had all these great ideas and a
lot of local conferences and collaborations, and
having had nothing happen. 
JOHNSON: Darrell, does that make sense 
to you?
KNUFFKE: It does make some sense to me.
Again, the Wilderness Society can support the
idea of restoration forestry but not unreservedly,
and we come to it with some unease, based on
the salvage experience wherein we saw an awful
lot of big, healthy trees taken out to make the
removal of salvage logs economic. 
I’d like to see us embark on a path whereby
we simply commit ourselves to spending what
it’s going to cost to do the job, starting at the
intermix and moving out. The further you get
from where the people live, the less effective are
those treatments if human health, property, and
safety are our concerns. There are a lot of jobs in
this work, and there ought to be. That’s all to the
good, but I think that in this effort, particularly
with the head of steam it seems to have behind
it, we need to separate the logs from the loggers.
Hire the work done by competent professionals,
hired by the Forest Service, to come in and get
the stuff out. If anything saleable results, let the
Forest Service sell it whether there is or isn’t a
market for it. Otherwise, I think we’re going to
run the same risk we encountered in the wake of
the salvage operation. 
RILEY: Let me say this. I think this is a
climate that calls for experimentation in lots of
different things, and I’m willing to say on behalf
of our people that these newer ideas about
different ways to organize contracts, about how
the private sector is involved in the activities are
all things we ought to explore, we ought to
monitor, and we ought to look what worked and
what didn’t. I also think we have to be careful
about these one-size-fits-all prescriptions. Any
forester in this part of the world goes out there
and says, “Each stand is different; each stand
requires a different set of circumstances.” To 
try to say in a uniform fashion that we’ll do
restoration forestry as long as there is no tree
bigger than a certain diameter is equally as
“duh” as it is to say we’re going to high-grade
and only take out the biggest and most valuable
trees.  You have to look at the functioning of 
the ecosystem. 
LITTLE: I’ve got a question for Jim Riley. He
talked about resolving the litigation hurdles at
the end. Are you talking about a pseudo God-
squad? You talked about some kind of executive
decision. This has to be a pretty powerful
executive. These federal courts are pretty tough
to get around. How do you do that?
RILEY: I better be a little careful here. We
have executives that think they are so powerful
that, in a sweeping action, they can set aside
millions of acres of land without any due public
process. You’d think that some of that same
executive authority might be used to grant
discretion to local groups and local states,
particularly in light of the fact that this is a
national emergency. In national emergencies,
maybe it warrants and justifies allowing people
to act in a controlled, monitored fashion and
include experimentation. So I think that the
executive officer of this country, the president of
the United States, can say we’re going to grant
discretion, under the Governor’s control, to
local forest units to write plans and carry them
out. When we’ll do that, monitor it year to year,
and bypass all those paralyzing processes that
mean you don’t get anything done unless you
spend $2 million and two years and have two
hundred attorneys look at it for you. 
KNUFFKE: I don’t think it’s a national
emergency. It’s a national problem. We’ve got
time to make a sensible decision, and there is
never a shortage of time to make a wrong
decision. I think it would be foolish in the ex-
treme to undertake any thoroughgoing changes
in the way we manage our forests until we’re
damn sure we know what happened in the 
year that is just about to pass. When you start
talking about an emergency, that often leads 
us to begin to think about ways to pinch off
public participation. The roadless policy – I’m
guessing you don’t like it though we haven’t
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talked about it. 
JOHNSON: I think that’s a safe assumption.
Accept that as a given. 
KNUFFKE: Two years and a huge public
involvement process, so I’m reluctant to see us,
under the guise of an emergency, start
eliminating people’s opportunities to comment
and to be involved. These are, from my
perspective, our national forests and ought to be
thought of that way. That does not necessarily
argue for a one-size fits all approach to their
management, but they are part of the national
birthright and ought to be dealt with that way. 
RILEY: I agree that there needs to be a
thoughtful process that’s open and available to
people who want to help shape these decisions,
but it needs to happen in time frames that can
be concluded so action occurs on the ground.
I’m not talking about overriding all of that.
There’s a right amount of that, but it certainly
should not be a process that is so stymied in
endless deliberation that nothing occurs.
Whether you want to describe it as a problem or
an emergency, something needs to happen.
JOHNSON: Dr. Pyne, would you stand up
here for a minute? Earlier this morning, it
seemed to me that you were ending where this
conversation has arrived right now. We have the
range of opinions here. What do you make of
what they’re saying?
PYNE: Well, I’m an historian, so I tend to
look to the past rather than project to the future.
I have mixed feelings about what’s going to
happen. Part of it is that we can’t parse up the
big problem into small problems. They are only
going to be solved on a site-specific basis, and
that’s going to be with some kind of collective
action. I’m also a pyromantic, not a pyromaniac.
I would like to see a whole lot more fire on the
landscape, and I don’t think it’s going to
happen. I think we’re going to have very
selective areas where, because fire is an
indispensable ecological component, we have to
have it in, but if all you’re talking about is fuel
reduction or other kinds of manipulations that
are a lot cheaper and more risk-free devices than
fire, I don’t think that’s going to happen. 
The other stakeholder that’s not here is the
international community. Why is it so awful for
Brazil or Indonesia to burn up a million acres of
old growth forest, but if we do it in Yellowstone,
it’s ecologically wonderful? All kinds of issues of
climate change enter into it, so it’s going to be
more complicated, but I would like to
reconstitute the debate. 
I think the whole set of terms that we’re using
remind me of my damn word processor. It starts
capitalizing, and it changes my grammar. When
I write something the way I want it, it defaults
into something else. I just see the whole debate
defaulting into things that will not be solved. If
you want to trisect an angle and you’re only
allowed to do it with a compass and a straight
edge, you’re not going to do it. You have to find
another set of devices to achieve that. So my
hope is that we can somehow go back and
reconstitute the discussion. I would call that a
story or inventing a story or however you want
to do it. 
JOHNSON: Sounds like the perspective of an
historian. Brad Little, with regard to Governor
Andrus’s comment earlier today, how about
rangelands? How should we think about these
issues in regard to rangelands and particularly
his comment about getting the cows on the
range to eat that grass early in the cycle and
then getting them off.
LITTLE: Well, even Chief Dombeck and I
agree that a lot of this fire problem is a fuel
problem. We’ve got a non-smoky way to take
care of the fuel problem. I was in Canada a few
years ago, and as they’re doing here in the
United States, they ran the sheep industry out of
Canada. In Alberta, they have classes now that
teach sheepherders how to pack a mule and
light a Coleman lantern They eliminated the
sheep industry, and then people up there
running big silvacultural operations realized
they had to bring sheep back as a 4-H
management tool. There are places in the
United States where we are getting to that. We’re
just eliminating the sheep industry, which is a
great tool for fuel management, particularly
herded sheep, and they’re going to have to bring
them back in. 
Sebastien Minaberri is paid to graze his sheep
just above Los Angeles as a fuel management
tool. I think even in the $1.8 billion, there is
language that talks about using livestock for fuel
management, but the problem with cheat 
grass is another conference. The fundamental
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element for both forest and range is that you
have to take care of the soil, and you have to
take care of the water. Everything else is
secondary. If you’re going to take care of the soil
long-term, you‘re going to have to do some fuel
management, and we think domestic livestock
has a big place there. 
JOHNSON: Jaime, same question I asked Jim
Riley a while ago. What would you tell these
federal land management agency heads that are
putting this national strategy together? What
ought they to be focused on?
PINKHAM: I guess the irony is that, as the
speakers mantioned this morning, the warning
signs have always been out there. So has the
concerned community, but as Darrell and others
have been saying, how do we make it a
responsive community and finally light the fire
under them, so to speak, to get them to respond.
I think too often we always point the fingers at
the federal land managers and say, “You’re the
ones to blame for the hardships of the world.”
Really, we need to look at another level of
leadership here. It is our Congressional leader-
ship. They’re our neighbors, and they are just as
impacted by this as we are. What do we do to get
them to help create the changes and reforms.
For example, people bad mouth the Endangered
Species Act and its administration by the Fish
and Wildlife Service, but don’t blame the
agency. Look at those who wrote the law. If you
want to effect change, effect change at the
highest level possible. Congress is the place to
look. I also feel that in these kinds of debates,
because of the diversity of values out there, it
needs to run through a deliberative process to
make sure we come to a right understanding. 
John Gordon said one time that the greatest
potential harvest from model forests is not wood
products but knowledge about how diverse
cultures and diverse politics shape our forests.
He’s right on target there. We need to have the
ability for all the communities to come together. 
The prescribed fire thing bothers me because
the same people who fear fire in their backyard
will fear smoke in their backyards. We have a
series of laws and hoops to jump through at the
state level, the federal level, and even the tribal
level in regard to air quality codes. So launching
right back into prescribed fires is going to 
have social impacts just like having wildfires
spreading across the community. 
JOHNSON: How do we deal, Jim Riley, with
roadless lands in this debate? Are we going to
have to think entirely differently about fire in
roadless lands or in designated wilderness?
RILEY: Much of that 39 million acres is in the
roadless lands. If you want to be honest about
addressing what is a region-wide problem, I
don’t think you can separate it by these
convenient categories of things we’ve allowed to
evolve over time. I don’t think it is good policy
to try to look at the roadless lands in a block and
to say they are uniform in some fashion and
need to be treated in some uniform way. That’s
part of what really troubles me about the recent
policy for those. When you get to looking 
at those roadless lands, you will find that
opportunities for environmental problems occur
because access and certain types of management
will not be permitted. It has reduced to zero
what management options will exist for folks
interested in controlling fuel loadings and
densities in these stands. I have asked the
question, and there is no part of that plan that
talks about what they’re going to do about the
high risk of forest lands within the roadless
blocks. It is a big problem, Marc, and I think the
policy is wrong-headed.
JOHNSON: Does someone else have a
perspective on how we ought to be thinking
about this debate with regard to roadless and
wilderness land? Darrell?
KNUFFKE: I might have a point of view on
that. It will not surprise you to hear me say that
the Wilderness Society has been very supportive
of the roadless initiative. In the context of
today’s discussion, I think we have to look at
what transpired in the year 2000 and conclude
that roads and logging haven’t done a heck of a
lot to slow forest fires. This year, heavily logged
areas burned, and then the fires tended to move
somewhat slowly into roadless areas and wilder-
ness areas. The fact that we can log them and
punch roads in them does not necessarily, in
and of itself, get us out of this problem. $1.8
billion sounds like a sack of money, and it is, but
not when set against the need. We can’t do it all.
If we’re going to get the greatest effect, you have
to start at the interface and work out. The
further into the wildland you get, the less
effective are treatments if protecting property is
what’s driving it, and I think it ought to be in
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the short term. 
In 1994, 35% of our firefighting budget
nationally was spent protecting private property.
I don’t think anyone in the room would argue
that hasn’t gone anywhere but up. One
anecdotal report I heard from Montana was that
90% of the money spent fighting fire in
Montana was to protect property. One fire-
fighter said, “When the fire starts, there is no
budget. You can spend $1 million to save a
$50,000 cabin.” That’s the magnitude of what
we’re talking about, and that’s why we had
better spend as much of that $1.8 billion 
as we can get our hands on and not worry for 
now very much about wilderness or roadless
areas. They take generally pretty good care 
of themselves. 
JOHNSON: Other thoughts on that? Jaime? 
PINKHAM: I guess I’d better put my other hat
on here. I also sit on the Governing Council for
the Wilderness Society. On the other hand,
being educated as a forester, sometimes I find
myself getting caught professionally, but that’s
nothing unusual for a salmon-eating Indian
Democrat in the state of Idaho. But that’s
another conference, too.
JOHNSON: Is that a “fourfer”?
PINKHAM: No, that’s more like a “duh.”
JOHNSON: Brad, how should we think about
roadless and wilderness in this discussion?
LITTLE: Well, as a hamburger-eating
Republican in Idaho...You know, my ancestors
and then Jaime’s ancestors burnt in those
roadless areas. They talk about my uncle packing
a 30-30 with him so that nobody would stop
him when he came out behind his sheep, just
setting everything on fire. Now they arrest you if
you do that. They probably tried to arrest him
then. That’s why he packed the 30-30. A lot of
these roadless areas were burnt, historically.
They were burnt by Jaime’s ancestors and mine,
and they were grazed. Some of those roadless
areas were grazed and grazed heavily. So both
the grazing is gone, and the burning is gone. 
I disagree that we don’t have a crisis out there.
I think the crisis is an environmental crisis about
our watershed and the soils that are up there. I
think that we do have to do something, and the
biggest impediment I see to it, as I stated earlier,
is litigation. That’s going to be the question.
How do we get around that? Look at the Quincy
Library group. Look at the enormous consensus
they had in Quincy, California. That was a
tough deal there, and they finally had to pass a
law through Congress. I don’t know whether, for
all these little different ecosystems, if I dare, as a
Republican, use the word “ecosystem,” we have
the time to pass legislation. That’s why I like
Jim’s concept that we need some kind of an
order. We have to have something to operate
with a 50-50 Senate and almost a 50-50 House.
There will have to be some buy-in from Darrell’s
constituency as well as Jim’s and mine. That’s
our challenge, I think.
WOLFE: Marc, can I weigh in here in terms of
fire in some of these roadless areas? I’m going to
approach it from the standpoint of an elk-eating
conservationist. Some folks would say, “How
can you rationalize that? How can you shoot
and eat elk and be a conservationist?” As an elk-
hunter, let’s take the Bob Marshall Wilderness
Area in Montana. In Montana this summer,
many of us who are elk-hunters and many who
are conservationists were saying, “You know, it
would sure be nice if the fires that were
occurring in the Bitterroot Valley were occurring
in the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area because it
would improve the habitat for elk, and it would
improve ultimately our opportunities for elk-
hunting in the Bob Marshall.” 
So some way or another, we have to make
sure that we can keep fire as an important
component of the roadless areas and the
wilderness areas. I’m not sure how we do that,
but it’s an important component and a valuable
ecological process. Our wildlife evolved with fire
in those wilderness and roadless areas. I know
that one of the challenges we have right now, as
wildlife managers, is trying to improve the
quality of the habitat within some of those
areas. So it’s important that we keep that in
mind and figure out a way to keep fire in those
areas. 
JOHNSON: Another quick comment on that
subject. I want to raise one more thing, and then
we’ll go to your questions.
HULL: Well, all I know about is armadillos.
Jim, they eat pretty good, too. I’ve tried them.
From my perspective, 6% of the forest land of
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Texas is federal land. Well over 50% of the
problems that I have are on that same 6%. Some
of that is wilderness area. 
I can tell you what we’re going to do down
our way because of the experience we’ve already
had messing around with a 2-acre fire on a
wilderness area and seeing what happens in
those highly-populated areas. Where there is
roadless, and we have about 4,000 acres that
might be impacted by that, if we can’t drive
there and put it out, we’re going to bomb it from
the air. We’re going to put the fires out, and I
think you’re going to see that across a large
portion of the nation. We cannot afford to mess
around with some of this stuff we talk about 
in our wilderness areas and other places, for 
that matter. 
JOHNSON: Gentlemen, Governor Kemp-
thorne will be here later today to give us the
perspective of the western governors on this
issue, but it’s clear that the governors are
arriving at one central issue, and that is more
involvement at the state and local level in
sorting out these issues. My question to each of
you, very quickly, is how do we get that
involvement screwed into this process? Jim,
how do county commissioners, local elected
officials, and state foresters have an impact on
these issues, which, as we’ve already said, are
national in scope?
HULL: I can tell it’s already starting to
happen. I can tell you, first off, that this B word
is something that’s very foreign to most state
foresters, that is, thinking in terms of “billions”
of anything. In regard to this $1.8 billion that
we’re talking about, the federal land
management agencies at Ag and Interior, are
insisting all the way along that the states be a
very viable partner in this whole thing. It’s
already starting to work. 
Through the states and the cooperation that
we can and must bring to all levels of
participation–not only just local governments
but all of the traditional and non-traditional
resources that are available to deal with the issue
in all of our states–that’s already starting to
happen. That gives me great hope. If we look at
that $1.8 billion and think that’s going to solve
the problem, it’s not. But it’s so imperative that
we do a fantastic job with what we have right
now so that Congress and the Administration
can look at that $1.8 billion as a start toward a
level that we must continue if we’re going to
involve the entire nation and be successful. 
JOHNSON: Other thoughts on local involve-
ment? Jaime?
PINKHAM: I’m pretty optimistic about it. I
think the relationship that has been created
with the Governor’s Office has been pretty
positive. When I reflect back on the floods that
we had up in northern Idaho back in 96, I’m
optimistic that the doors will be open and that
the tribes will be walking through that door to
be a player. 
JOHNSON: Other thoughts on that question?
SMALLEY: The National Wildland/Urban
Interface Fire program, which is sponsored by a
number of agencies, including the Forest
Service, DOI agencies, and the NFPA, offers a
series of workshops directed at local communi-
ties to start redefining what those paradigms are,
what those responsibilities are, in concert with
the American Planning Association, the Nation-
al Association of Homebuilders, and others. It’s
designed to move those efforts down to the local
level for local decision-making, collaborative
planning, creative decision-making, and creative
mitigation strategies and to get people to talk
about these issues from all aspects. We’re already
seeing some success in a number of places, and
we just completed the first year of the work-
shops. We’re already seeing builders offering
fire-wise communities, already seeing the Ameri-
can Planning Association and their chapters
doing some special planning techniques and
studies, and seeing the National Association of
Homebuilders urging all of their members to
attend the workshops. It stimulates the dialogue
and comes long before litigation or reaction 
to legislation. 
LITTLE: On the question of local control on
these resource issues, I guess I have a question
for Darrell. The biggest impediment to local
control is the comfort level of the national
environmental organizations, to be sure their
concerns are addressed down to being very site-
specific. You get to some of these communities,
you need a green card program for environ-
mentalists to bring them in. What would make
the national environmental groups comfortable
with some sort of local decision-making process
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on forest health and fire management?
KNUFFKE: When you say “local decision-
making process,” I think it depends on what
you’re talking about. If you’re talking about
local governmental control of national public
lands, then we’re going to have a big problem
with it. If you’re talking about the active day-to-
day involvement of these people who live close
to these places, we’d be very supportive of that.
I would have to offer a caution, though. You
have suggested that the Quincy Library process
was a model of its kind. We think that it was not
what it was cracked up to be and that there was
a good deal less to it than meets the eye. The
suggestion that only national conservation
groups opposed the Quincy process misses the
fact that just about every California-based
conservation organization also opposed it. The
reason they opposed it was that it was not
inclusive. We weren’t at the table; our partners
in California, in the main, were not at the table.
They had a couple of local activists from Quincy,
the industry, and the county commissioners,
and that’s pretty much the totality of that
enterprise. 
LITTLE: I think you answered my question. 
RILEY: Darrell, do you have an example of
a local, empowered, decision-making process
that has worked from the Wilderness Society’s
perspective?
KNUFFKE: We’re involved in one in
Lakeview, Oregon, a sustained management unit
there. The successes have been pretty
remarkable. The consensus has been remarkably
easy to come to. Not everyone in the
environmental community thinks we have any
business being part of that process, but we are,
and we like the results so far. In our mind, what
made it succeed is that it flowed from consensus
in the community about what they wanted from
the forests that were in their back yard. They
want them healthy. They see them as a backdrop
for economic development of other kinds and
not just for their forestry values. They do see a
lot of promise in value-added wood production
from those forests but at much-reduced levels
from what’s historically taken place. 
Yes, there are some models, but there aren’t
very many around the country that anyone can
point to that we think work. 
RILEY: We seem to have this standard around
the country that I believe in local decision-
making as long as it comes up with the answer I
like. If not, it’s a bad process. A lot of people are
applying that test. But I think the answer to
Marc Johnson’s question is that it has to truly be
an empowered process, and it has to be able to
bring finality of action. People have to be able to
implement it even if there is not 100%
consensus, because you’ll never get that, given
the fact that some people empower themselves
by being professional combatants. That’s the
reality. How you get there has to be led by local
governments, I believe. 
JOHNSON: Let’s go to some questions. 
FREEMUTH: There is one important group of
players in all this whose interests are not quite
represented on the panel. So we’re going to start
with is a question from Dave Mills, who is a
long-time Idaho outfitter, and also a question
from Grant Simonds, who is the Outfitters and
Guides Association’s executive director and
lobbyist. That will start us off, and then we’ll 
go through either your written or stand-
up comments. 
DAVE MILLS: I’ve been outfitting on the
Middle Fork of the Salmon for 24 years, and we
haven’t heard any conversation about the im-
pact of wildfires on recreation. I guess that’s the
question. What’s going to happen next time? 
The outfitters supported the closing of the
Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness. It
was a hard call on the part of the Forest Service
and not a pretty picture financially for all of us,
but we’ve made the most of it. From my
experience in watching how the fire was run,
there were a lot of management problems, and I
could give you several examples. For instance,
we use the air services, so these people were
basically out of work. Well, the Forest Service
hired them on a fourteen-day rotation, but there
wasn’t a lot of communication among the
various fire managers that made the decisions.
For instance, you had professional pilots who
knew the wilderness area, and they hired these
air services. On the next rotation, a guy comes
in who is the manager from Wisconsin, and he
says, “Oh, single engine places aren’t safe,” so
these guys are flat out of work immediately.
Then they have to help these twin-engine pilots
that they bring in from another part of the
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country and tell them about the landscape,
besides having it filled with smoke. 
JOHNSON: Dave, what’s your estimate 
about what the economic impact was, the 
dollar impact?
MILLS: I’ll have to defer to Grant on that, but
it’s horrific. We work out of the town of Salmon,
Idaho, and there was a major impact on the city.
Another example: handling the laundry system.
Keep in mind that the laundries work with the
outfitters and do a great job. Now they’re
handling the Forest Service and the fire-related
stuff. All of a sudden, the fourteen-day rollover
comes along, and that manager brings in
somebody with a portable laundry service, and
our local guy is just out of work. So in the fire
bureaucracy and management systems, there are
people who are building businesses on that
short time period to service these fires, and it’s
an interesting false economy.
JOHNSON: The American entrepreneurial
culture.
LITTLE: The old forest rangers I know talk
about the audit function that took place during
the fire and the rehab. I’m not calling for
another GAO audit, but I do think in some of
these situations, there needs to be-inside this
$1.8 billion particularly in relation to rehab
projects where they spend more money on one
acre than they can buy the adjacent acre for-
some kind of an audit function for both rehab
and firefighting. You really don’t want to get in
and tinker with why they’re doing it, but it sure
isn’t conducive to have it happen over and over.
It leaves a bad taste in a lot of people’s mouths,
and that’s not in anybody’s interest. 
FREEMUTH: Part II of the question, Grant
Simonds. 
GRANT SIMONDS: Several panelists dealt a
little bit with the wilderness fire regime. Let me
just answer Marc’s question. At the height of the
fire season, we had a 150 businesses that were
locked out of designated wilderness due to
closures. That amounted to about $2.4 million
worth of lost business in Idaho. Our brethren in
Montana were also impacted dramatically.
Our folks operate in ecosystems that are not
natural. We forget that about designated
wilderness in Idaho because preceding the 1964
and 1980 legislation to designate, we dealt with
the 1935 policy of putting it out by 10:00 AM
the next morning. So we have this unnatural
buildup whereby we had half a million acres
burn in the Frank, and yet when we go just a
little farther north, as Gary Wolfe said about the
Bob Marshall, we have a different situation with
the Selway/Bitterroot, what I call the asbestos
forest. You can’t get a fire to burn in the Selway,
and we’re losing our elk herds quickly. 
My point is that we need to keep in mind that
while our industry generally supports natural
ecosystems, they are not natural, and we have to
find some way to bridge that gap from the
seventy years of fire suppression to something
that will approach whatever this pre-1870 or
pre-350 year forest was. As Brad mentioned,
these areas have been managed, whether by
Native Americans or cattle persons, and that’s
what missing in the equation for us today.
We ended up being in a position where we
had 65 business operators trying to make a
decision about whether to start a trip, abort a
trip, or change it. Yeah, the web sites and the E-
mail were nice, and I applaud the folks I dealt
with on the phone, but we have to get better
information so we avoid near casualties like we
had at the Flying B on August 18th. That’s a little
nuance that I want to bring to this discussion.
We fine-tuned the system after Storm King
Mountain, but we have to take a look at some of
these nuances that affect the outdoor industry
and our need to get information on a more
timely basis. 
FREEMUTH: Do you have a comment on
that, Darrell?
KNUFFKE: One of the things I have found a
little troubling in the wake of the fires is the
extent to which we seem, yet again, willing to
scapegoat the U.S. Forest Service. Since its
creation, the Forest Service has behaved, in the
main, the way we in the society have told them
to behave. We said put them out, all of them,
leave them out, and keep them out. Now we’re
beginning to reap the consequences of that. In
some of our forests, we have ten times the
number of trees per acre that we had 100 years
ago. If that’s not a prescription for trouble, I
don’t know what is. 
If I could use an example from my neck of the
woods, a year ago last July 4th, in the Boundary
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Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, a windstorm
came up and leveled a swath of trees fifty miles
long and 12 miles wide. When I say “leveled,”
I’m not making this up. These things were
stacked 12, 15, 20 trees deep. The question in
that part of the world is not whether it’s going to
burn but when. The Forest Service was superb in
the wake of that blowdown, and it has been
tremendous ever since. There has been real will-
ingness in those communities, some of them
right outside the wilderness, to pull together, to
settle on what’s important, and to leave the rest
of the baggage behind. The agency is working
very hard to come up with a plan of prescribed
burns inside the forest with the single goal of
interrupting that swath because the blowdown
continued outside the wilderness to the east,
and there are an awful lot of homes there in 
the trees. 
So I think we ought to be a little less eager to
beat up on the Forest Service. 
FREEMUTH: Darrell, along that line, there
are a lot of federal people in this room who are
really glad they came to the conference. We
have here at least 70 people from BLM, who are
having their own conference, and a lot of people
from the Forest Service. They have asked me to
ask this question: How do they avoid being set
up to fail? They have all this money, but in a
year from now, if some miracle hasn’t happened
or we’re thinking too short term, then everyone
turns to them as having failed once again.
They’re nervous about it; they want to succeed;
there is all kinds of money there. What help do
they need so they’re not the Congressional
whipping boy in a year for having failed?
LITTLE: I’m sure they’re going to fail. We
heard earlier figures that it’s going to take maybe
three or four billion dollars a year. In some areas,
they will have great successes, but in some areas,
there is going to be failure. We know there is.
And there are people who will say, “Look, right
there. We gave them $1.8 billion, and they
didn’t take care of it.” 
I think they’re dead on. They’re going to fail
because $1.8 billion, given the situation we
have, is not going to get it done. It is a tough
deal. I think that’s why we have to go back to
the model Marc alluded to where the local
people have some kind of responsibility. You can
see it. $1.8 billion; what do we get for it?
Somebody standing in front of a burned-out
home; it’s going to happen. 
WOLFE: It didn’t take twelve months create
this problem. We’re not going to solve it in
twelve months.
FREEMUTH: Is the Congressional staff in the
room hearing this? You could be of help here,
you know. 
WOLFE: To follow up on that, I agree. This
problem has been created over a period of 50 to
100 years. There is not enough money in the
world to solve it in one year. You couldn’t solve
it in one year if finance wasn’t even a problem.
The reality is that, as a society, we tend to get
worked up and concerned about issues when
they occur, and catastrophic fires throughout
the country are cyclical. They don’t happen
every year. They happen periodically. What
we’ve done is respond and get very concerned
over a one to two-year period, and then it 
fades off. 
What we have to do is recognize that this
can’t be a one-year effort. It can’t be $1.8 billion
for one year; it has to be significant funding for
a significant number of years, recognizing that
we’re going to be working to resolve this
problem in wet years when people are saying,
“Why are you spending all this money to do
something about forest fires? We haven’t seen a
major forest fire for ten years.” We have to keep
in mind that those are cyclical and that you
have to work on the problem incrementally 
and constantly. 
SMALLEY: We also have to remember that
when we get all heated up here and try to make
a quick decision on things, the decisions that we
make now may impact things later on, and we
create contradictions. Florida, for example, got
all upset about the decreasing black bear
population, so they instituted a statewide vanity
license plate to protect the black bear. The extra
money from the license plates went into
protecting the black bear. It’s ironic because the
automobile is the biggest killer of black bears in
the state. The money in this protection fund was
going to set aside land in the core of the state
where the black bear habitat is so no one would
be able to build on it. That now means that the
population densities are going to be even greater
along the coast, which then puts them in hazard
of hurricanes and flooding and more wildfires.
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RILEY: While most people recognize that 
this is a multi-year problem that we have to
work through, you can’t deny, when you look at
the legislative history of the $1.8 billion, that
members of Congress were very serious about
some level of accountability. At the end of next
year, they want to see something more than a
long list of the new green pickup trucks that
were bought and parked behind the fire offices.
They want to see something real in terms of 
a strategic approach to land management, 
fuel treatment, and other things. That’s what 
it’s about.
SMALLEY: I think you’ll see that, in part, on
the local level. If you go back to Jaime’s
comment and the need for land-use planning in
local communities and where and how they put
structures in there, that will be a local decision,
and I think you’ll see some impact in that. 
HULL: Since the states are somewhat
involved in this, I’d just make one comment.
Based on what you said a while ago about the
number of BLM and Forest Service people that
are here, as I look at this, we have Rick Gale,
Larry Hamilton, Lyle Laverty. If we look to those
people and say, “You’re going to fail,” they’re
going to fail. To the many people we have in
here that aren’t part of BLM and the Forest
Service, let me say we’re all going to fail if we
don’t work together to take advantage of this
magnificent opportunity we have with $1.8
billion. That’s all of our responsibility, and we’d
better get behind it and make sure we don’t fail.
FREEMUTH: The next question is going to
come from somebody who represents another
level of government that’s pretty vital with the
fire money and some of the Craig-Widen
legislation that’s come up. That person is John
Foard, a county commissioner here in Idaho. 
JOHN FOARD: This question is for Darrell,
and it’s not county-based, but it is in a lot of
ways. For the last several years, Idaho has had a
process that is attempting, because of the
gridlock on our forests, to identify some sample
projects that might be put into place to test
alternative methods of managing our federal
lands. It comes to a close here next week, and
the group working on it will present its
recommendations to the Idaho Land Board. 
I’m going back now to your comment on the
Quincy Library project. During its three to four
year process, the group has attempted to involve
the Idaho environmental groups, both the
Wilderness Society and the other groups.
Particularly in the last thirteen months, they
have attempted to get their input and have
them at the table during this process. Those
groups have declined to participate. Does that
mean, based on your comments on the Quincy
Library project, that the Wilderness Society and
the other national environmental groups will
automatically oppose anything that comes
forward from Idaho in this regard?
KNUFFKE: I don’t think “automatically
oppose” is even close to accurate. No, not
automatically oppose. All we ever sought in the
Quincy Library Project was a seat at the table,
not just California regional groups. You’re
telling me that the Wilderness Society, the Sierra
Club here, the Idaho Conservation League–none
of them show any interest in this process? Are
these on state lands or federal lands? Well, if we
didn’t show up to play, there must have been a
reason for it, but finally it seems to me we might
have surrendered our opportunity to comment
intelligently on whatever you guys show up
with. I need to know a lot more about it than
what you’ve just sketched out, but that doesn’t
strike me as the way the Wilderness Society
typically comports itself in these processes.
We’re always willing to sit down and talk. What
we’re not willing to do is negotiate existing law
usually. Those processes are not the forum for
that. The process for that is the United States
Congress. Set that aside, and let’s see what we
can come to agreement on. I’m surprised to hear
your description of that process; it’s not at all
like us.
FREEMUTH: Does anybody from the 
local Wilderness Society or ICL want to
comment? Craig?
CRAIG GEHRKE: I remember addressing the
Public Lands Task Force about three years ago. It
was on a Saturday. I remember because I had to
come up with day care for my kids to go do that.
Fundamental thing on the Public Lands Task
Force, from our standpoint, was that they are
aiming toward state management of public
lands. We don’t support that. It’s not part of our
agenda; it’s not something we are pleased with,
and we will not help the process that goes
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toward state management of federal public
lands. It’s as simple as that; we have better
things to spend our time on.
FREEMUTH: I know something about this,
but I’m not going there. Dennis, you had a
question about this?
FOARD: One of the fundamental premises of
this project is that it does not involve state
management of federal lands. It is alternative
methods of federal land management; all five
projects are going before the Land Board next
week. It involves federal managers managing
federal lands and has nothing to do with state
management of federal lands.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Then why is it going
before the State Land Board? 
DENNIS WHEELER: John, one of the best
ways we can help the federal and state land
managers here is for us as the public to stop
sending conflicting messages to them, expecting
them to solve things. When I listened to the
panel this morning, I was kind of astonished. I
hear some saying it’s OK to create conditions
that kill salmon through siltation or that it’s
even OK in the short term to let wildlife die in
uncontrolled fires if it’s going to be healthy for
us to have wildlife in the long term. We’ve
learned as humans that, through preventive
health measures, we can extend our quality of
life. Why don’t we take a preventive health
approach to our forests in solving these
problems rather than to suggest that in the short
term, we have to let salmon and wildlife die in
the process. 
WOLFE: John, if I can respond to that. If you
took my comments to mean that we thought
this was OK, I didn’t intend them to mean that.
What I was trying to explain was that if you’re
looking at the long-term impacts on wildlife,
specifically elk and deer, which is what our focus
is on, the long-term impacts are probably going
to be beneficial. I followed up by saying that we
don’t think that’s the way to do it. We think
there is a better way to do it. I just wanted to
clarify that we weren’t trying to say that we
think that was OK. We wish it would have
happened in a much different way, but we think
that the reality is that the long-term impact on
deer and elk habitat is probably going to be
positive, down the line.
FREEMUTH: OK. Let me read a question, and
then I’ll take some hands. It seems that there is
fundamental disagreement on this question:
How do we reach consensus on what we’re
managing both forests and fire for: property
protection, habitat protection, endangered
species protection, community enhancement?
Do we not need some agreement on the
purposes of the national forests again before we
can move ahead on this? Any reaction to that?
KNUFFKE: I would take a shot at it. I think
that agreement has been emerging over the last
decade. Some of us would say that the strongest
voice for consensus is reflected in the roadless
policy. If you look at the numbers of Americans
in the millions who commented in support of
that policy, that speaks, I think, about strong
support for defending our forests in something
approaching a natural state even though the
scientists tell us we don’t know what the heck
that might be. Letting them be as close to
natural as possible, putting fire back in its
appropriate role—I don’t think we’re as far from
consensus as the question might suggest. 
The Wilderness Society has put together a
forest vision. We think we ought to make
decisions on the national forests subject to this
vision. It comes down with one very significant
feature. We ought to manage our national
forests for that range of values that have
essentially disappeared from other lands. That’s
a good place to start, and that takes in many of
the values mentioned in your question. 
SMALLEY: And wouldn’t it be nice if the fires
stopped at the borders of the national forest
lands or the state forest lands. Unfortunately, it
can’t see those designations, and I think it has to
be a national-state-private combination that
comes up with how these forests are managed
and used. Probably the biggest challenge is to
redefine what those responsibility areas are and
how those responsibilities are actually carried
out. We do a big disservice when we tell the
Forest Service or BLM or the county or a state or
any jurisdiction, “That’s your responsibility.” If
the national forests and national lands are truly
national lands and belong to everyone, then it’s
everyone’s responsibility to look at how these
things should be managed and used. I think that
if we somehow come up with a key to do that 
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on a regional or local level, consensus or agree-
ment possibility. Litigation used to be our
national pastime, but now watching litigation
on television is what we like to do the best. 
The limits of liability should go along with 
that responsibility. 
RILEY: I think consensus is very hard if not
impossible to obtain on these issues. You just
have to face that reality. The most surefire way
to never get consensus is to insist upon it as a
criterion for moving forward. That will make
sure we never agree to anything. 
Let’s see what we’re talking about here. The
Wilderness Society’s vision for management of
the national forests we would disagree with as a
matter of general principle. We think there are
ways that man can interact with the federal
forest lands that mimic the processes of nature
and utilize the opportunities, ways that provide
for the good of the economy and the good of
mankind. I suspect we will forever disagree with
the Wilderness Society about that. 
What I’m wondering if we can agree upon is
the set of lands, the 39 million acres, that the
scientists tell us over and over again are beyond
natural ecological conditions because of the
activities that have occurred on them. They are
over-dense, they exhibit conditions today that
have never existed before under any natural
conditions, and they are not natural stands of
forests. Can we engage about a process of
restoration forestry that we can all agree upon to
bring them back within what the Wilderness
Society would agree are natural conditions and
what we would agree is a rational way to get
there? If we can get agreement there, we’ll have
a much better platform on which to carry on our
historic discussion about this. But agreement
will come within a group of folks; it will not 
be consensus.
KNUFFKE: That’s probably true, and I think
that may be an area that would be fruitful to
pursue. There ought to be some things we can
agree upon so long as we know darn well going
in that there are some places we will disagree. I
did not mean to suggest for a second that you
ought to advocate for your issues on the basis of
my forest vision policy. I meant only to describe
it as the document that governs our thinking
about forest management.
RILEY: And certainly you didn’t expect that I
was going to agree that the roadless policy was a
consensus policy. 
LITTLE: You asked about what parameters. I
think generally the old principle that we used to
use of taking care of the soil and the water very
long term–not short spikes in one-plant
communities because that happens to be helpful
for one species or another–but the long term,
very long term health of the soil and the water
should be the key component. Really,
everything else is secondary. If it means building
a road in there to do something to get some trees
out of there to stop a catastrophic fire, if I got to
send out the poll west-wide with that question
on there, people would come back and say,
“That’s correct.” The long-term health of the soil
and the water for our children and
grandchildren is the most important thing. 
FREEMUTH: I’d remind everyone before we
stop that we sort of came to consensus on how
we were going to elect the president, and we
called it the electoral college. Maybe that
consensus wasn’t such a good one, or maybe 
it was. 
ANDRUS: We’re going next door for lunch.
First of all, Dave Mills made the comments
about the impact on recreation. Remember what
Jim Hull said about setting aside 10% for
prevention and getting more from it than he
gets from the 90% for suppression. With the
$1.8 billion, maybe you could divide it up with
one project in each forest that would be a
sampling, but what Dave Mills didn’t have the
opportunity to say is that the cost of fires goes
clear across the whole spectrum of our economic
society. One motel in Stanley lost $42,000 in
cancellations when the river was closed. The
service station across the road stopped selling
gas. Grant could give you a list of others that I
don’t have in my head. It impacts everything, so
some way we have to come up with an answer,
and we hope that’s what we’re here for today. 
I had a note from a gentlemen from FEMA. It
says that FEMA pays only for those uninsured
properties, not the insured properties. In Idaho,
the total claims paid this year were $14,000. 
We’re going to have lunch now, and then I’ll
see you back in here. We want to keep this thing
moving along.
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CECIL D. ANDRUS: Good afternoon, ladies
and gentlemen. Thank you very much for
coming in here to break bread with us. I
appreciate the participation of all the people in
the morning session. Once again, my thanks to
the Idaho Statesman and its staff. We will, in fact,
have a white paper for you, but I doubt that it
will be finished by Monday. 
We have the opportunity today to hear from
a very experienced individual when it comes to
fire. I’m going to put him on now, but we need
to have you back in the other room by 1:50
because we have a satellite hookup from
Washington D.C. with some Congressional
members, and we need to begin promptly at
2:00 PM.
Rick Gale has been in the National Park
Service for more than 40 years. He is a second
generation Park Service official, and he and his
wife have three daughters, all three of whom are
employed by the National Park Service. Doesn’t
that cause a little conflict?
RICHARD T. GALE: They don’t work for me. 
ANDRUS: Rick is now the National
Commander for Fire and Aviation for the
National Park Service, and is stationed here in
Boise. He was also the Fire Commander during
the Yellowstone fire, and I’m sure he’ll use that
someplace in his comments. He’s an
outstanding individual who can tell you the way
it is, has enough time in grade that he doesn’t
have to kowtow to ex-governors or anyone else.
He can tell it straight, and that’s the way you’re
going to hear it today. Rick Gale.
GALE: Thank you, Governor. Good
afternoon. Given the day it is, I have to digress
for one moment because nine years ago today, I
had the distinct honor and privilege of being the
Incident Commander for the commemoration
of the 50th anniversary of the bombing of Pearl
Harbor. The reason I mention that today is that
I get a flood of wonderful memories every
December 7th. I haven’t really thought about
fire this morning; I was thinking about the Pearl
Harbor commemoration. What an experience.
More fun than Yellowstone, more rewarding
than Yellowstone. 
I’m here as the third string or something for
Bob Barbee, the Superintendent of Yellowstone
in 1988. Six weeks ago, he retired as Regional
Director in Alaska, and when he retired, he did
two things. He immediately moved to Bozeman,
Montana, and he got a hip replacement that
prevented him from traveling, so you’re stuck
with me. 
I’m going to talk about some lessons and
reflections on Yellowstone, but I’m also going to
do a few other things. The Governor said I could
talk about any aspect of wildfire that I wanted
to, so I’m not going to miss this chance for a
bully pulpit. 
The first thing I would tell you is this: My
second favorite general, Colin Powell, says
something that I think is absolutely right on
target. He says, “The role of the leader is not to
be the great organizer; it’s to be the principal
disorganizer.” I hope this afternoon to provoke
and stimulate you a little bit by disorganizing
some stuff for you. 
At Yellowstone, one of the things that kept
me (a) sane and (b) out of trouble was the
41
executive director of the Greater Yellowstone
Coordinating Committee, who had to do that
about twelve times a day. He is now the Deputy
Regional Forester for the Intermountain Region
in Ogden, Utah. I’m going to ask him, when I
get through with some reflections, whether he’d
like to say something. Jack Troyer. The only
reason I was successful at any of it was thanks 
to Jack 
What I’m going to do is share some
reflections and then share some lessons learned.
I would tell you that we probably learned these
lessons in Idaho in 1985, in northern California
in 1987, in Washington in 1994, in Florida in
1998, and in Texas, Oklahoma, Idaho, and
Montana in 2000, and any year you want to take
back from that, we’ve been there and done that.
We’re going to talk about that a little bit.
Some reflections, and here I think I’m
reflecting mostly Bob Barbee’s thoughts. It was
an interesting summer as you might guess. One
of the things we learned is that neighbors once
friendly can become anguished and hostile. We
learned that cohesiveness can give way to
recrimination and blame. Yet, during that
summer, there were numerous acts of what I
would call heroism and certainly thousands of
examples of selfless cooperation. I think the fires
that summer brought out the best and the worst
in human nature. We learned that good
communication with the public is essential.
There is a corollary here. Good communication
works very well when you’re winning. It’s an
entirely different matter when you’re getting
your ass kicked. To quote one of my colleagues
in southern California, “I’ve had a lot of difficult
times on fires, but this is the first time I’ve had
my butt kicked 28 consecutive days.” I had it
kicked for 39.
We learned that the media is not necessarily a
window to the world. There was a lot of hype.
There was even more distortion, but there were
a lot of attempts at honest reporting. The thing
we learned out there–and I don’t think we’ve
learned it very well yet–is that we weren’t
prepared to deal with the media on that scope
with that level of focus. I don’t think we are any
better prepared to deal with that same kind of
situation today than we were in 1988.
We also learned that there is no shortage—in
fact, there is an overabundance—of pundits,
pontificators, and polemicists. It’s sort of like
Florida today. Maybe that’s where they all went. 
We learned once again that mechanized
equipment is not a panacea, especially when
you sit in the Madison River Canyon, watch the
fire come to the south rim of the canyon, and
jump the half mile across to the north slope.
Multiply half a mile by the eight feet of a
bulldozer blade, and tell me how many blades
wide you have to have a fire break.
We learned, once again, that during extreme
or severe fire conditions, all the firefighting
resources in the free world aren’t going to make
one whit of difference. They never have, and
they never will. In fact, I will tell you this—
although even I had enough sense not to say
this publicly at the time–the best thing we could
have done in mid and late August and in early
September would have been to send all the
firefighting resources home except those who
were doing structural protection. How do you
suppose that would have played politically? or
in the media? You couldn’t do it. 
But we weren’t doing any good. I will tell you
about the day that my Co-Area Commander and
I gave thirteen incident commanders the
order—because that’s what it ended up having
to be— that we were going to stop fighting fires
on the internal lines. We just about had an
insurrection on our hands. If we can’t get our
best and brightest incident commanders to
understand extreme conditions, how do we 
ever expect anybody else to do that who isn’t in
that game?
We learned there, although I wasn’t smart
enough to realize it then, and we’ve learned
again that the challenges from now on out in
fire management aren’t in the physical sciences.
They are in the social sciences. I don’t know that
we have come to grips with that or are even
aware of that. But to me, that’s something we
have to look at. That goes across any social
science you want to talk about, whether it’s
economics, organizational psychology, whatever
you want to get to, I think that’s where the
challenges are. Just look at the mixed messages
between Smoky the Bear and the message that
prescribed fires are good. 
Jack Troyer, do you want to say anything?
JACK TROYER: Well, if I had to come up with
more lessons learned, they would be these. First,
in the world of television, if you don’t have a
prescribed burn policy that can be explained
clearly and completely in 30 seconds, then you
are perceived as having no coherent policy. “Let
burn” wasn’t really let burn, but that’s what
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came across. 
Second, in 1988, for the first time, the fire
behavior that was observed was of a much
greater magnitude than anything we had
observed before. We weren’t prepared for it, and
it was a glimpse into the future. 
Third, what happened in 1988 really
emphasized that fire recognizes no political
boundaries. The fire was running back and forth
from private to public lands controlled by
various federal, state, and local entities. It was
the same with the aftermath and the noxious
weed problem. They don’t recognize political
boundaries either. It underscores the need for
coordinated efforts. 
GALE: Thank you, Jack. Having Jack around
was one of the great pleasures there. The final
lesson we learned at Yellowstone, although there
are a thousand more, was that Mother Nature is
not always a gentle hostess, but she always bats
last. I would submit to you that we did not learn
anything new at Yellowstone. Steve Pyne’s a far
better historian than I am, so I probably have
this quote a little wrong, and you’ve probably all
heard this: Those of us who do not learn from
history are doomed to repeat it.
That leads me into some other topics, and I’ll
be happy to answer any questions about
Yellowstone as long as you don’t get too much
into rehab because I’ve only been there five or
six times since 1988, so I’m not going to be able
to get into any details there for you. 
I want to talk about some other things. I
heard this morning–and I cringe every time I
hear it-the words “catastrophic fire season.”
Having said that, I certainly recognize that one’s
definition of catastrophe depends on whose ox
is being gored. If you lost your house, that’s a
catastrophe. But I would submit to you that
1988 and 2000 were not catastrophic fire
seasons. I say that for one simple reason. With
very few exceptions, in both those years, the
same number of people we sent out to the fire
line in the morning came back to the fire camp
in the evening. To me the catastrophic fire year
was 1994 when we killed 34 people.
Here’s something I believe you can take to the
bank. If we had not killed 14 of those people in
the same place and at the same time, we would
still be doing business as usual. We would not
have done one thing about that. The only
reason we ever had some of these reviews, safety
awareness studies, and maybe even the 1995 fire
policy was that we had an unmitigated disaster
at South Canyon with 14 individuals. 
Now we react to disasters, and usually we do
two things. First, we wring our hands, and then
we point fingers. We’re good at doing studies
about the disasters. You go to any fire
management office, whether it’s state or federal
or local around the country, and there is a stack
of disaster review reports, gathering dust. I
would bet you that if you looked at the
recommendations, you could almost tape record
one and replay it again for the next. 
So what’s wrong with this picture? I think
what’s wrong with this picture is that we’re
looking at the wrong thing. In addition to
looking at the disasters, we ought to look at the
“There but for the grace of God...” events, those
“almost” situations. We don’t look at those, and
we don’t learn from those. Yet to me, those are
the ones that will tell us the lessons learned.
Why didn’t it go sour? What was the difference
there. We need to be smarter about what we are
really analyzing and reviewing here, ladies and
gentlemen, if we’re really going to learn lessons
and change the way we do business in the 
fire game. 
Now one other thing we all know but don’t
do. We learned again in 1988, we learned it
many times before, and we learned it again this
year. During extreme or severe fire conditions,
we can’t do much for the fire. Yet, we persist,
each and every one of us—whether we are
politicians, policy-makers, or practitioners–with
the myth that we can put the fire out. We don’t
put the fire out in extreme or severe conditions
until those conditions change.
What do we do? We have severe conditions,
so we adopt the same strategies and tactics that
work well for us in normal times. Then we
wonder why they are not working in an
abnormal situation. We fail to understand that
we are trying to handle abnormal conditions.
We believe we can make a difference with the
addition of a few more firefighting resources and
keep hammering away, day after day after day. 
Let me give you an example of that. The
Dome Fire, which occurred in an infamous place
called Bandolier National Monument in the
Sante Fe National Forest, was a wildland fire.
New Mexico had been in a drought, and the
wind was blowing. A strategy was selected that
the review team said, given the conditions,
meant it wasn’t a question of whether we were
going to have an entrapment; the question was
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where, when, and how many people were going
to be involved. We did have an entrapment with
49 people into shelters. Fortunately, there were
no injuries and no fatalities, and we burned 
an engine. 
Now here’s my favorite quote to the review
team from one of the people involved in the fire.
“Well, our strategy would have worked if this
had been a normal year.” We can laugh, but
every practitioner in this room has said the same
sort of thing. I know that’s true because I have.
We have to get smarter about this, folks. We
have to back off and think about what we’re
doing here. 
I’ll probably raise a few hackles, but let’s talk
about the Clear Creek fire in Idaho. We would
look at the daily situation report, double the
amount of resources assigned to the fire, and the
percentage of containment would go down. In
these kinds of years, as Jerry Williams so
eloquently put it, we have to do what the fire
will let us do and not what we would like to do.
Or as another IC [Incident Commander]
colleague of mine puts it, “We’ve got to learn to
back off to the best ridge, not the next ridge.”
We’ve also got to learn to say, when we’re
thinking about adding more resources to one of
these bottomless pit fires, when is enough,
enough? What are we doing besides putting
people in jeopardy and spending money?
All right. That, I hope, has stirred up a few
folks. If I’m not, I’m missing my charge up here. 
We had a lot of talk this morning and we’ll
have a lot more about the National Fire Plan,
which is to build off the President’s Report and
the appropriations stuff. I agree with Jim Hull
that it’s one of the most unique opportunities
we have ever had, and we need to do it right. 
Let me talk about three things, just to give
you a snapshot of how this might work. They all
involve wildland fires in 2000. They all involve
National Park areas, and they all involve the
effectiveness of hazard fuel reduction. The first
of these is Mesa Verde National Park in
Colorado, which is a pinion-juniper fuel type.
Because of the threat to cultural resources and
structures, there was no way that you were going
to reduce fuels in that fuel type with prescribed
fire. So for five years, they had a variety of
mechanical reduction programs, and in 2000,
when the Bircher Fire hit, as it came toward
those structures, that park infrastructure, and
those irreplaceable cultural resources of Mesa
Verde, it laid down, engines got in there, 
and they stopped the fire. Success Story 
Number One.
Success Story Number Two. Jewel Cave
National Monument in South Dakota. Fuel type:
Ponderosa pine, typical Ponderosa pine with
successful suppression for 70 years. Thick. Too
thick to prescribe burn. So we did mechanical
fuel reduction first to reduce some of the fuels,
then we prescribe burned it twice, in 1996 and
1999. The Jasper Fire, 2000. Full head of steam,
the head of the fire was bore-sighted right for
headquarters and the park infrastructure. There
weren’t any resources out in front of it because
you could hardly fly an airplane fast enough to
keep up, let along anything else. It hit where the
fuel reduction had been done, and the head of
the fire split and went around that park and 
that infrastructure.
The final success story was in Jim’s state of
Texas, Lake Meredith National Recreation Area.
It’s an interesting place because it’s one of three
places where the National Park Service actually
manages oil and gas resources. Never mind. We
won’t get into that. Anyway, here grassland is
the fuel type, and they burned it in 1998 and
again in 1999. There was a fire just outside that
park, 16,000 acres, which basically had every
single resource tied up. There was a single
engine left. A fire started at Lake Meredith and
headed toward the town of Sandford and toward
the gas and oil field development that we had
prescribed burned. The fire came, it hit where we
burned, it laid down, and one engine took care
of it. 
Those, to me, are the kind of success stories
we need to build on, a hundred-fold over, with
this new money we’re getting. I think we have
the opportunity and the ability to do just that,
and I’m pretty danged excited about it, frankly.
I’m as excited as Jim Hull is. 
We are going to need to be collaborative. You
have to understand that I’m talking about
collaborative here in the sense of, according to
the dictionary, “cooperating with an agency or
instrumentality with which one is not
immediately connected.” I’m not talking about
the collaboration definition that talks about
giving succor to the enemy. That’s supposed to
be humorous.
In addition to the National Fire Plan, the
Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior, re-
commissioned the original team that put
together the 1995 Federal Fire Policy to look at
that. This is the 2000 edition in final draft form,
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ready to go to the two Secretaries for, we hope,
their signature and adoption. I’m not going into
a lot of detail about that. Suffice it to say that the
principal finding was that the 1995 policy is
sound and should continue. But it strengthens
and mirrors the National Fire Plan in the sense
of collaboration among the feds, the states, the
locals, and the tribes. So they are to work
together, and I think that is an excellent thing.
Our challenge, it seems to me, is that we have
to look beyond these immediate 2001 projects.
We have to look beyond hazard fuels. We have
to look beyond focusing the fire issue on the
intermountain west. We need to develop a long-
term, strategic plan that includes all aspects of
fire management across the nation and involves
all our partners.
I’m going to give you a couple of examples,
and I will slightly exaggerate, but not much, for
emphasis. The Olympic Peninsula of
Washington. Right here in the core, you have a
national park. Surrounding that core, you have
a national forest. Surrounding that forest core,
the area is the responsibility of the Washington
State Department of Natural Resources. So what
do we have on the Olympic Peninsula? It
doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that
we have three fire management organizations,
we have three discreet fire management plans,
we have three separate response capabilities, and
we have three dispatch organizations. Do the
park, the forest, and the Washington DNR
coordinate? Absolutely. But are they joined at
the hip with one overall fire management plan
and one united response and one dispatch
center? You know the answer as well as I do. 
That, to me, is what we’re talking about when
we talk about collaboration. It’s more than just,
“Yes, we’ll work together.” It’s not just the
Olympic Peninsula. That was an easy one to get
to because it’s so obvious. That’s the question.
Why aren’t we doing that? That’s our challenge,
to do those kinds of things and use these
resources we have. We may have a billion, and 
it sounds like a lot money, but as Senator
Dirksen said, “A billion here, a billion there, 
and pretty soon you’re talking about real
money.” Our finite resources are not maybe the
financial ones; they are human ones. So we 
had better start thinking about how to use 
this money in the most effective, cohesive,
collaborative manner. 
I’m going to go back to Cerro Grande. That
was Jerry Williams idea, but first, I have to tell
you a story. When you get a situation like Cerro
Grande, you can have about three options. You
can cuss, you can laugh, or you can cry. But
about five days after Cerro Grande occurred, I
got an E-mail from a friend of mine who is a
park ranger in Scotland. He said, “I thought you
be interested in what the BBC is playing on this
fire. The quote he sent was, ‘American Park
Ranger Burned Down the Alamo.’
I’m not going to talk about whether
prescribed fire should or should not have been
lit in Cerro Grande or whether there were or
were not contingency resources or whether the
strategy and tactics after it was declared a
wildfire were adequate or whatever. Let’s look at
a bigger picture here. If the objective was to
provide defensible space and reduce threats to
Los Alamos, we went about this backwards. We
should have started out doing fuel reduction in
and around the city of Los Alamos. Then we
should have gone out to protect stuff in the
Santa Fe National Forest. Step 3 would have
been the hazard fuel reduction that we
attempted to do at Cerro Grande. There are a lot
of reasons why that didn’t happen, but again,
we have to start working smarter, not working
harder, and thinking through what we are really
doing here. I think we need to plan and execute
every fire management plan in a cohesive,
holistic manner among all our partners. We
have an opportunity to do that, and if we don’t
take it, we’re silly.
I’m noted for my tactical truths. I’m going to
give you a tactical truth and then a strategic
truth and then, if we have time, we can take
questions. Do we have time?
ANDRUS: That depends on how long it takes
you to tell the truth.
GALE: All right, here’s the tactical truth.
Remember it is almost impossible to undervalue
the status quo. Think about that.
Here is the strategic truth, and it emphasizes
what I’ve been trying to say but in a different
way. The most important principle is that the
strategy be correct. If the strategy is wrong, no
amount of tactical brilliance, dogged determi-
nation, superior morale, or material can
compensate. That again is what I’m trying to
talk about with the big picture. 
I always enjoy an opportunity to tip over the
apple cart, and I hope I have provoked and
maybe even irritated a few of you. So let’s take a
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couple of questions.
ANDRUS: We have time for about three
questions. It depends on whether you make a
speech or ask a question. Who has one?
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Do you agree with
the other gentleman who said today that the
10% he spent on prevention was worth more
than the 90% he spent on suppression? 
GALE: That was Jim Hull, talking about
prevention, right? Yes, I agree with that. Again, I
think that’s working smarter. Does that mean we
never have to do anything with the 90%? No, it
doesn’t, but I think prevention is where you get
the best bang for the buck. I agree entirely.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: What do you think
of the moratorium that was placed on prescribed
burns after Los Alamos? We held up a lot of
prescribed fires last year on national forest and
BLM land. What is your response to that?
GALE: The moratorium for everybody but the
National Park Service was lifted thirty days later.
It only applied to prescribed fires west of the
100th meridian. The moratorium was lifted after
30 days for every agency but NPS. You need to
get someone from the BLM or Forest Service to
see whether they continued it for other reasons,
but there was no moratorium from either
secretary after that period of time for other than
the NPS. 
ANDRUS: Rick Gale, thank you very much. I
have to have all of you back in there in about
eight minutes. We have a satellite hookup, but
you’re free to go as long as you’re back in your
seats in eight minutes.
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MARC C. JOHNSON: We had a very good
discussion this morning on the history and
science of wildfires, a review of their impacts by
our stakeholders just before lunch, and some
practical words of wisdom from Rick Gale about
fighting fires in the west, who talked about some
of the lessons we’ve learned and maybe need to
re-learn over and over again. We’re going to
conclude our conference this afternoon with a
discussion among the folks who are charged
with developing and implementing fire policy. 
We’re extremely pleased to have the
Governor of Idaho, the honorable Dirk
Kempthorne, with us today and we are truly
pleased to have, by satellite from Washington,
D.C., Idaho’s Second District Congressman,
Mike Simpson, and Representative Tom Udall
from the great state of New Mexico. It’s a
pleasure to have them both with us. 
I also want to introduce Lyle Laverty who has
the enviable or unenviable task of developing
for the Forest Service the National Fire Strategy
and one of his counterparts in the Interior
Department, Larry Hamilton, Director of the
National Interagency Fire Center. 
Governor, welcome to you, sir. The Western
Governors’ Association had a meeting in San
Diego last week. Could you begin by giving us a
little background on where the western
governors are coming from with regard to this
National Fire Strategy?
GOVERNOR DIRK KEMPTHORNE: Marc,
thank you very much for being down there for
that session. Governor Andrus, I commend you
for the convening of this gathering and this
exchange of good information. Lyle Laverty was
one of our speakers. The WGA had two plenary
sessions, and virtually the entire first day of the
meeting, we discussed the condition of the
forests with regard to the ecosystem and health.
Then we talked about where do we go from here,
the restoration, etc. 
I thought it was an outstanding presentation.
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I wish that somehow I could appropriately en-
capsulate some of the good things that were
discussed there. I will try to touch on them, but
again, Lyle, I want to compliment you. You did
very well, and I’m looking forward to your
comments here. Larry, I’m delighted to be 
with you.
In September, the Western Governors’
Association had a meeting in Salt Lake City. A
number of western governors met with the
Secretary of Interior, Bruce Babbitt, and with the
Agriculture Secretary, Dan Glickman. I don’t
think anybody doubts that the current forest
policy is not working. We have just come off
probably the worst forest fire season that Idaho
has ever experienced. 1.3 million acres, one
billion board feet of lumber from which you
could probably have built 100,000 single family
homes, went up in smoke. That’s what I contend
happened to the forest policy; it went up 
in smoke.
The two secretaries concurred with the
governors that the states need to be full partners
in dealing with the forest health. Language from
that meeting was then included in the Interior
appropriations bill. That language is very
straightforward. It calls upon the secretaries to
work with the states as full partners in
developing a ten-year plan for forest health.
The WGA meeting in San Diego was a
continuation of that to see some of the progress
that’s been made by Lyle and his team. We were
impressed with what we heard. We were also
concerned with some of the findings, the
statistics that have been pointed out. I know it’s
been referenced, but here’s the GAO report,
Western National Forests. “A cohesive strategy is
needed to address catastrophic wildfire threats.”
This estimates that 39 million acres are at what
they call “high risk of catastrophic fire.” 
The game plan that’s been devised suggests
that we could probably treat 3 million acres a
year. If you run your math, you could say, “Well,
in perhaps ten to twelve years, we’ll have
something that perhaps is fire safe.” Not fire
retardant but fire safe forests. The trouble is that
we will continue to have these catastrophic fires
in the meantime. One of the quotes that struck
a chord with me was from Wally Covington,
who is a professor of the Ecological Restoration
Institute at Northern Arizona University. He
said, “Trends over the last half-century show
that the frequency, intensity, and size of
wildfires will increase by orders of magnitude
the loss of biological diversity, property, and
human lives for many generations to come.”
There is also concern that this report by GAO
was even conservative, that it’s many more
million acres than has been reported. 
So we now have a partnership that has been
established, Marc, between the states and our
federal partners. We certainly have the attention
and support of the Administration. The
governors felt good about the presentations
made by the Forest Service and by BLM. There is
much more I’d like to discuss about this, but,
Marc, do you now want to make this into 
a conversation?
JOHNSON: I would like to do that, Governor,
with your permission. I’d like to bring
Congressman Simpson and Congressman Udall
into the discussion. Gentlemen, we had a lot of
talk here this morning about the $1.8 billion
that the Congress has appropriated to deal with
some of these fire issues. Knowing what both of
you know right now about how the national
strategy is beginning to unfold, are you
comfortable with the way the Forest Service and
the BLM, in particular, are establishing this
national strategy? Mike Simpson?
CONGRESSMAN MIKE SIMPSON: I’m not
sure “comfortable” is the right word. As you
know, when you appropriate $1.8 billion to
address fire suppression, fuel reduction, and
rehabilitation, what we need to see and what
Congress wants to see are solid results. We’re
going to need to see that this money actually
goes on the ground and is doing those things
that, in fact, were promised to us. We need to see
that stakeholders and state and local govern-
ments are involved. That’s one of things I’d like
to discuss with Lyle. Since he’s going to be
implementing this plan, how sure are we that
the states and local governments are going to be
involved, to what degree will they be involved,
and what type of results can we expect to see out
of this?
This is going to have to be an ongoing
appropriation from Congress even though this is
a one-time appropriation. If we don’t address
wildfires in the west effectively, we’re going to
have to appropriate more and more money. If
you look at the fires that have happened this
past year and in previous years, everyone wants
to point fingers, and there are plenty of places 
to point fingers. Congress has its share of
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responsibility and blame to take on these
wildfires. For years, the Forest Service has
requested money for fire suppression, fuel
reduction, and other things. The Administration
has then reduced that amount, and generally
Congress has reduced that a little bit more. Over
the last four or five years, the Forest Service had
about a15% reduction in what it has requested
for fire suppression and fuel reduction.
Congress needs to take some responsibility for
the condition of our forests, and we’re going to
have to appropriate more money. Unless we see
a cohesive strategy, why we need to appropriate
this money, what results we can expect to see,
it’s going to be difficult to get it through
Congress. So I’m optimistic that when we see
how this $1.8 billion was spent, we will see some
positive results from it. 
JOHNSON: Congressman Udall, same
question, sir. How are you feeling about the way
the strategy is unfolding at this point?
CONGRESSMAN TOM UDALL: Thank you,
Marc. Let me also say hello to my friend, Cecil
Andrus, who is out there and with whom I have
worked. I think Mike is correct on the approach
Congress needs to take here. This is very early
for us to buy into whatever strategy and
proposals are out there. We’re not even going to
learn until next week, with the publication of
the Federal Register, which communities are
being targeted, which ones are at the highest
risk, and how the monies are going to be spent.
Until we start seeing what the communities 
and strategies are, it’s hard to buy into this
whole thing. 
Another point that I think is very important
to me and my Congressional District is that
there are rural areas, which we call “forest-
dependent communities”. I hate the term, but I
use it because we’re all on the same wave length.
The people who live in these communities are
very independent, and they don’t think of
themselves as being dependent. Those commu-
nities have a real opportunity to revive and grow
as a result of this, and I believe we can use the
contracting and fuel reduction efforts in a way
that will give communities close to the forest
some economic opportunity. I think it would
really help in many rural areas across the west.
So I am looking for the Forest Service, the BLM,
and the other agencies to organize themselves in
such a way so that there are small contracts so
that smaller operators in local communities can
be involved in this process. I think we would
really be missing out if this turns into a
Washington-run operation.
I liked very much what Governor
Kempthorne said about partnerships. We really
need a partnership among the federal govern-
ment, the states, local governments, and in my
area, the Native American tribes, who have some
real concerns about the forests. Several of the
tribes had lands burned in these fires. 
So I think it’s early, but I think we know
where we want to go. We want to thin, and we
want fuel reduction. I think prescribed fires have
to be a part of the process. If can come to
agreement and move forward, this is an area in
which we should all be able to cooperate. 
JOHNSON: Lyle Laverty and Larry Hamilton,
these gentlemen are from Idaho and New
Mexico, but they sound as though they could be
from Missouri. They need to be convinced.
Show me the money, and show me how you’re
going to spend the money. Show us where the
results are going to be on the ground. Can you
give us today some reassurance that you’re off to
a good start?
LYLE LAVERTY: Marc, a great question, and I
appreciate the comments of both congressman.
I feel as though I have a whole load of hay to
drop off, but I don’t want to choke everybody.
The first piece is that we really have changed
behaviors. As the Governor addressed, we have
been working very closely with both the Interior
and Agriculture agencies and, more important,
in a different relationship with the western
governors. Probably the first element that
models what we’ve been doing is this list of
communities that Tom mentioned. This list has
been generated as a result of a session that the
western governors called in Denver, and they
addressed the need to bring this list together. 
It is being generated by the governors, by 
the states. This is not a federally-generated list 
of communities.
JOHNSON: This is a list of communities that
you governors see as being at particular risk 
for fire? 
LAVERTY: That’s right. The conference report
speaks about identifying these communities that
are at high risk. The real value in that will be to
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do just what Congressman Udall spoke about.
We can begin to identify where we can begin to
make the investments in land treatments or
activities that will begin to address some of 
the issues that surfaced this morning, where 
we can have some targeted opportunities, 
again developed in collaboration, to help 
these communities.
We spoke to Senator Domenici’s staff the day
before yesterday, and we talked about the list of
communities. As you might expect, many of the
projects for 2001, because of how this process
works, were started two or three years ago and
are finally coming to the point where we can
implement those projects. We’ve racked up the
communities. As of last week, we had thirty
states that had submitted their lists of commu-
nities. Again, this is a nationwide approach, and
that was the intent of the legislation. We had
about 4300 communities and 500 projects on a
very coarse screen that we’ve been able to match
up with that list of communities. 
As we work on into 2001, we’ll get into the
collaborative ideas that Governor Kempthorne
talked about. We’ll begin working with states
and local communities, working with the
National Association of Counties about how we
can begin to identify targets, what opportunities
we should be looking for. 
If there is a quick take-home message, it’s that
the behavior has changed already. Congressman
Simpson and Congressman Udall, we’re looking
forward to the opportunity to come back and
visit you next week. 
JOHNSON: Larry, before Lyle has a full...
LAVERTY: Do you want some more? I have
some more.
LARRY HAMILTON: I have a couple of bales
myself. I’ll unload one of those. I’d like to go
back to some things that were said this morning,
and I’d like to thank Bob Nelson for talking only
about the Forest Service, not the BLM. I really
appreciate that.
I’ve worked at BLM for 27 years, and I never
felt as though I worked in a theme park. As a
matter of fact, I’ve had some days when I’ve
actually had to pinch myself to make sure I
hadn’t gone straight to hell, and I’m hoping this
isn’t one of those days before this is over. 
I’m commonly called what’s referred to as a
“bureaucratic bottom-feeder,” and I really
appreciate the opportunity to come to the
surface here today and take a look around. But I
have this urge and propensity to go back to the
bottom before this is over with. But I think there
were some really good comments made this
morning, some great observations. One of them
was about the ‘95 policy and the review that we
just went through. Rick talked about that a little
bit at lunch. Another major finding in there was
that the policy was sound, as Rick talked about,
but there were 83 action items in that 95 effort.
The other finding in that review is that the
agencies really didn’t have the capacity or
wherewithal to implement them. It’s not a
question of not having the right policy; 
it’s a question of being able to implement 
those policies.
That brings us to the $1.8 billion that’s been
appropriated here. We think that’s a huge sum
of money, one that will enable us to get a lot of
things done. I’m actually more excited than Jim
Hull or Rick Gale about having this money, and
I think the plan we’ve put together is an
excellent start. 
Another thing that was mentioned was this
notion of leadership. Eventually, we’re going to
get some new leaders here, but I’m hoping we
have an opportunity not to go through what
we’ve had here in the last eight years, at least
here in the Bureau of Land Management, where
we had five different directors and no director at
all in two of those eight years. That’s probably
one of the things that was recommended 
in the white paper, and I think that’s a 
great recommendation. 
The other thing that’s important is to take a
look at our organizations. I’m not sure we’re
organized in the most appropriate, elegant
fashion. Lyle, Rick, and I work very well
together, and I think it might be nice if we had
the same boss so we don’t end up with these
organizational divisive exercises when things go
up the food chain and other people disagree
with our recommendations. If there is a new
organization established and someone in here
ends up being the director or chief of that
organization, I’d like to put my pitch in. I’d like
to be had of the Department of Duh. I’ll explain
that to you later, how that works. 
I think the point has been made here in
collaborative management. There’s an old
adage: Think globally and act locally. We need to
figure out a way to start diluting the divisiveness
that comes between us in getting the job done.
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This $1.8 billion has a lot of potential, and we
need to take advantage of it. 
I have one last comment on research because
that was talked about here today. The research
that I would like to see some of these researchers
get behind is to develop a drip torch that won’t
ignite if we’re not in prescription. 
JOHNSON: Gentlemen, let’s talk about
specifics for a moment. We had a discussion
about these 500 communities that were going to
be identified soon. Thinking about Idaho in
particular, what do you think is going to happen
when those 500 communities are identified?
What actions do you expect to see on 
the ground to deal in the near term with 
these problems?
KEMPTHORNE: Marc, I would expect to see a
reduction of fuel load. That’s what I think this is
all about. We have too much fuel out there. I can
tell you that in the state of Idaho, our state
forested land is in far better health than the
federal land. We look at it on stems per acre. I
don’t know, Lyle, whether you have the charts
you showed, but they show stands of trees in
1909, 23 trees per acre, that today are up to
1,000 trees per acre. We wonder why one
ignition can cause this to take off?
What I anticipate, Marc, and what I expect is
to see a reduction of fuel load, just as
Congressman Simpson raised the point at our
meeting of the Western Governors’ Association.
I asked Lyle specifically to please put a
probability–I want a number–as to how success-
ful you believe you can be in treating three
million acres of forest land and one million
acres of BLM land. Then a year from now when
you come back to the Western Governors
Association, you can show us how successful
you were. That’s critical.
Then the second year–because right now,
there is momentum and enthusiasm–we need to
see whether we sustain this process. I think, too,
that we should not waltz around it. When I talk
about reduction of the fuel load, there are three
elements to that: prescribed burns, thinning,
and logging. Among different governors, you’ll
get different thoughts and different phrases to
describe it, but all three of those are tools that
must be utilized. You can’t eliminate any one of
them. That goes back to what Tom was raising,
and there has to be economic benefit that will
be derived by these local communities, but we’re
no longer putting it in terms of a quota of logs
taken off or how many we’re going to cut. It’s
based upon forest health. As part of that
strategy, you have three elements, and one of
them includes logging. 
JOHNSON: Congressman Simpson, you said
earlier you had some questions for Lyle. Do you
want to pose one of these questions?
SIMPSON: What I’d like to know, Lyle, is
exactly how much local discretion you’re going
to have in making decisions and how much is
going to be decided by bureaucrats in
Washington, D.C. What do you describe as
involving state and local communities? Just
advising them of what you‘re going to do? Or
does it involve making them part of the
decision-making process as the language of the
appropriation suggests?
One of the other concerns that I have is that
reducing the fuel load requires more than just
prescribed burns. It requires thinning and
logging. How much of this $1.8 billion do you
anticipate is going to be used up in Washington
or in lawsuits?
LAVERTY: I thought I might have the answer.
I was anticipating the question. Then when you
said lawsuits, it’s not in here. I guess a couple of
things, Congressman, to go back to your first
question in terms of what do we mean by local
involvement. It’s very clear. Tim Hartsell, on the
Interior side, and I are working on this, and we
really believe that it’s very clear what they
expect. It’s not just that the feds design a project
and then walk up to the county or the governor
and say, “What do you think about this?” It’s
actually engaging those folks early in the
planning and conceiving where we should be
making these investments. It’s a radical way for
us of doing things differently, and we are really
conscious of that. 
So as we move ahead to accomplish this
whole task, there are several pieces that the
governors identified in Salt Lake City. One 
of those was to develop a ten-year comprehen-
sive plan that talks about how we are going to
treat fuel conditions across the country on all
lands, not just the federal lands. We do have a
cohesive strategy that the Forest Service
developed, and Tim and I have talked about
how we’re going to be able to expand that to
include all the federal lands. It becomes a nice
51
walk-in component that fits right into this
broader, comprehensive strategy. 
To make that happen, we have a small group
that’s working on how we design and move
ahead on the framework of that. We’ve had the
governor’s staff, we’ve had the National
Association of Counties involved, and we’re
involving the tribes to help us begin to frame
how we going to approach this. If there is a
message that comes out of this, it is that the
behaviors have changed, and we’re starting to
see that already. This work group met in mid-
November and December in Denver, we talked
about the issue, and we had a first-cut discussion
draft for the governors in San Diego last week.
That group worked over Thanksgiving to do
this, and it’s really a very collaborative effort. It’s
not just the feds putting together a white paper
and saying “What do you think about this?”
These folks have actually been involved in the
crafting and design of that. 
So there are some things that are happening.
The governor spoke about performance,
expectations, and accountability. He asked
pretty pointed questions in San Diego, like
“What are you going to do?” Tim and I are
committed to doing all we can to make sure we
come back and deliver the goods, and I would
hope, Congressman, that I can change your
mind that this is not just a one-year shot. We
need to recognize that this is the first of many
years and that we can in fact show that things
are different across the country. 
I’m convinced that government is good; I’ve
shared this with folks, and I think we can show
that government can work well across all levels
whether it’s local or state or federal.
SIMPSON: I agree with what you’ve said. I,
too, hope this is not one-year shot. What I was
trying to emphasize is that this is a one-year
appropriation and that if Tom and I are going to
be able to sell this to our colleagues back there,
we need that ten-year strategy about how we’re
going to reduce fuel load on all lands. Without
that long-range plan, we’re going to have
difficulty selling this, but if we can put together
a long-term strategy, that gives us something to
fall back on as we continue this appropriation
process. Like you, I hope it isn’t a one-year shot.
LAVERTY: The real test for us is that we’ve set
a fairly tight window to have that strategy done
by May 1 with almost a final discussion draft
ready for those folks when they come back in
February to Washington. We’re putting the
pressure on people to deliver the goods as well. I
think that performance is going to be absolutely
critical for all of us, not just for the feds but for
the states working together. There is a huge
chunk of the appropriation that provides funds
for the states to do some treatments on some of
the landscapes as well, so we’re going to need to
again work collectively to make that happen.
JOHNSON: Congressman Udall?
UDALL: May I ask a followup question here
on what Mike’s been talking about? This is
changing direction just a little bit, but it seems
to me that the way we got into this over 80 or
100 years has a lot to do with what’s happened
with the population growth in the west. We
have a writer by the name of Charles Wilkerson
out there in Boulder, who talks about the last
generation and the “big buildup” here in the
west and about the doubling of population that
has occurred. So with these population pressures
and new people moving in, I’ll bet every day
we’re creating new acreage that’s at risk in terms
of people moving into what we’re now calling
the urban/wildland interface. I’m just
wondering, from the agency perspective, how
much thought you’ve given there to where we’re
headed? Are we going to continue to create
more at-risk areas? How are we going to work
this through in terms of states and local
governments? Each one of them has a piece of
this problem. It seems to me that’s an issue that
increasingly we’re going to be asked about if we
stay committed over this ten-year period. 
HAMILTON: I’d like to take a shot at that
one. We have a fire-wise program, and the
purpose of that program is to get out in the local
communities and talk about mitigation and the
way to do things so we’re not creating the
problem over and over. It was real interesting
this summer. We had over 80 firefighters,
managers, and supervisors from Australia and
New Zealand, and they were here sixty days and
worked on some of these large fires. We did a
debriefing with them before they went home,
and they were absolutely aghast at what we do
in this country, at the amount of resources we
put into protecting structures. In their country,
it’s a much different approach. The approach
there is that if you’re going to build or move out
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into the wildland/urban interface, the fire
engine doesn’t show up there, the retardant
plane doesn’t fly over, and there are all kinds of
things you’re responsible for and have to do. So
I think we’re confronted with a mindset in this
country, a cultural value, that we’re going to
have to change. It will take a lot of education
and will have to start in elementary school and
work it’s way through the adult population.
I had an opportunity this summer to be out
on a fire where the local fire department was
brought out. It was an inholding on a national
forest, and the fire department said there is no
way we can protect those structures because the
roads are one-way, and we can’t even turn our
equipment around in there. I said, “Have you
ever talked to these people about what they
need to do?” They said, “Absolutely, we talked to
them.” I said, “What kind of response did you
get?” They said, “The reason we live out here in
the first place is because of the trees. We want to
live in the trees, and if you think we’re going to
cut down a tree, forget it. If the place burns
down, guess what? We’ll go someplace else.” 
That, I think, is one of our major challenges.
We’ve got to start this educational effort and get
this turned around. That’s going to take us a
while to do because you’re not only talking
about changing behavior, you’re probably
talking about changing some deep-rooted values
in the culture.
JOHNSON: Governor, Congressman Simpson
mentioned a moment ago, let’s assume for a
moment that we have lots of agreement about
this strategy, a lot of different buy-in from a lot
of different people and different constituencies,
real consensus, but we get down to the actual
implementation on the ground, and one 33c
stamp on an appeal brings it all to a halt. Is that
a concern? Do you have that concern? Could
that stymie any real effort to truly move forward
on this?
KEMPTHORNE: Absolutely. We discussed
that, particularly at the Western Governors
meeting. This all does sound good, but we know
that there are some people who say this is not
the correct approach. Some people say we
should not cut one more tree for whatever
reason. I totally disagree with that. A number of
people disagree with that, and it’s a very extreme
position for them to take. Yes, we have to
anticipate the lawsuits, but I have to ask then
the other question. So you have one billion
board feet of timber that’s now gone up in
smoke, what have we gained? You fly over what
was a beautiful landscape, now it’s charred, and
then you can’t get in there and remove some of
that dead timber, which in ten or twenty years
will fall down and create a brand new level of
fuel load. When it burns, it will burn with such
intensity that it will sterilize that soil down to
maybe 18 inches, so what have we gained as
opposed to a practical pragmatic approach
where we go in and try to make our 
forests healthy? 
I would also throw in one other element.
There are those individuals who say, “Well, but
if we lose a stand of trees, they will return. We’ll
see that they will all come back.” That’s not
necessarily true with the advent of the noxious
weeds. Without that competition, here comes a
noxious weed, and you have suddenly, instead
of a beautiful green lush forest and a variety of
fauna and flora, a monoculture. It’s a sincere and
critical problem for us. So noxious weeds need
to be part of this discussion.
Isn’t it funny. You talk about lawsuits,
lawyers, and noxious weeds…
JOHNSON: …all in the same sentence. Well,
Lyle, you heard that discussion this morning
with some of the people who recreate and make
a living off the public lands and enjoy them for
all kinds of different purposes and passions, how
do we deal with that legal issue about being
hamstrung, regardless of how great your strategy
might be, and stymied from doing anything
really meaningful on the ground?
LAVERTY: If I had the answer, I probably
wouldn’t be sitting here. I’m looking at some
examples we have going right now on the Rocky
Mountains. We have a project right outside of
Boulder. We’ve been working on it for about
three and a half years, and it will deal with this
wildland/urban interface. It has been one of
these very collaborative efforts with lots of
community meetings. Folks have been out
walking the stands, and we’re almost at the
point where they have each tree identified by
name. We’re going to leave Susie but we’re going
to cut Johnny. It’s that kind of thing. We finally
got to a point where they came to a decision,
and the community applauded the decision. 
In Colorado, we have groups that appeal
every project; it doesn’t make any difference
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what it is. We were flooded with comments from
the community about why do we have to hold
up? Why can’t we get on with this? I think it’s
going to take time to start building community
support so people will say these are good things,
and we don’t want people just stopping these
things. We live in this great country where we
can express those kinds of opinions. Just because
someone doesn’t agree with us and doesn’t like
the project, you can’t just cut them off and say,
“You‘re not part of this.” We have to go through
the process. I think it’s a good process, but at
some point, as Commander Gale said, you have
a make a decision and go on. 
JOHNSON: Congressman Udall, let me ask
you, sir. Let’s assume for a moment that we have
some consensus about using prescribed fire,
maybe even thinning–and put whatever defini-
tion you might on that–what do we do about
the question that the Governor raises here about
logging, cutting merchantable saw timber in the
national forest? 
You have a reputation, deservedly so, with
environmental credentials. Governor Andrus
was telling us earlier, in a friendly way, about
having locked horns with you over a certain
little nuclear waste depository in your state that
we have a fair amount of interest in up here. You
care about environmental values. Tell us how we
get to the point where we actually cut some
timber if that, in fact, is part of the strategy. 
UDALL: Well, you’ve raised the nub of the
issues. You talk about prescribed burns, you talk
about thinning, you talk, as the Forest Service
Chief did in his letter, about 12 inches and
under. I think there is an awful lot of agreement,
and there is consensus in those areas. The big
concern of people is that a lot of the groups that
monitor this wonder, “Is the policy we’re
proposing in order to get back to the levels of
logging that we were seeing in our national
forests in the 1980s? Is this a legitimate policy
toward lowering the risk of catastrophic fire, or
is this really the big lumber companies pushing
it in order to get the logging levels back up?”
That’s why it’s important that we move forward
in the areas where we have consensus.
Let me give you a local example from Santa
Fe, New Mexico. Our forest supervisor out there,
Leonard Atencio, has done an incredible job. We
probably have more people that would protest
forest plans and thinning and those kinds of
things in the Santa Fe area, and he has gone out
publicly with a variety of meetings. They have
tours for any citizen up in the Santa Fe
watershed because Santa Fe gets almost 40% of
its drinking water from this watershed, which is
at very high risk. I hope it’s on that list that is
coming out soon, and I understand it is. What
we need to do is have that kind of outreach by
the Forest Service, involve the community,
involve all the groups, including the environ-
mentalists, and see if we can’t do something that
builds consensus on how we go forward. 
The second point that I would make is one
that has to do with the forests themselves
overall. We got in this over 100 years, and we’re
not going to get out of it in one, two, or even ten
years. We need to build in local communities
the constituency for moving forward with this. I
get very worried that’s the biggest task we have. 
The other big task for me and Mike is that we
have put so many laws on the books about how
we manage our forests that I hear some of the
old-time foresters say, “What we really need to
do is move back toward active management.”
We’re really being hampered by that. I think
Congress needs to take a look at all of these laws
and see, in the light of what’s happened, what
we need to amend, what we need to work with,
and what mandate we give these federal land
managers in the Forest Service and the BLM. 
JOHNSON: Congressman Simpson, a quick
comment.
SIMPSON: I would agree with what Tom just
said. I think you have to build the relationship
with both the environmental community and
with the stakeholders that use the forest if we’re
going to get anything done in the long run. But
I am concerned that, even if you get the local
communities together to agree on something,
oftentimes the national groups oppose things,
and a 33c stamp can stop just about anything.
But we do need to start building this consensus.
I do agree with Tom that we have to review
the laws we have on the books that hamper the
decision-making process. More and more, the
decisions in the Forest Service and the BLM have
been moving to Washington, D.C. and away
from local management. When I went out for a
couple of days on the Clear Creek fire, you could
talk to the local forest supervisors there and the
people that actually know their forests. They can
tell you what the problems are. They can tell
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you where the fuel loads are excessive and where
they need to do some active fuel load reduction.
Rather than having a national policy saying we
can cut anything smaller than 12 inches, the
facts are that in some forests, you need to cut
large trees as well as some other small trees in
order to thin the forest out and make it more 
fire resistant.
So a national policy oftentimes doesn’t 
work. What’s so important about Governor
Kempthorne’s and the Western Governors’
Association’s proposal is that it involves the
state and local communities, local forest super-
visors, and the people that really know their
forests. That’s what I’d like to see developed
more and more, a move back toward that type of
management instead of the central control from
Washington, D.C.
JOHNSON: Gentlemen? Governor?
KEMPTHORNE: Marc, thank you. I appre-
ciate what the two congressmen said. Some of
the most frustrated people are professional forest
supervisors, the people on the ground. They
know what they would like to do, they’ve been
trained to manage, but they feel they have been
hamstrung because of command and control
from Washington, D.C.
When we talk about this work product that
has been developed by the Western Governors’
Association, state foresters were really some of
the chief designers of it. At this last meeting of
the Western Governors’ Association, I asked the
state forester of Colorado if he was supportive of
this product thus far. He said he absolutely was
and was one of those at the table helping to
design it. Then I asked the state forester of
California whether he was supportive. Colorado
has a Republican Administration, and we
thought California, with a Democratic Admin-
istration, might have a different view. They said,
“No, we totally support the product thus far.” So
it’s going in the right direction. 
I think we’ve identified many concerns. An
important part about the Western Governors’
proposal is a process called “En Libra,” which is
coming more and more to the forefront. It’s a
process whereby you bring the different people,
diverse people, and different views to the
common table. If we can sit down, discuss it,
actually listen to one another, and leave the
rhetoric outside, we ultimately begin to hear
what the true intent is. We can find creative
ways to get there. 
LAVERTY: Marc, if I could just pick up.
Probably one of the most eloquent discussions
that took place at the Western Governors was a
conversation that focused on this whole idea of
how we begin to describe and come to
consensus on what we want to leave on the
landscape, rather than being driven by going in
to treat this or remove that. It was great. 
Governor Kitzhaber talked about some of the
things that are happening in Oregon, and he
talked about going in and about what needed 
to happen on the landscape. He said they had
accomplished this objective and that objective.
Then he said, “By the way, we harvested 30
million board feet of timber.” That was not the
driver that took them in, but this becomes a
cultural change for us as a society. All of a
sudden, we’re no longer driven by targets. I
really commend the governors because you folks
came across as a very bipartisan group. It was
not one side versus the other. It was encouraging
to hear those discussions. As we begin to model
that behavior, I’m optimistic that we can do 
this job.
HAMILTON: I guess the one thing I’d want to
add to this is the P word: patience. We’ve seen
several occasions on which we’re getting out
ahead of our head lights. One good example is
in trying to identify these urban/wildland
interface communities. The list is over 4300.
Obviously, $1.8 billion isn’t going to fix all of
those. It’s going to take a lot more effort than
that. So we have to have some criteria and to
come up with some ways that people can buy
into the criteria, realizing that they may not be
at the top of the list this year but that they’re on
the list and will get there eventually. 
We need to look at ways of leveraging
capability. We’re going to get a lot more done if
we’re working together across all the different
agencies and partners we have out there on
the land. 
SIMPSON: Has there been any discussion of
stewardship contracts and allowing for those
areas where we go in and do selective thinning
and logging to receive the income off the acti-
vities surrounding that thinning and logging? 
LAVERTY: Congressman, we do have some
pilots we’re-evaluating right now in terms of
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how that tool can work for us. That surely is one
tool that fits into that broad scheme of how we
can accomplish those outcomes. But certainly
it’s on the table for conversation and discussion. 
JOHNSON: Gentlemen, I want to open this
up to some of the 400 people who are here in
Boise today and invite back into the discussion
Darrell Knuffke, who is vice president of the
Wilderness Society, in International Falls and
Washington. Darrell, how are you feeling about
what you‘re hearing here? There’s a lot of talk
about cooperation. Does it sound good? or 
too good?
KNUFFKE: It sounds generally pretty good
although I have to say I squirm a little bit at
repeated references to the fact that anybody
with a 33c stamp can shut down the system. I
disagree with that. I think the Forest Service’s
own numbers will suggest to us that timber sales
have not been much hampered by environ-
mental challenges. The National Environmental
Policy Act doesn’t stop much of anything. It can
slow things, it can shape things, it can change
things. In the end, it’s not a tool for stopping
anything nor is it meant to be. It is meant to be
a clear-headed opportunity to understand major
federal actions. To the extent that the agencies
do their jobs up front, appeals are essentially
meaningless or moot. I hope that we are not at
the point where we’re about short-circuiting
those kinds of opportunities for the public or
activist organizations like mine that pay
attention to public lands. 
LAVERTY: That was not the message that was
communicated. I really believe that, as we look
at the new planning regs, the whole idea is to
bring those conversations up front and bring as
much closure as we can before the project gets
started, rather than what we’ve done histori-
cally. I think those kinds of discussions are
valuable because we can do that.
SIMPSON: I hope that the conversation was
not that we want to stop public input. You do
need public input. That’s the American way. But
I can tell you that in conversations I’ve had with
Chief Dombeck about the Forest Service and
their budget, one of that agency’s concerns is
that more and more and more of their budget is
being used to settle lawsuits. I’m not talking just
about the environmental community; I’m
talking about everybody. With every decision
they make, they’re sued by somebody.
Consequently, they spend more and more
money fighting lawsuits. That’s a concern of
mine. I’d like to see more of the money we
appropriate go into forest management rather
than into lawsuits. Maybe that means we need
to have more involvement up front and more of
the stakeholders together at the table when the
decisions are being made. Perhaps we can avoid
some of these unneeded costs. 
JOHNSON: Jim Riley is here with me. Jim is
the executive with the Intermountain Forest
Association, a major wood products association
in the northwest. Jim, how are you feeling about
what you’re hearing from the policy-makers? 
JIM RILEY: I’m encouraged by the enthusi-
asm for more locally-driven management plans
and implementation. It is my understanding
that in the $1.8 billion appropriation is a
requirement for the Council of Environmental
Quality to come forward with some expedited
procedures that could be made available to cause
these things to happen, not without public
comment, but in a much more expedited and
streamlined process than normally exists. I
haven’t heard any discussion about that. Is that
in the works still? What’s the outlook for that? It
might do a lot to address these concerns. 
LAVERTY: Specifically, a group is working on
that right now with CEQ. A report is due on
Monday to the Congress. A group of folks have
been looking at that to see whether there are
some things that can be done. The folks just told
me this morning, and I got a copy of it last
night. I’ll take a look at it. There are conversa-
tions and efforts moving along on that. 
JOHNSON: Ladies and gentlemen, let’s open
this up. If anyone else has a question, hold your
hand up. John Freemuth has a microphone, and
we’ll circulate.
HERB MALANY: My name is Herb Malany. I
manage 200,000 acres of industrial forest lands,
and I find this whole discussion here rather
fascinating because I’ve been doing this for
about 45 years. We don’t have a fire problem on
our lands. At this time, they look almost like
parks. I’ve taken very strong environmentalists
along on tours, and when they get done talking,
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they say, “Hey, this looks good. We can live
with this.” 
Then I think of the problems we have, trying
to pre-commercial thin, which is the same
discussion we’re having here, on 5,000 acres a
year and finding enough employees to do this
work. When you start talking the numbers
you’re talking here, I find it absolutely
fascinating to consider where all these people
are going to come from. 
UDALL: I’d like to comment on that. At least
in New Mexico, I think there are some real
opportunities here. We have very small rural
communities in northern New Mexico that are
very close to the forests. Some of them are
heavily Hispanic; some are Native American.
They have lived with forests for 400 years, and if
we had the kind of investment with young
people that you saw back with FDR and the CCC
and if you had a Job Corps and put the young
people out there, we could create some
opportunities. You’re right, sir. It’s very labor-
intensive. That’s why I said early on that we
need to design this in a way that gives those
small communities in rural areas the
opportunity to lift themselves up as a result of
this effort and create economic opportunities.
You have to design the Forest Service contracts
in a way that allows smaller operators to
participate. You have to let the word go out a
couple of years in advance that it’s going to
happen so some of these businesses can start up
and grow. I think the people are out there; at
least, they are in my community. I think they’re
out there; I think they’re willing to work. We’ve
just got to put the structures in place and have
the Forest Service, BLM, and the other federal
agencies be responsive to having it move
forward in that way.
LAVERTY: Congressman, one of the things
that we’ve been talking about just this last two
or three days is that we need to bring all the
agencies together. Interior has a huge portion of
this appropriation that deals with economic
action. The Forest Service has some, and we’ve
been talking about other agencies that generally
don’t come into this discussion. The Small
Business Administration has some incredible
programs that we can bring to some of these
communities. The Department of Labor has
money that we could bring in for training. It
goes back to the question of where do we find
people to do this job in an almost full
employment economy. It’s going to be
extremely difficult. We could not hire people
this summer because of our pay level. We
couldn’t compete with UPS, which was paying
kids $12 an hour to wash trucks. That’s the
challenge for all of us: How are we going to
accomplish the expectations of Congress and
the governors?
MATT CARROLL: My name is Matt Carroll. I
teach natural research policy at Washington
State University. I’m wondering if this panel
would care to comment on the potential impact
of the Florida Supreme Court on the actual
implementation of this plan. 
SIMPSON: We’ve got our own wildfire back
here, and I’m not sure we want to go any further
with that. One thing that I thought was very
important was that in September, I asked
Governor Kempthorne to come out and testify
before the House Agriculture Committee, which
oversees the Forest Service, because we wanted
to put into the record what the Western
Governors had negotiated with the Department
of Interior and Secretary Babbitt. I wanted that
to be part of the permanent record, the
Congressional Record, so that when a new
Administration comes in, whichever
Administration it is, we follow through with
those plans that were implemented with the
Western Governors. It was very important to get
that into the record, and I was very pleased that
the Governor came out and did that. 
FREEMUTH: Marc, I have a written question
that I know is on many people’s minds.
Congressman, Governor, what role will the
regulatory agencies play in either implementing
or destroying the national fire plan by
regulatory oversight?
LAVERTY: Let me try to answer that one.
HAMILTON: We’re looking forward to this
answer, too.
LAVERTY: Part of the provisions of the
appropriations bill in the conference report
provided funds for the Interior agencies as well
as the Forest Service to finance the Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service staffing to get us through the
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Section Seven consultation. As probably
everybody in this room knows, that’s one of the
huge barriers in getting projects done on the
ground. This last week, Fish and Wildlife, NMFS,
BLM, Forest Service, the National Park Service,
and the refuge site have been coming together,
and we really have closure on that. My guess is
that within the next week or so, Fish and
Wildlife and NMFS both will be hiring the
people we need to get projects cleared. 
What we don’t want to do is let the ESA
become the barrier as to why we can’t do this.
The real barrier is getting through the
consultation process, and that has been the
piece that Fish and Wildlife and NMFS have
never been financed to do, so we have this
incredible bottleneck. It’s almost like threading
the needle, and I think this is going to open up.
I’m really encouraged that we’re making good
progress. We have commitment from Jamie
Clark [Director of the U. S. Fish and Wildlife
Service], and she does not want this to be
perceived as a barrier to implementing the plan.
The message, again, is that we don’t want ESA to
be perceived as a problem in implementing 
the plan. 
JOHNSON: Pat Shea is here, former director
of the Bureau of Land Management, now–I hate
to say it in this audience, Pat–an attorney in Salt
Lake City. A question.
PATRICK SHEA: The question goes to the
Governor and the two Congressmen. From my
experience in Washington, I would hope you
might try to describe what we call “breathing
room.” You’ve been talking about how federal
land managers need to make locally-based
decisions, but each of us–Larry, Lyle, and others
in the audience-have then been hauled before
Congress where your staffs are less than kind
and certainly don’t give any breathing room 
for the experimentation you seem to be
encouraging. With this $1.8 billion, how do you
anticipate lessening the “gotcha” mentality 
that oftentimes defines the boundaries of 
public policy?
JOHNSON: Governor, I know this never
happened while you were in the Senate. 
KEMPTHORNE: They said I was a breath of
fresh air. You did good on Mountain Home. Pat,
it’s a fair question, and I imagine it does happen
from time to time because of the politics. But
also, there have been many many times–and
Mike and Tom have experienced this-that when
they are out here or we’re all out in the field, we
hear things from the people on the ground, the
local foresters who take you into their
confidence. I had a policy: you never burn them.
It is a confidence. Based on that conversation,
yes, it gives you much greater insight so that
when there’s a hearing and you have some of
the higher level bureaucrats before you, you’re a
lot sharper because you’ve heard it. I’ve always
felt, though, that if you burn one of those folks,
the word will spread that “you can’t trust this
guy,” but if the word spreads that “He is a
straight shooter and you can tell it like it is,”
you’ll probably find that in the pecking order,
some things have been improved because you
gave them some insight. To be an effective
public official, if you burn someone who gave
you some good insight, you’re going to be out of
business pretty soon. 
SIMPSON: I would agree with what the
Governor said. In fact, as I mentioned earlier,
my Chief of Staff and I spent two days earlier out
in the Clear Creek Fire. We talked to forest
managers from all over the country, and they
told us things as we sat around and had dinner,
things that were beneficial to me as a
policymaker. For example, the concern that we
have about the fact that we’re losing a lot of our
forest fire managers. We have the ones who are
getting older and will be getting out of the
business in a few years, but we don’t have any
young ones moving up into that area.
Pay was mentioned earlier and the difficulty
of hiring people for these projects. Those are
things we have to be able to look at, so it was
very educational for me to be able to just sit
down and talk to these individuals and to feel
that they had the confidence to tell me what
was actually going on in some of these areas. 
Often the money gets eaten up in the
bureaucracy and never actually gets down to the
forest. They don’t see their forest management
budgets increasing, even though Congress keeps
appropriating more money. I agree with the
Governor. You don’t really want to burn any of
those people, and yet I do agree with Pat that
you have to be respectful of the fact that these
people are professionals. When they’re trying
something, I think you have to give them some
leeway. Obviously, politics gets into it
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sometimes and sometimes too often. 
FREEMUTH: I have another question 
back here. 
BILL MULLIGAN: My name is Bill Mulligan
from Kamiah, and among other things, I’m a
member of the Clearwater Elk Recovery team,
and I have a question for you, Lyle. In the
Clearwater Basin, if you look at the GAO Report
the Governor has there, it showed it as a red
area. The Upper Clearwater Basin on Forest
Service ground is the highest priority area, the
worst area of the state in terms of its current
condition from a forest health standpoint. It’s
most at risk. It’s also an area where we’ve already
lost 50% of our elk herd, and we have a very low
percentage of calf survival now, which means
that the premier elk herd on public lands in the
United States is going to continue to decrease.
The problem we have is that we have no
openings or younger forests, and it is an area
where we have too many 12-inch plus trees, not
too many 12-inch minus trees. 
My question is that, in looking at the new
National Fire Plan, I was really alarmed because
in the priority system, the Upper Clearwater
Basin is the lowest priority of all because it is a
wet forest, a forest advanced in age. Because it is
a wet forest, it has a very low fire frequency.
What are you going to do to help us in that kind
of fuel type? It doesn’t fall into the wildland/
urban interface. We don’t have local commu-
nities there except really small communities
that apparently don’t meet the criteria for
communities in danger from that standpoint.
The population is too low. How come those
areas aren’t being addressed by the National Fire
Plan? I’m concerned that the $1.8 billion will go
to other areas, and we will sit there and have the
fuel continue to accumulate in that area and not
deal with it. Can you do something to help us?
LAVERTY: R. Really an excellent question,
and maybe I can start by going back to the GAO
report the Governor mentioned and its focus on
these lands that were at high risk. When we
began to develop a response, we took a look at
those short fire interval landscapes and
concluded that would be the first round of
response for us. As you pointed out so well,
many of the areas we’re talking about were
beyond that; it’s that fire regime 3, 4 and 5
situation, rather than the 1 and 2, where this
wildland/urban interface has taken place. When
we put our response together, though, we
identified three categories that we felt we
needed to look at with the investment in
treating fuels. The first one was communities.
We identified habitats, and we identified
watersheds that we needed to target in order to
address these high-risk situations. 
The immediate question that came out after
the fires was what are we going to do with
communities? I think for the long term, we are
very definitely involved in how we begin to
meet those habitat needs. In Colorado, we’re
considering how to integrate some of the other
programs as well in this strategy so that we can
begin to treat some of the habitat. The largest
elk herds in the country are in Colorado, and
we’re really serious about how to make those
kinds of investments. Even though with this
$1.8 billion, there is high interest in the
Congress about how to help communities, we
also have opportunities with other program
accounts to target other areas, such as the one
you pointed out in the Clearwater Basin. 
I can talk to you some more about what we’re
doing in Colorado.
JOHNSON: We’re going to lose our satellite
here in a few minutes. The congressmen will
fade away into the ether, and we don’t want that
to happen without giving them an opportunity
for a final thought. I’d like to go around real
quick, maybe starting with you, Congressman
Udall. What should we take away from this
discussion today? What is the big theme that we
should be focused on as we think about where
we’re going with these fire policies? What would
you have us focus on?
UDALL: Well, I would say the big theme
ought to be patience. We need to look at this
situation in terms of history: how we got into
this, what happened in the 1910 fires with the
millions of acres that burned, how we changed
fire policy as documented by Stephen Pyne,
what impacts occurred as a result of logging and
grazing, and how the Native Americans, with
their close ties to the land, utilized fire for
hundreds of years until government and
reservation policy forced them to abandon that
tool. It’s all part of a big picture, a pageant that
brought us to today. We have to put our minds
to it as we’ve done here. 
I think these western governors are great to
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have spoken out, and I appreciate Mike’s getting
it in the Record because we need to build
consensus, we need to be patient, and it takes a
while to turn things around. That would be
what I draw from this, and it’s important that we
give our managers the ability and time to do 
this job. 
JOHNSON: Congressman Simpson, a final
quick thought from you.
SIMPSON: I would agree with everything
Tom said. I would also say that what I hope to
see is that when we look at how we’ve used this
$1.8 billion, we will have used it productively
and be able to use that as a selling point to
continue to manage our forests. As Tom said,
this is something that has been building up for
the last 100 years. It’s not something that
happened just during the last eight years. What
I would like to see in the future is to have our
forests become healthier, more fire-resistant
than they currently are. We have 47 million
acres that are in Category 3 fire potential. Will
we have reduced that number of acres? What
have we done to make a healthy forest? 
I’d also like to see us address what we have
mentioned here earlier: the urban/wildland
interface. It will occur more and more as more
people move out into the country to build a
cabin or home in the middle of trees because
they want the trees around it. There will be some
problems there. I talked to an insurance agent
who said they were getting calls from people
when the fire was on the ridge above their
homes, asking for fire insurance. Obviously,
they couldn’t get that done. We need to address
this issue of how we’re going to solve the
wildland/urban interface because more and
more of our fire resource dollars are going to
address that problem. Consequently, it’s
something we have to look at. I hope we will
end up down the road with forests that are more
fire resistant and are healthier than they
currently are. 
JOHNSON: Governor, I give you the last word.
KEMPTHORNE: Thank you. Congressman
Udall, I’m glad there are no hard feelings on the
nuclear waste. All we were trying to do in Idaho
was get all the Colorado waste out of Idaho and
over to New Mexico. 
I appreciate what our congressman have said,
and it’s nice to have teams like that back there,
people that are so receptive and so on top of
these issues. We can agree that we all want
healthy forests. Maybe that’s as far as we can
agree, but we have that as a beginning. Then
there is scientific evidence that would strongly
suggest that in the near future, we will continue
to see catastrophic forest fires. Therefore, I
believe the logical question to ask is what can we
do to try to eliminate that? 
We’ve outlined a game plan, and part of that
game plan must have measurements so that
there can be accountability. It will be at the
Western Governors’ Association meetings. It will
be before House committees, testifying before
Congressman Simpson’s committee, before
Congressman Udall, etc. Those measurements
have to be there. But I believe that we have in
place and have identified the individuals that
are going to raise the issue, decide where the
forums will be, where the venues will be. Add to
this a healthy atmosphere where consensus can
be built. That is achieved by bringing the diverse
groups to a common table so that people don’t
feel left out. We’ve demonstrated time and again
that works. They may not agree with the final
result, but they will say, “We had our day in
court.” As long as we can keep it in that court
and not the legal court, we’re all better off. 
JOHNSON: Thank you, Governor. I’m going
to turn the microphone over to the Chairman of
the Andrus Center, the former Governor and
Secretary of the Interior, Cecil Andrus.
CECIL D. ANDRUS: Thank you. Before we
lose Mike and Tom, let me thank you very
much. I know you can’t see us, but we can see
you, and we appreciate very much your being
with us today via the satellite. I know that,
having spoken with both of you, it was your
intention and desire to be here with us, but
funny things have happened this fall, and it’s
not over yet.
SIMPSON: It’s still our wish we could 
be there.
ANDRUS: Well, both of you keep watching
out for us, will you, on both sides of the aisle?
Thanks again for being with us today, and
Governor Kempthorne, thank you very much
for being here today. Thanks to Lyle and Larry as
well. I hope we’ll come out of here with some
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suggestions. A white paper will be delivered 
to you. 
Also, I know, Mike, that you have a white
paper, and I’ll see that you have one, Tom, from
our June meeting. It also covers some of the
things that Larry talked about, perhaps the
possibility of bringing the resource agencies
under one umbrella, one guidance. With that,
thank you very much, gentlemen, for being 
with us. 
We have time for a couple of questions, and
then Leon is going to make four or five minutes
of comments on range fire and range health, a
problem that was probably not covered in
sufficient depth earlier today. 
GENE BRAY: I’m Gene Bray, and this is a
question for Governor Kempthorne. We touched
on this briefly this morning, and I can
summarize it by saying partnership is a two-
edged sword. I wonder, in your position with the
Western Governors’ Association, are the western
states and their governors inclined to support
fuel reduction activities right across public lands
and onto private lands that are similarly
overloaded? Also, would they also support land
use changes, zoning, and building code changes
to prevent placing more acreage and more new
private dwellings at risk over the ten-year life of
this program? If we keep adding to that
inventory, $1.8 billion a year is not going to
cover it. 
KEMPTHORNE: With regard to private land,
I think we can identify what an objective may
be, but we have to respect private property
rights. This is something we discussed. The fact
of the matter is that when we look at the 39
million acres that are at high risk, those are
public lands. We also discussed that state lands
and private lands also need to be examined in
the same light, respecting private property
rights, respecting the sovereignty of the states.
My contention is yes, you can find examples
where maybe there is as much overgrowth, but
in many of the private lands, as was evidenced
back here, there have been thinning and
prescribed burns. Yes, we all need to be in this,
but we need to respect sovereignty lines as well. 
ANDRUS: Thank you very much, Governor.
I’m going to excuse you. I appreciate your
coming from the office. I know you have over 
a hundred legislators clamoring at you to 
do something.
KEMPTHORNE: Please, can I stay here? 
ANDRUS: Feel free to stay. We appreciate your
being here. Thanks again. 
Before this crowd leaves, I want Leon to have
the opportunity to visit a very, very important
topic for four or five minutes with regard to
range fires. We have a tendency to talk about
forest fires and trees, and many things have to
be done on the range out there as well. 
LEON NEUENSCHWANDER: Thank you very
much, Governor. I’ll tell you a little bit about
rangelands. It has to be really a little because I
don’t know all the issues on rangelands. I
haven’t been working down there on those
issues for about three or four months. 
The first thing I want to tell you is a story
about cheat grass. Do you all know the story
about cheat grass? In the olden times, I’m told
that there was no cheat grass here. It was bunch
grass and sagebrush, and we had sage grouse. A
lot of the sagebrush in this country was winter
range for deer. With frequent fire, every time a
fire comes through, it kills some of the grass and
kills the sagebrush. Historically, that grass would
grow and the sagebrush would come back. The
introduction of a weed from Eurasia called cheat
grass has changed the fire story. The fire story is
Catch 22. As you get more fire and as those
native grasses and sagebrush are killed by the
fire, in its place comes cheat grass. The cheat
grass spreads out and becomes more uniform
and makes a field much more conducive to
having the next fire. And of course the next fire
kills more bunch grasses and sagebrush, and
then we get another fire. As this gets more and
more filled with cheat grass, the intervals
between those fires becomes shorter and shorter
to the point where it kills the sagebrush before it
can produce a lot of viable seed. It gets so thick
that it competes with the sagebrush and bunch
grass seedlings, and pretty soon we have lots of
cheat grass. This cycle ends only in the story of
having more and more and more cheat grass. 
The BLM has recognized this problem quite
adequately I believe, and they have attempted
many things to try to change this fuel bed
because the bunch grasses are needed for grazing
into the fall, well beyond the cheat grass, which
is an annual, dries up, and doesn’t produce very
much forage. Of course our sagebrush and
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bitterbrush are the browse for our mule deer and
were really important on this former winter
range that we call Boise.
Now the rest of the story is that the sage
grouse depend on the sagebrush, which is no
longer there. Now we have to go to the R period
here because traditional fuel treatments don’t
work. I don’t think there are enough chain saws
in the room to go out and mow down all that
cheat grass, certainly not every year. 
Then we get to one of the alternatives that
shows some promise to stop the fires. It’s called
greenstripping, which means planting perennial
grass, which means usually crested wheatgrass
or one of its varieties along the highways to help
reduce the frequency of fire. It’s had mixed
success in its results, but at least it’s one effort.
Catch 22. Removing one exotic grass, cheat
grass, and planting another one, crested
wheatgrass, is not necessarily a popular activity
in this part of the world. 
Let’s go to another quick issue. Let’s talk
about juniper. Over many of our range lands in
Idaho, Washington, Utah, and Nevada and
other places, we are seeing the encroachment
and density of juniper increasing across our
rangelands. Many of these junipers, young small
trees, would have been burned by the fires,
keeping the rangelands open for sagebrush,
bunch grass, and bitter brush and creating a
wonderful winter and summer range for wildlife
and livestock. Well, as juniper becomes thick, it
shades everything out and stops the fires to the
point where they burn into the juniper, no
longer kill it, and die down. When the fires stop,
the junipers continue to grow and shade out
everything underneath it. It becomes very bare. 
Some time later, the juniper becomes so thick
that when a fire comes, it burns through the
crowns of the trees, creating the same set of fire
problems we’ve already talked about. The result
on the juniper is to burn them when they’re
young or wait until they get very old and thin
them out. 
Again, the most important part of trying to
reduce these fires is figuring out where the fires
are most likely to start. That’s along roads, along
right of ways, and around houses. Well, that’s it.
ANDRUS: I’d like to express my personal
appreciation to the Idaho Statesman, to Margaret
and Carolyn, for being here, for helping to
sponsor what I think has been a very productive
session today. We will come up with a white
paper, similar to the June one, that will sum-
marize and make recommendations for the
enhancement and health of the range and 
the timberlands in Idaho and the western
United States. 
Let me speak just one minute toward the June
white paper. Note the recommendations on
page 5. Let me tell you, from personal experi-
ence, the easiest time to make change in the
public arena and bureaucracies is at the very
beginning of a new Administration. I speak from
experience because I was there – Darrell remem-
bers – when the Department of Energy was
created. It would never have been created had
President Carter not said, “It shall be created,”
and he gave all of his incoming cabinet officials
that charge: “You shall do this.” At Interior, we
gave up a lot of different ingredients that went
into it. At that point, you can accomplish some
of these things that won’t happen if you wait six
months because the internal bureaucracy takes
over, and the protection of personal turf
becomes much more important than what the
boss says at the cabinet meetings. 
So I would urge you, take a look at this white
paper. Take a look at the one that will come out
of this meeting. I hope we will have a new
Administration soon. Duh. I don’t believe I’ll go
any further. 
I want to express my appreciation to you
people who are here today because you care. If
you didn’t care, you wouldn’t be here. We have
to do something to stop these little individual
civil wars and litmus tests about how pure you
are, how pure I might be, and come together to
find consensus on some of those proposals that
will improve the life we enjoy here. 
With that, thank you very much for being
here. Margaret and Carolyn, thank you very
much for the newspaper’s involvement. I ask
you to continue to be involved because you’re
our vehicle for educating the public.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much
for being with us today.
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Association, and the Idaho National Guard’s top
civilian honor, the Distinguished Service Medal.
He and his wife Patricia, an outstanding
advocate for children in her own right, have two
children, Heather and Jeff.
Darrell R. Knuffke: Vice President for Regional
Conservation, The Wilderness Society,
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Knuffke oversees the work of the Society’s
eight regional offices, works with grass roots
organizations, the general public, and the media
on wilderness protection programs. He joined
the Wilderness Society in 1985 as regional
director in its Denver office. After a decade in
that post, he served as western outreach
coordinator before assuming his present
position in 1997. Prior to coming to the Society,
Knuffke worked in Washington, first as press
secretary for a U.S. Senator from Colorado, then
in the Interior Department during the Carter
Administration. A Colorado native, he studied
journalism at Denver University and worked at a
number of Colorado community newspapers as
both reporter and editor before going to
Washington. His wife, Barbara West, is a
national park superintendent. Knuffke splits his
time between International Falls, Minnesota and
Washington, D.C. 
Lyle Laverty: Regional Forester for the U.S.
Forest Service’s Region II, which includes
Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas, Nebraska, and
South Dakota. He will soon have a new title,
following his recent appointment to direct the
National Fire Plan. Before becoming Regional
Forester, Mr. Laverty was a senior executive in
the Forest Service’s Washington, D.C.
Headquarters Office after moving there from the
Pacific Northwest Region. Mr. Laverty’s first
assignment with the Forest Service was in timber
management on the Six Rivers National Forest
in Orleans, California. From there, he went to
the Bear Springs Ranger District on the Mt. Hood
National Forest and then to the Skykomish
Ranger District on the Mt. Baker-Snoqualmie
National Forest in western Washington. He was
supervisor of the Mendocino National Forest in
Northern California from 1983 to 1987. A native
of California, Laverty received a B.S. degree in
forest management from Humboldt State
University and a M.A. in public administration
from George Mason University. His hobbies
include skiing, hiking, and biking. He lives in
Colorado with his wife, Pam, and they are the
parents of two grown children, Lori and Chad. 
Brad Little: President, Little Land and Livestock.
Mr. Little owns and oversees a cattle, sheep, and
farming operation in southwest Idaho. In
addition, he has found time to devote his talents
and a large amount of time to a great number of
civic, business, and charitable enterprises. He is
currently chairman of the American Land
Resources Foundation, which educates the
public about the biological, economic, and
cultural benefits of livestock grazing, and the
Idaho Association of Commerce and Industry.
He is a past director of the Idaho Heart
Association and a past chairman of the Idaho
Business Week Foundation and the Public Lands
Committee of the American Sheep Industry. He
has served as a member of the National 
Wild Horse and Burro Study Committee, 
the University of Idaho Vet School Advisory
Committee, the Idaho Fish and Game Bear
Management Task Force, and the Public Land
Law Review Committee of the Western
Governors Association. He also serves as a
director of the High County News Foundation
and the Idaho Community Foundation. In the
last five years, Mr. Little has spent a considerable
amount of time meeting with national livestock,
political, and environmental leaders to resolve
grazing controversies. Mr. Little graduated from
the University of Idaho and lives in Emmett
with his wife, Teresa, and his sons, Adam 
and David. 
Robert H. Nelson, Ph.D.: Professor of
Environmental Policy, University of Maryland,
School of Public Affairs. Dr. Nelson’s particular
expertise is on land and natural resource
management with an emphasis on management
of federally-owned resources. He is the author of
several journal articles and five books: Zoning
and Property Rights (MIT Press, 1977); The
Making of Federal Coal Policy (Duke University
Press, 1983); Reaching for Heaven on Earth: The
Theological Meaning of Economics (1991);
Public Lands and Private Rights: The Failure of
Scientific Management (1995); and, most
recently, A Burning Issue: A Case for Abolishing
the U. S. Forest Service (2000). He has written for
broader audiences as well, including the
Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, Forbes,
the Weekly Standard, Reason, Society, and
Technology Review. Nelson has served in the
principal policy office of the U.S. Secretary of
the Interior, the senior economist of the
Congressionally-chartered Commission on Fair
Market Value Policy for Federal Coal Leasing,
and as senior research manager of the President’s
Commission on Privatization. He has been a
visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution,
visiting Senior Fellow at the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution, and visiting scholar
at the Political Economy Research Center. 
Leon F. Neuenschwander, Ph.D.: Professor of
Forest Resources at the University of Idaho and
nationally-recognized expert on fire and
restoration ecology, Dr. Neuenschwander is also
Associate Dean for Research and International
Programs at the University’s College of Natural
Resources. He teaches graduate courses in
wildland ecology, prescribed burning, and fire
management and ecology. His recent and cur-
rent research includes fire effects and processes
in forest ecosystems, restoration of fire de-
pendent ecosystems, regeneration of forest and
range important species. Dr. Neuenschwander
earned his B.S. and M.A. degrees at California
State University and his Ph.D. at Texas Tech
University. He has taught at the University of
Idaho since 1976. Author of more than 50
journals, a book, and many popular fire articles,
he frequently testifies before Congressional
committees, is often quoted in the media, and
works to help journalists prepare accurate
accounts regarding fire in natural resource
management. 
Jaime A. Pinkham: Member, Nez Perce Tribal
Executive Committee. Mr. Pinkham was elected
to the NPTEC in 1996 and currently chairs the
Budget and Finance Subcommittee and the
Enterprise Board. He has been president of the
Board of Directors of the Intertribal Timber
Council since 1994 and serves on the Governor’s
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Council of the Wilderness Society, the Columbia
River Intertribal Fish Commission, and the Trust
for Public Lands Indian Lands Initiative
Advisory Council. Past board service includes
the American Indian Science and Engineering
Society. He worked formerly for the Washington
State Department of Natural Resources and was
staff forester in fire management for Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, southeast Alaska, and
western Montana for the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. He holds a B.S. degree in forest
management from Oregon State University and
completed a two-year leadership program at the
Washington State Agriculture and Forestry
Education Foundation.
Stephen J. Pyne, Ph.D.: Professor of Biology
and Society Programs, Arizona State University
at Tempe. Dr. Pyne is also the author of a dozen
books, mostly on fire. His most widely known
are Fire in America:  A Cultural History of Wildland
and Rural Fire (1997) and World Fire: The Culture
of Fire on Earth (1995). Two more are scheduled
to appear next summer: Fire: An Introduction will
summarize his view of the principles that have
governed fire’s geography and dynamics since
its origins, and Year of the Fires, a narrative
history of the Great Fires of 1910 and how they
shaped America’s fire policies and programs. Dr.
Pyne was born in San Francisco but grew up in
Phoenix, which he considers his home town.
Shortly after high school, he began working on
a forest fire crew at the North Rim of the Grand
Canyon, to which he returned for a total of
fifteen summers and from which experience all
his writing stems. He received a B.A. from
Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. from
the University of Texas at Austin. He taught at
the University of Iowa before joining the faculty
at Arizona State University in1985. His awards
include the Robert Kirsch Award from the Los
Angeles Times for a living western author ”whose
career contributions merit body-of-work
recognition,” the ASU Alumni Award for
Research, a B. Benjamin Zucker Environmental
Fellowship at Yale, a MacArthur Fellowship, and
the Theodore Blegen Award from the Forest
History Society. In 1998, he was Distinguished
Visiting Professor at the University of Alberta
and was named a Fellow of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1995. He is a
prolific writer, and his published articles,
interviews, monographs, reports, and essays
number in the hundreds. At this moment,
fourteen articles and two books are in progress. 
James S. Riley: Chief Executive Officer,
Intermountain Forest Association (IFA),
headquartered in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. IFA’s
focus is on advancing scientifically-based
forestland policies that promote active
management compatible with environmental
stewardship. Among IFA’s accomplishments
under Mr. Riley’s leadership are: a voluntary
conservation planning program for small private
forest landowners in Montana with endangered
fish species concerns; a Citizens Management
Committee program to manage reintroduced
grizzly bear populations in the Selway-Bitterroot
Mountains of Idaho; land stewardship
contracting approaches to the management of
federal forest lands; and completion of the
community-based “Flathead Common Ground”
forest management plan for portions of the
Flathead National Forest in Montana. His
professional affiliations include the Forest
Industry Labor Management Committee, the
Idaho Forest Products Commission, the
University of Idaho Policy Analysis Group, the
American Forest and Paper Association, and the
Pend Orielle Lake Watershed Advisory Group.
He has also provided expert testimony and
analysis on forest resource policy issues to
numerous Congressional committees and
members of Congress. Mr. Riley completed his
graduate and undergraduate studies in forest
management and economics at Utah State
University. He currently resides in Hayden,
Idaho where he is active in community and
family activities. 
Mike Simpson: U.S. Representative from Idaho’s
Second District, Congressman Simpson has just
been re-elected to his second term in the House
of Representatives where he serves on the
Agriculture, Resources, Transportation, and
Veterans Affairs Committees and on six
subcommittees. Prior to his election to
Congress, he served fourteen years in the Idaho
Legislature and three terms as Speaker of the
Idaho House of Representatives. During that
time, he was appointed Vice Chair of the
Legislative Effectiveness Committee for the
National Conference of State Legislatures. He
also received the Boyd A. Martin Award from the
Association of Idaho Cities for exceptional con-
tributions benefiting Idaho city governments
because of his diligent work to pass legislation
stopping unfunded state mandates. Mike
Simpson attended Utah State University and
graduated from Washington University School
of Dental Medicine in St. Louis. He began prac-
ticing dentistry in Blackfoot in 1978 and has
recently received the Idaho State Dental Associ-
ation President’s Award in recognition of out-
standing service to ISDA and to the people 
of Idaho. 
James C. Smalley: Senior Fire Service Specialist,
National Fire Protection Association, located in
Quincy, Massachusetts. Mr. Smalley manages
the National Wildland/Urban Interface Fire
Program, an initiative that provides
information, research, training, and education
materials concerning the severity and impact of
wildfires that threaten homes and other
structures. From 1983 to 1992, he managed
several programs for the NFPA relating to
wildland and wildland/urban interface fires and
produced video programs on firefighter safety
and fire behavior in interface areas. He spent
weeks covering the 1987 fires in southern
Oregon, northern California, and Yellowstone.
While working for the U. S. Fire Administration
in Washington, D.C., he managed a national
technical assistance program in fire protection
and fire service planning. Previous to his work at
the national level, Mr. Smalley served as director
of the Arkansas State Fire Training Academy and
worked for fire departments in three Arkansas
cities. Mr. Smalley holds an A.S. degree in Fire
Protection and a B.S. degree in Education. He 
is a member of the American Planning Associ-
ation, the Society of American Foresters, the
Institute of Fire Engineers, and the Society of
Fire Protection Engineers.
Tom Udall: U.S. Representative from New
Mexico’s Third Congressional District, Congress-
man Udall serves as a Democratic Floor Whip.
Born in Tucson, he earned his B.A. degree at
Arizona’s Prescott College. He studied
international law at Cambridge University in
England, where he received a Bachelor of Law
degree in 1975. In 1977, he earned his J.D. from
the University of New Mexico Law School. Prior
to entering the political arena, he served as a law
clerk for Chief Justice Oliver Seth of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Assistant U.S. Attorney,
and Chief Counsel for the New Mexico Health
and Environment Department. Following a five-
year tenure as partner and shareholder with the
Albuquerque law firm of Miller, Stratvert,
Torgerson & Schlender, Congressman Udall
entered the race for New Mexico Attorney
General and was successful. He served in that
capacity for two four-year terms and was elected
president of the National Association of
Attorneys General. The congressman has served
on the boards of the Santa Fe Chamber Music
Festival and the Law Fund, a regional
environmental public interest law firm. He
comes from a family distinguished for its
devotion to public service. His father, Stewart
Udall, served in the U.S. House of Represent-
atives from 1954 to 1960 and subsequently as
Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior
during the Kennedy and Johnson Administra-
tions. His uncle, Morris Udall, represented
Arizona in Congress from 1961 to 1991, serving
as chairman of the U.S. House Interior
Committee for 14 years. Congressman Udall is
married to Jill Z. Cooper, a former New Mexico
Deputy Attorney General, and they have 
one daughter.
Gary J. Wolfe, Ph.D.: President and CEO of the
Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation. Dr. Wolfe was
born in central Texas and grew up in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. He attended the
University of New Mexico where he received a
B.A. degree in chemistry in 1971. He later
obtained an M.S and Ph.D. in wildlife biology
from Colorado State University. Before joining
RMEF in 1986, Dr. Wolfe spent 12 years at
Pennzoil Company’s 500,000-acre Vermejo Park
Ranch in various capacities, eventually serving
as vice president and general manager. While at
Vermejo, he was responsible for managing one
of the southwest’s largest elk herds and directed
North America’s largest private land elk-hunting
operation. Dr. Wolfe received the New Mexico
Wildlife Federation’s Conservationist of the 
Year Award in 1978, Ducks Unlimited’s
“Distinguished Service Award” in 1983, and the
Northwest Section of the Wildlife Society’s
“Wildlife Administrator of the Year Award” in
1991. He and his wife, Rita, enjoy hiking,
camping, hunting, and fishing as their primary
recreational activities.
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